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Some of America’s most important judges have emphasized or embodied 
the practice of judicial statesmanship.  Yet from the examples they set, it is not 
particularly clear what judicial statesmanship is or why it matters.  In this 
Article, I conceptualize the elusive phenomenon of judicial statesmanship, and I 
defend statesmanship as a core, if underappreciated, dimension of judicial role. 
I argue that judicial statesmanship defines a virtue in the role of a judge.  
Statesmanship charges judges with approaching cases so as to facilitate the ca-
pacity of the legal system to legitimate itself—over the long run and with respect 
to the nation as a whole—by accomplishing two paradoxically related precondi-
tions and purposes of law: expressing social values as social circumstances 
change and sustaining social solidarity amidst reasonable, irreconcilable 
disagreement.  I derive judicial statesmanship from an understanding of the 
preconditions of law’s public legitimation and from an understanding of the 
purposes of the institution of law.  I demonstrate that statesmanship is a 
necessary, although not sufficient, component of judicial role. 
I argue that judicial statesmanship is not sufficient to legitimate the legal 
system because there are other major purposes of law with which statesmanship 
can be in tension, especially those advanced by maintaining fidelity to such rule-
of-law values as consistency and transparency.  But I also argue that statesman-
ship is necessary if law is to fulfill all of its functions and to take account of the 
conditions of its own legitimation.  The rule of law depends for its practical re-
alization on political trust between the government and the governed.  In 
circumstances in which trust is strained, the virtue of statesmanship is especially 
valuable and produces leadership. 
I illustrate the present importance of judicial statesmanship by engaging 
some instances of its existence or absence during the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
October 2006 Term.  I argue that Justice Kennedy’s controlling opinion in 
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 seems 
in important ways to exhibit the practice of judicial statesmanship but that his 
majority opinion in Gonzales v. Carhart will in most respects likely prove a 
failure of statesmanship. 
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[B]ut this much I think I do know—that a society so riven that the spirit 
of moderation is gone, no court can save; that a society where that spirit 
flourishes, no court need save; that in a society which evades its responsibil-
ity by thrusting upon the courts the nurture of that spirit, that spirit in the end 
will perish.  What is the spirit of moderation?  It is the temper which does not 
press a partisan advantage to its bitter end, which can understand and will 
respect the other side, which feels a unity between all citizens—real and not 
the factitious product of propaganda—which recognizes their common fate 
and their common aspirations—in a word, which has faith in the sacredness 
of the individual. 
—Learned Hand1 
 
Judge Hand was right about many things.  He certainly was correct that 
no court can save an increasingly polarized political community that refuses 
to save itself.  He was also right that no court need try to save a community 
in which “the spirit of moderation” abounds.  But what about the vast middle 
between those extremes?  What about a culture in which citizens are divided 
over profound questions of individual and collective identity and the spirit of 
moderation appears at times to be imperiled, yet it would be unduly pessi-
mistic to conclude that the spirit of moderation is gone?  In such 
circumstances, is it sufficient for a judge to observe that “in a society which 
evades its responsibility by thrusting upon the courts the nurture of that spirit, 
that spirit in the end will perish”?  Or might such a judge be courting an eva-
sion of his or her own responsibility, the responsibility to adopt “the posture 
of statesmanship”?2 
Some of America’s most important judges have embraced the thing that 
Brandeis, Frankfurter, and others called judicial statesmanship.  It is not easy, 
however, to specify what they meant by the idea.  Justice Frankfurter, for 
example, was perhaps the foremost advocate of statesmanship on the 
Supreme Court, yet he tended to champion the practice in relatively vague 
terms.  He did not clearly identify what he conceived statesmanship to entail 
and how its various, potentially conflicting facets fit together.3  Among other 
things, he emphasized the open-endedness of constitutional language;4 the 
 
1. LEARNED HAND, The Contribution of an Independent Judiciary to Civilization, in THE 
SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 155, 164 (3d ed., enlarged 1960). 
2. PHILIP SELZNICK, LEADERSHIP IN ADMINISTRATION: A SOCIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION 
134 (1957). 
3. See, e.g., GARY J. JACOBSOHN, PRAGMATISM, STATESMANSHIP, AND THE SUPREME COURT 
119 (1977) (noting the “vague[ness]” of Frankfurter’s “general comments on the subject [of judicial 
statesmanship]”). 
4. See, e.g., Felix Frankfurter, Twenty Years of Mr. Justice Holmes’ Constitutional Opinions, 36 
HARV. L. REV. 909, 911 (1923) [hereinafter Frankfurter, Twenty Years] (arguing that the questions 
confronting the Court are “not to be answered by mechanical magic distilled from the four corners 
of the Constitution, nor self-revealed in the Constitution ‘by taking the words and a dictionary’”); 
see also, e.g., FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT: 
A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 310 (1928) (“[T]he words of the Constitution . . . are 
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enormous difficulty of the problems facing the Court and the limited experi-
ence of any individual judge;5 the need for law to keep up with the times;6 
the responsibility to imagine the needs of the future;7 the related necessity of 
possessing a vision of the future and of finding ways to achieve it;8 the perils 
of insisting upon absolutes;9 the obligation to view society as a whole;10 the 
importance of judicial deference to legislative judgments;11 and a number of 
other purportedly statesmanlike qualities that judges ought to possess.12  That 
 
so unrestrained by their intrinsic meaning, or by their history, or by tradition, or by prior decisions, 
that they leave the individual Justice free, if indeed they do not compel him, to gather meaning not 
from reading the Constitution but from reading life.”); FELIX FRANKFURTER, Mr. Justice Brandeis 
and the Constitution, in LAW AND POLITICS: OCCASIONAL PAPERS OF FELIX FRANKFURTER, 1913–
1938, at 113, 117 (E.F. Prichard, Jr. & Archibald MacLeish eds., 1939) [hereinafter FRANKFURTER, 
Mr. Justice Brandeis] (“In essence, the Constitution is not a literary composition but a way of 
ordering society, adequate for imaginative statesmanship, if judges have imagination for 
statesmanship.”). 
5. See, e.g., FELIX FRANKFURTER, Justice Holmes Defines the Constitution, in LAW AND 
POLITICS: OCCASIONAL PAPERS OF FELIX FRANKFURTER, 1913–1938, supra note 4, at 61, 72 (“In 
view of the complexities of modern society and the restricted scope of any man’s experience, 
tolerance and humility in passing judgment on the worth of the experience and beliefs of others 
become crucial faculties in the disposition of cases.”); see also FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra 
note 4, at 310, 308–10 (surveying some of the “tremendous and delicate problems” that Supreme 
Court Justices confront in a variety of areas). 
6. See, e.g., FELIX FRANKFURTER, The Judicial Process and the Supreme Court, in OF LAW 
AND MEN: PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FELIX FRANKFURTER, 1939–1956, at 31, 35 (Philip Elman 
ed., 1956) [hereinafter FRANKFURTER, The Judicial Process] (“Human society keeps changing.  
Needs emerge, first vaguely felt and unexpressed, imperceptibly gathering strength, steadily 
becoming more and more exigent . . . .  Law [i]s the response to these needs . . . .”). 
7. See, e.g., id. at 39 (“To pierce the curtain of the future, to give shape and visage to mysteries 
still in the womb of time, is the gift of imagination.  It requires poetic sensibilities with which 
judges are rarely endowed and which their education does not normally develop.”). 
8. See, e.g., FELIX FRANKFURTER, Israel’s Tenth Anniversary, in OF LAW AND LIFE & OTHER 
THINGS THAT MATTER: PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FELIX FRANKFURTER, 1956–1963, at 113, 118 
(Philip B. Kurland ed., 1965) [hereinafter FRANKFURTER, Tenth Anniversary] (“[T]wo 
indispensable qualifications for high statesmanship, for high achievement, for great civilization . . . 
[are being] a man of vision who harnesse[s] his science to the achievement of his vision.”). 
9. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 31 
(1970) (“[Frankfurter] inveighed against the postulation of absolutes by anyone, most of all by 
judges. . . .  [He believed in no] absolutes, therefore, . . . and prudence in the imposition of one’s 
principles on the society at large . . . .”). 
10. See, e.g., FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 4, at 317 (stressing the importance of “[t]he 
capacity to transcend one’s own limitations, the imagination to see society as a whole”). 
11. See, e.g., FELIX FRANKFURTER, The Supreme Court of the United States, in LAW AND 
POLITICS: OCCASIONAL PAPERS OF FELIX FRANKFURTER, 1913–1938, supra note 4, at 21, 26–27 
(“The Court will avoid if possible passing on constitutionality; but if the issues cannot be burked, if 
it must face its responsibility as the arbiter between contending political forces, it will indulge every 
presumption of validity on behalf of challenged powers.  This is not merely the wisdom of caution, 
but the insight of statesmanship.”); Felix Frankfurter & Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Business of the 
Supreme Court at October Term, 1932, 47 HARV. L. REV. 245, 296 (1933) (“[T]he requisite of a 
statesmanlike answer is . . . patient and searching examination of the circumstances which have 
seemed to legislators to call for the assertion of the power under review.  Upon the question of more 
or less . . . understanding and sympathy with legislative purposes are crucial.”). 
12. See, e.g., FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 4, at 318 (“The accents of statesmen are the 
recurring motif of Supreme Court opinions . . . .  To wisdom in political adjustment, talent for 
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descriptive litany is no doubt understandable, as it is difficult to make general 
statements about the subject of judicial statesmanship.  Sometimes one sim-
ply seems to know statesmanship when one sees it—or when one does not 
see it.  Yet if that is all that confidently can be said about the matter—if the 
very notion of judicial statesmanship eludes even rough conceptualization—
then it makes scant sense to describe a judicial opinion as statesmanlike or 
unstatesmanlike. 
In this Article, I argue that there is more that can be said about the 
matter.  I analyze the notoriously “elusive” phenomenon of judicial 
statesmanship,13 and I defend the practice of statesmanship as a core, if 
underappreciated, dimension of judicial role. 
Judicial statesmanship, I suggest, defines a virtue in the role of a judge.  
That virtue is best derived from a proper understanding of the preconditions 
of law’s public legitimation and the purposes of the institution of law.  
Statesmanship charges judges with approaching cases so as to facilitate the 
capacity of the legal system to legitimate itself by accomplishing two para-
doxically related preconditions and purposes of law: expressing social values 
as social circumstances change and sustaining social solidarity amidst 
reasonable, irreconcilable disagreement.  I argue that judicial statesmanship 
is a necessary, although not sufficient, component of judicial role in the 
American constitutional order.14  Statesmanship is not sufficient to legitimate 
the legal system because there are other important purposes of law with 
which statesmanship can be in tension, particularly those secured by main-
taining fidelity to such rule-of-law values as consistency and transparency.  
But statesmanship is necessary if law is to fulfill all of its functions and to 
sustain its legitimacy over the long run and with respect to the nation as a 
whole.  I conceive of law as an institution that must accomplish a diversity of 
purposes and that must account for the conditions of its own legitimation.  It 
 
industrial statesmanship must be joined.”); FELIX FRANKFURTER & WILBER G. KATZ, CASES AND 
OTHER AUTHORITIES ON FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE, at vi–vii (1931) (“That the 
interaction between the political power of states and central government is conveyed, as it often is, 
through nice questions of judicial competence and procedure only adds zest to the exploration of 
such issues, and for their solution demands the statesman’s gift of imagination as well as the 
disciplined training of the lawyer.”); FELIX FRANKFURTER, The Court and Statesmanship, in LAW 
AND POLITICS: OCCASIONAL PAPERS OF FELIX FRANKFURTER, 1913–1938, supra note 4, at 34, 34–
35 [hereinafter FRANKFURTER, The Court and Statesmanship] (“[T]he Court’s successful 
contribution to the statesmanship of the country . . . [rests] upon the self-denying ordinances of the 
Justices[,] . . . rigorous objectivity, . . . scrupulous alertness, . . . [avoidance of] confounding 
personal convictions upon ephemeral policies with enduring principles of right and wrong, . . . the 
utmost tolerance and detachment, . . . [and] uncommon gifts of intellectual objectivity.”). 
13. See SELZNICK, supra note 2, at 1 (“The nature and quality of leadership, in the sense of 
statesmanship, is an elusive but persistent theme in the history of ideas.”). 
14. I do not purport to offer a universal account of ideal judging grounded in a functional 
analysis of the role of courts in any political society.  On the contrary, much of my argument is 
contingent upon certain features of the American experience with constitutionalism—for example, a 
written constitution with open-ended language and the power of judges authoritatively to interpret 
that language amidst cultural heterogeneity. 
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follows that the practice of judicial statesmanship is always already inside the 
rule of law.  The judicial statesman understands legality in ways that mediate 
among the multiple, potentially conflicting preconditions and purposes of 
law.15 
In Part I, I explore the political foundations of the rule of law and the 
preconditions for the legitimation of law.  I proceed from the observation that 
the rule of law is “a crucial and historically rare”16 cultural achievement, one 
that is based upon political “trust”17 between the government and the 
governed.  An apprehension of the trust that sustains the rule of law underlies 
my subsequent suggestion that when trust is strained, the virtue of judicial 
statesmanship is particularly important and produces leadership. 
In Part II, I examine two purposes of law that help to sustain the 
political foundations of the rule of law.  I focus on the expression of social 
values and the maintenance of social solidarity.  I show that those purposes 
are potentially conflicting in particular cases yet mutually supporting along 
the broad range of cases.  Those purposes of law will prove central to my 
conceptualization of the practice of judicial statesmanship. 
In Part III, I analyze the phenomenon of judicial statesmanship, and I 
defend statesmanship as one important dimension of judicial role.  My ac-
count reveals why the idea of statesmanship is so hard to pin down: the 
preconditions and purposes of law that statesmanship seeks to accomplish are 
potentially conflicting and mutually dependent at the same time, and the 
bounds of reasonable disagreement within which statesmanship seeks to 
sustain social solidarity can be intensely controversial.  Regardless of the 
difficulties that accompany constitutive tensions and normative judgments of 
reasonableness, I present an account that renders the practice of judicial 
statesmanship a required part of the faithful discharge of a judge’s 
responsibilities.  In developing my account, I argue that there is no necessary 
relation between judicial statesmanship and judicial restraint, and I anticipate 
several objections to my treatment of the subject. 
 
15. In this inquiry, I focus on the relations between judges and the larger society, not on the 
relations among judges within a collegial court.  Nor do I explore the possible connections between 
external and internal forms of judicial statesmanship.  For a discussion, see ANTHONY T. 
KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 344–45 (1993) and 
Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term—Foreword: Traces of Self-government, 100 
HARV. L. REV. 4, 74–75 (1986).  Throughout this Article, I engage Kronman’s thinking on the 
subject of statesmanship. 
16. Martin Krygier, Marxism and the Rule of Law: Reflections After the Collapse of 
Communism, 15 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 633, 642 (1990) (describing the rule of law as “a crucial and 
historically rare mode of restraint on power by law”). 
17. See, e.g., TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC 
COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 204, 204–08 (2002) (underscoring the importance to 
effective legal regulation of “the public’s trust in the motives of legal authorities”); Carla Hesse & 
Robert Post, Introduction to HUMAN RIGHTS IN POLITICAL TRANSITIONS: GETTYSBURG TO BOSNIA 
13, 20 (Carla Hesse & Robert Post eds., 1999) (“[T]he relationship between the governed and the 
governors necessary to sustain the rule of law . . . consists of specific practices that reflect trust and 
tacit social understandings.”). 
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In Part IV, I illustrate the contemporary importance of judicial 
statesmanship by engaging some recent instances of its existence or absence.  
I focus on the Supreme Court’s momentous interventions in Parents Involved 
in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 118 and Gonzales v. 
Carhart.19  I choose those cases because the need for judicial statesmanship 
may be greatest in constitutional controversies implicating divisive questions 
of personal and collective identity, and questions of racial equality and abor-
tion rights in America fit that description.  I argue that Justice Kennedy’s 
controlling opinion in Parents Involved seems in important ways to exhibit 
the practice of judicial statesmanship but that his majority opinion in 
Gonzales v. Carhart will in most respects likely prove a failure of 
statesmanship. 
In the conclusion, I suggest that the potential perils of judicial 
statesmanship may counsel care and caution, but they do not advise 
abandonment of a practice that our country requires if it is to sustain the rule 
of law while remaining one country. 
I. The Political Foundations of the Rule of Law 
It has been said that the rule of law is “an ideal of governance” that 
embodies “implicit” and “nonlegal” rules of lawmaking,20 “rules internal to 
the very idea of governing by rules.”21  The ideal of the rule of law requires 
both the government and the governed to “be ruled by the law and obey it,”22 
and it thus requires that “the law . . . be capable of guiding the behaviour of 
its subjects.”23  A society can realize the purposes of a law only if the law is 
able to guide behavior, “and the more it conforms to the principles of the rule 
of law the better it can do so.”24  That is why fidelity to the rule of law is “an 
inherent value of laws,”25 the “virtue of law in itself, law as law regardless of 
the purposes it serves,”26 and why maintenance of the rule of law is appropri-
ately viewed “as among the few virtues of law which are the special 
responsibility of the courts and the legal profession.”27 
Establishing and preserving the rule of law is no simple task.  The rule 
of law constitutes a cultural achievement that is both “crucial and historically 
 
18. 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007). 
19. 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007). 
20. Martin P. Golding, Transitional Regimes and the Rule of Law, 9 RATIO JURIS 387, 389 
(1996). 
21. Id. at 390. 
22. JOSEPH RAZ, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 210, 213 (1979) 
(emphasis omitted). 
23. Id. at 214 (emphasis omitted). 
24. Id. at 225. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. at 225–26. 
27. Id. at 226. 
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rare.”28  Martin Krygier has powerfully captured the magnitude of the accom-
plishment by contrasting “societies where law can plausibly be said to count 
as a restraint on power and those where it cannot.”29  The political culture 
that sustains the idea that law matters is “extraordinary: it cannot be decreed, 
though it can be destroyed.”30 
If such a political culture is extraordinary, it also tends to be taken for 
granted: 
In societies where government is under law, this is commonly so 
deeply embedded an achievement that no one notices it as an 
achievement.  It simply is taken as the normal way to behave.31 
 . . . . 
 . . .  Living in a society where law counts, it is easy to imagine that 
that is a natural state of affairs.  In fact, it is not natural and it is rare.32 
The rule of law may be so thoroughly ingrained in a political community that 
neither the governors nor the governed recognize its cultural contingency. 
 The assertion that the rule of law is culturally contingent may seem 
obvious once we are advised not to forget it, but the theoretical implication 
of that claim may not be obvious.  Indeed, the implication is profound be-
cause it speaks to the ultimate question of what law is.  Because the rule of 
law is not self-sustaining, the institution of law must have built into it ways 
of accounting for the conditions of its own legitimation. 
Martin Golding has suggested that “[l]aw depends for its existence on a 
reciprocity of expectations between the governed and the governors, 
expectations that survive only when there is adherence to the rule of law.”33  
But just as compliance with the rule of law helps to sustain certain social 
expectations, so the rule of law itself is sustained by a particular relationship 
between those who make and apply the law and those whom the law purports 
to govern.  “That relationship ultimately consists of specific practices that 
reflect trust and tacit social understandings.”34  Maintaining the rule of law, 
therefore, requires all of the tools by which relationships of trust and mutual 
understanding are maintained. 
One critical facet of the relationship of trust that sustains the rule of law 
is the confidence of the governed that the fidelity of their governors to what I 
shall call rule-of-law values—that is, to the values of consistency, stability, 
predictability, and transparency that were celebrated by legal-process 
 
28. Krygier, supra note 16, at 642. 
29. Id. at 640. 
30. Id. at 646. 
31. Id. at 643. 
32. Id. at 644. 
33. Golding, supra note 20, at 390. 
34. Hesse & Post, supra note 17, at 20. 
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jurisprudence35 and that are essential to the rule of law36—does not result in 
law that the governed do not recognize as their own.  If members of a politi-
cal community experienced the law as deeply alienating over an extended 
period of time, they would inevitably feel a diminished sense of obligation to 
obey the law.  They might continue to obey out of fear of punishment if 
punishment were reasonably likely to follow noncompliance, but less and 
less would those citizens continue relating to the law from what H.L.A. Hart 
called “the internal point of view.”37  They would become less inclined to 
view the requirements of the law as a “reason” to behave in a certain way.38  
Alienation, in other words, undermines the “widespread assumption within 
[a] society that law matters and should matter.”39  Without that tacit 
understanding, the rule of law will die. 
Counterintuitively, therefore, while the rule of law is not primarily 
concerned with the content of legal rules,40 a society cannot sustain the rule 
of law by pursuing rule-of-law values single-mindedly at the expense of all 
other ideals.  Accordingly, and focusing now on the role of courts in sus-
taining the rule of law, one fails to apprehend the conditions for realizing the 
rule of law when one conceives of fidelity to rule-of-law values as exhaus-
tively defining judicial role.  One fails to register the magnitude of the 
cultural feat that the rule of law embodies. 
In a modern, heterogeneous community, a certain kind of democratic 
politics provides perhaps the best political support for the rule of law.  It is a 
politics of persuasion, coexistence, and imagination that allows citizens 
within it to negotiate potentially profound disagreements that may endure 
despite a profound sense of common identity—even though the most signifi-
cant disagreements may be about the meaning of that very identity.  It is a 
politics that pursues the normative ideal of democracy as collective self-
governance.  That conception of democracy engages the “question of how, in 
the face of manifest and indissoluble differences, we may be said to govern 
ourselves through collective self-determination.”41 
Dialogic theorists have argued that realizing democracy in the presence 
of diversity requires an analytical move from substance to process.42  That is, 
 
35. See infra notes 55–56 and accompanying text (discussing the work of several legal-process 
scholars). 
36. See, e.g., ROBERT C. POST, Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, in CONSTITUTIONAL 
DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT 23, 30–32 (1995) (discussing rule-of-law 
values); Neil S. Siegel, A Theory in Search of a Court, and Itself: Judicial Minimalism at the 
Supreme Court Bar, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1951, 2015–16 (2005) (same). 
37. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 90 (2d ed. 1994). 
38. Id. 
39. Krygier, supra note 16, at 646. 
40. Hesse & Post, supra note 17, at 20. 
41. Robert Post, Democracy, Popular Sovereignty, and Judicial Review, 86 CAL. L. REV. 429, 
433 (1998). 
42. See ROBERT C. POST, Between Democracy and Community: The Legal Constitution of 
Social Form, in CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT, supra 
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democratic legitimacy must be secured independently of particular outcomes.  
Such independence is said to inhere in a state where “citizens identify with a 
system of open participation in the formation of public opinion.”43  
Democratic legitimacy, however, cannot be achieved wholly independently 
of political outcomes.  When a subcommunity loses in the political process 
often enough on issues that matter enough, alienation eventually will set in 
even if there is ample opportunity to voice dissent.  Accordingly, a commu-
nity that means to manifest a significant measure of collective self-
governance under conditions of “irreparable reasonable disagreement”44 must 
supplement the communicative processes analyzed by dialogic theorists.  
Among other things, such a community requires an analytical move from 
process back to substance. 
Hannah Arendt described politics as the realm of “agreement, dispute, 
opinion, [and] consent.”45  She contrasted politics with all forms of truth 
because “[t]ruth carries within itself an element of coercion.”46  Regarding a 
statement of factual truth—for example, that “[i]n August 1914 Germany 
invaded Belgium”—“persuasion or dissuasion is useless, for the content of 
the statement is not of a persuasive nature but of a coercive one.”47  “Seen 
from the viewpoint of politics,” therefore, “truth has a despotic character”: 
 Facts are beyond agreement and consent, and all talk about them—
all exchanges of opinion based on correct information—will 
contribute nothing to their establishment.  Unwelcome opinion can be 
argued with, rejected, or compromised upon, but unwelcome facts 
possess an infuriating stubbornness that nothing can move except 
plain lies.  The trouble is that factual truth, like all other truth, 
peremptorily claims to be acknowledged and precludes debate, and 
debate constitutes the very essence of political life.  The modes of 
thought and communication that deal with truth, if seen from the 
political perspective, are necessarily domineering; they don’t take into 
account other people’s opinions, and taking these into account is the 
hallmark of all strictly political thinking.48 
 
note 36, at 179, 184–91 (discussing the accounts of several dialogic theorists, including Hans 
Kelsen, Benjamin Barber, Emile Durkheim, Claude Lefort, Jürgen Habermas, John Rawls, and 
Frank Michelman). 
43. Post, supra note 41, at 436. 
44. Frank I. Michelman, Brennan and Democracy, 86 CAL. L. REV. 399, 421 (1998) (citing 
JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 36 (1993)). 
45. HANNAH ARENDT, Truth and Politics, in BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE 227, 240 (enlarged 
ed. 1968). 
46. Id. at 239. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. at 241.  Daniel Patrick Moynihan put it well: “You’re entitled to your own opinions.  
You’re not entitled to your own facts.”  ELLEN HUME, ANNENBERG WASH. PROGRAM IN 
COMMC’NS POLICY STUDIES OF NW. UNIV., TABLOIDS, TALK RADIO, AND THE FUTURE OF NEWS: 
TECHNOLOGY’S IMPACT ON JOURNALISM (1995), http://www.ellenhume.com/articles/tabloids_print 
able.html. 
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A statement of factual truth has no tolerance for untruth. 
By contrast, the kind of democratic politics I describe is a realm of 
reasonable, potentially irreconcilable disagreement.  It is a realm in which 
citizens must tolerate those who disagree with their views and reject their 
values.  But citizens must do more.  They must also seek to persuade their 
fellow citizens, and they must accommodate opposing views and values, at 
least to some extent within a broad range of reasonableness.  They must 
register, acknowledge, and even at times validate the concerns of other 
citizens in seeking to craft resolutions that do not threaten to alienate fellow 
citizens from the political community.49  “The business of politics is not with 
theory and ideology but with accommodation.”50 
 The kind of democratic politics that I have sketched above helps to 
sustain the political foundations of the rule of law.  It helps to maintain the 
preconditions of law’s public legitimation by tempering normal and neces-
sary efforts to shape social values in particular ways with the inclusive 
expression of social values and attempts to maintain social solidarity. 
II. Some Purposes of Law 
Expressing social values and sustaining social solidarity are not only 
preconditions for successful law.  They are also fundamental purposes of the 
 
49. One positive premise of the conception of democratic politics discussed in the text is that it 
is not entirely unrealistic—that in at least some democratic societies, people do what I describe in 
living with and exercising power together.  I suggest, without purporting to demonstrate, that it 
captures much of the American experience with collective self-governance.  Other commentators 
have expressed similar normative conceptions of democratic politics.  See POST, supra note 36, at 
184–91; David Bromwich, Lincoln and Whitman as Representative Americans, in DEMOCRATIC 
VISTAS: REFLECTIONS ON THE LIFE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 36, 48, 36–52 (Jedediah Purdy ed., 
2004) (“When Lincoln [places himself in the position of the Southern people], he is engaged in a 
disagreeable and necessary act of sympathy.  He is seeking to conciliate, and he is also telling the 
truth as he sees it.”); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and 
Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 379–87 (2007); Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, 
Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CAL. L. 
REV. 1323, 1343 (2006) (“Because citizens must enlist the voice and accommodate the views of 
others if they are to persuade officials charged with enforcing the Constitution, the quest to secure 
constitutional recognition may promote forms of community identification, and not merely 
exacerbate group division.”). 
 Anthony Amsterdam and Jerome Bruner offer a nice account of one community’s success in 
maintaining the sort of democratic ethos that sustains community despite irreconcilable 
disagreements on first principles.  They describe the experience of Reggio Emilia, a city in northern 
Italy where devout Communists and devout Catholics have been living and governing together for 
more than a century.  See ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 242–
43 (2000) (“There is abundant dialogue.  The Left majority in Reggio is not the voice of an angry 
and dispossessed proletariat, nor is the Right an expression of single-minded Catholic militancy.  
Both sides are quite aware that they must occupy the same space, and have been long aware of it.”). 
50. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 19 (1975); see also id. (“‘All 
government, indeed every human benefit and enjoyment,’ Burke said in 1775 urging conciliation 
with America, ‘every virtue, and every prudent act, is founded on compromise and barter.  We 
balance inconveniences; we give and take; we remit some rights, that we may enjoy others; and we 
choose rather to be happy citizens, than subtle disputants.’”). 
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institution of law.51  The legal order exists to serve purposes for society at 
large, and those purposes are multiple.  The two upon which I focus relate to 
each another in a complex fashion.52 
A. Expressing Social Values 
A primary purpose of law, one associated with the professional norm of 
offering reasons in support of a judgment, is to provide “a justification in 
principle for official coercion.”53  Requiring judges to articulate reasons for 
their decisions disciplines them to the virtue of consistency—to deciding fu-
ture cases according to previously articulated reasons.  Judicial reason giving 
also serves an important settlement function54 and provides lower courts and 
the public with reliable guidance about the future path of the law: 
Only opinions which are grounded in reason and not on mere fiat or 
precedent can do the job which the Supreme Court of the United 
States has to do.  Only opinions of this kind can be worked with by 
other men who have to take a judgment rendered on one set of facts 
and decide how it should be applied to a cognate but still different set 
of facts.55 
The celebration of reason and principle in legal-process jurisprudence, 
nowhere developed more influentially than in the writings of Henry M. Hart, 
 
51. There is of course a distinction between the preconditions of something and the purposes of 
something.  In this inquiry, however, I argue that expressing social values and sustaining social 
solidarity are both preconditions for effective law and fundamental purposes of law.  On my 
account, courts are charged with expressing social values and sustaining social solidarity for two 
logically distinct reasons: (1) doing so is necessary in order to legitimate the legal system, thereby 
establishing a precondition for the capacity of law to achieve its various purposes; and (2) doing so 
is necessary if the legal system is to accomplish all of its purposes, thereby legitimating itself over 
the long run.  The first reason understands legitimacy as an independent value (so that, as I argue in 
Part III, an attribute of judicial statesmanship is to ensure legitimation).  The second reason 
conceives of legitimacy as parasitic on the realization of other values (so that an attribute of judicial 
statesmanship is the achievement of certain purposes of law).  The argument in this Part is 
important because, among other things, it reduces the likelihood that courts will confront acute 
trade-offs between securing their own legitimacy and accomplishing the purposes of the legal 
system.  See infra subpart III(D). 
52. I focus on those purposes of law that are essential to my conceptualization of the 
phenomenon of judicial statesmanship in Part III.  There are obviously several purposes of law that 
I do not discuss.  Nor do I distinguish the various functions of law qua law from the various goods 
that can be obtained through law. 
53. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 110 (1986); see also id. at 93 (“Law insists that force 
not be used or withheld, no matter how useful that would be to ends in view, no matter how 
beneficial or noble these ends, except as licensed or required by individual rights and 
responsibilities flowing from past political decisions about when collective force is justified.”). 
54. See Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 
110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1377 (1997) (“[A]n important—perhaps the important—function of law is 
its ability to settle authoritatively what is to be done.  That function is performed by all law; but 
because the Constitution governs all other law, it is especially important for the matters it covers to 
be settled.”). 
55. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1958 Term—Foreword: The Time Chart of the 
Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84, 99 (1959). 
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Herbert Wechsler, and Albert M. Sacks,56 is thus closely tied to achieving the 
values of consistency, stability, predictability, and transparency that, as noted 
in Part I, are essential to the rule of law. 
There are other weighty social values, however, and they may conflict 
at times with such rule-of-law values as consistency.57  In cases of value 
conflict, it may be misguided to assume that judicial decision making fulfills 
its functions merely by remaining faithful to rule-of-law values.  For 
example, the Supreme Court’s adherence to Lochner58 Era precedents of 
substantive due process may have been consistent with rule-of-law values, 
and in reaffirming Lochner-type norms of substantive due process, the Court 
maintained fidelity to various professional norms, including norms of reason 
giving.59  But such fidelity did not secure the legitimacy of the Court during 
the constitutional crisis of the New Deal.60  In fact, the Court’s fidelity to 
rule-of-law values likely undermined the Court’s legitimacy.61 
 
56. See, e.g., id. (“[T]he Court is predestined . . . to be a voice of reason, charged with the 
creative function of . . . developing impersonal and durable principles of law.”); Herbert Wechsler, 
Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 15 (1959) (“[T]he main 
constituent of the judicial process is precisely that it must be genuinely principled, resting with 
respect to every step that is involved in reaching judgment on analysis and reasons quite 
transcending the immediate result that is achieved.”); id. at 19 (“A principled decision . . . is one 
that rests on reasons with respect to all the issues in the case, reasons that in their generality and 
their neutrality transcend any immediate result that is involved.”).  See generally HENRY M. HART, 
JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND 
APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994). 
57. See, e.g., RAZ, supra note 22, at 228 (“Since the rule of law is just one of the virtues the law 
should possess, it is to be expected that it possesses no more than prima facie force.  It has always to 
be balanced against competing claims of other values.”); id. at 229 (noting that “the rule of law is 
meant to enable the law to promote social good” and cautioning that “[s]acrificing too many social 
goals on the altar of the rule of law may make the law barren and empty”); Krygier, supra note 16, 
at 645 (“There is also room for argument that the rule of law is not all we should want and for 
recognition that, in case of conflict of values, we need not assume that only maintenance of the rule 
of law matters, or that any chink in what are fancied to be its formalistic preconditions spells its 
doom.” (footnote omitted)). 
58. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
59. See, e.g., id. at 52–65 (providing an extensive explanation of the reasoning behind the 
majority’s decision). 
60. To be sure, the Lochner Court was criticized for arbitrariness and inconsistency, but those 
criticisms were not primarily responsible for the crisis of legitimacy that the Court eventually faced.  
See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT 
THE BAR OF POLITICS 45 (1962) (“Serving this value [of laissez faire] in the most uncompromising 
fashion, at a time when it was well past its heyday, five Justices, in a series of spectacular cases in 
the 1920’s and 1930’s, went to unprecedented lengths to thwart the majority will.  The consequence 
was very nearly the end of the story.”). 
61. Barry Friedman has put the point nicely: 
The proper lesson of Lochner instructs us that, even where it is possible to identify a 
jurisprudential basis for judicial decisions, if those familiar with the Court’s decisions 
do not believe those decisions to be socially correct, the work of judges will be seen as 
illegitimate.  There will be attacks on judges and, ultimately, on the institution of 
judicial review.  Even in the face of established precedent, law itself will come to be 
seen as nothing but politics. 
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There is, of course, nothing sui generis about the Lochner period.  For 
example, the claim to legitimacy of Brown v. Board of Education62 is today 
unimpeachable, and any legal arguments to the contrary seem tellingly beside 
the point.  The ultimate ground of Brown—whether it sounds primarily in 
antisubordination values or in anticlassification discourse63—remains hotly 
contested, but each side of the cultural divide on race and the Constitution 
lays claim to Brown’s repudiation of state-mandated racial segregation in 
public education.64  It appears of little or no consequence anymore whether 
the holding in Brown enjoys adequate legal support in the text of the Equal 
Protection Clause, the original meaning(s) of the text, the constitutional 
structure, or pre-Brown precedent.65  Any court that suggested a return to the 
regime of Plessy v. Ferguson66 would face an insurmountable crisis of 
legitimacy. 
Because the legitimation of a court, like the legitimation of any 
government institution, “is constituted by its collective acceptance,”67 and 
 
Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Three: The Lesson of 
Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1383, 1387 (2001). 
62. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
63. See generally, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: 
Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9 (2003) (challenging the common 
assumption that the anticlassification principle triumphed over the antisubordination principle 
during the Second Reconstruction); Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and 
Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470 (2004) 
(identifying the competing principles of antisubordination and anticlassification and analyzing their 
relations to each other and to Brown). 
64. Compare Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2767–
68 (2007) (plurality opinion) (reading Brown and its progeny as requiring vigorous judicial scrutiny 
of all racial classifications), and id. at 2782, 2782–88 (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasizing the 
“color-blind Constitution” in rejecting any consideration of race in allocating educational 
opportunities, absent de jure segregation), with id. at 2797, 2797–800 (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(noting a “cruel irony” in the way the plurality “re[wrote] the history” of Brown and rejecting the 
application of strict scrutiny to racial classifications that promote practices of inclusion), and id. at 
2800 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (reading Brown as promising racially integrated schools and viewing 
the plans at issue as important efforts to fulfill that promise). 
65. I am aware that some modern commentators have been concerned with establishing the 
legality of Brown from an originalist perspective.  See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Originalism 
and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947 (1995).  But such efforts may support the 
claims in the text.  The assumption animating much such work may be that there has to be a way to 
justify Brown even from an originalist point of view precisely because contemporary social values 
so strongly support the decision.  I imagine few commentators would suggest that Brown should be 
overruled if an adequate legal case for it cannot be made from their interpretive perspective.  On the 
contrary, in cases of conflict, it is the interpretive perspective—not Brown—that must bend, break, 
or fall temporarily silent.  See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE 
POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 77 (1990) (“Brown has become the high ground of 
constitutional theory.  Theorists of all persuasions seek to capture it, because any theory that seeks 
acceptance must, as a matter of psychological fact, if not of logical necessity, account for the result 
in Brown.”). 
66. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown, 347 U.S. 489. 
67. JOHN R. SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 117 (1995).  As Searle 
observes, “institutions survive on acceptance.”  Id. at 118; see also Oscar Schachter, Towards a 
Theory of International Obligation, 8 VA. J. INT’L L. 300, 309 (1968) (“[W]hether a designated 
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because collective acceptance turns in significant part on whether a govern-
ment institution is accomplishing its purposes, the Lochner and Brown 
experiences suggest that there are other purposes of law beside the justifica-
tion of official coercion and the provision of authoritative guidance.  Another 
principal function of law is to declare official government approval of “[t]he 
felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, 
intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious.”68  That purpose of law 
consists of the expression of fundamental social values.  Those who embrace 
that purpose apprehend, “as the great men of law have always insisted, that 
law must be sensitive to life.”69  The Lochner period culminated in what was 
widely perceived to be a crisis because the values that the Court insisted on 
continuing to express had come to sit in acute tension with the political con-
sensus in the nation, and the Court was refusing to get out of the way.70  The 
Brown Court, by contrast, ultimately won its bet with constitutional destiny 
by succeeding in shaping constitutional values as it expressed them.71 
 
requirement is to be regarded as obligatory will depend in part on whether those who have made 
that designation are regarded by those to whom the requirement is addressed (the target audience) as 
endowed with the requisite competence or authority for that role.”); Martin Shapiro, The Supreme 
Court and Constitutional Adjudication: Of Politics and Neutral Principles, 31 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
587, 604 (1963) (“Political institutions survive and prosper to the extent that they satisfy widely held 
expectations about them.”); Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of 
Law, 30 CRIME & JUST. 283, 307 (2003) (“Legitimacy is the property that a rule or an authority has 
when others feel obligated to defer voluntarily.”). 
68. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Harvard 
Univ. Press 1963) (1881).  Archibald MacLeish observed that “[t]o most great lawyers the law 
sooner or later becomes a substantive, a noun.  To Mr. Justice Holmes it was always a verb having a 
predicate to follow.”  Archibald MacLeish, Foreword to LAW AND POLITICS: OCCASIONAL PAPERS 
OF FELIX FRANKFURTER, 1913–1938, supra note 4, at xviii. 
69. FRANKFURTER, Mr. Justice Brandeis, supra note 4, at 116.  Frankfurter wrote that Brandeis 
so insisted “[a]t a time when our constitutional law was becoming dangerously unresponsive to 
drastic social changes, when sterile clichés instead of facts were deciding cases.”  Id. 
70. Theodore Roosevelt stressed the disconnect in the middle of the Lochner Era: 
[Courts] have thus strained to the utmost (and, indeed, in my judgment, violated) the 
Constitution in order to sustain a do-nothing philosophy which has everywhere 
completely broken down when applied to the actual conditions of modern life.  These 
good judges, these upright and well-meaning men, who champion an outworn 
philosophy, do not realize that the changed conditions mean changed needs, and that 
the tremendous social problem of to-day cannot be solved by methods adequate to 
meet the infinitely simpler problems offered by industrial and social life a century ago. 
Theodore Roosevelt, Judges and Progress, 100 OUTLOOK 40, 44 (1912); see also Editorial, The 
Red Terror of Judicial Reform, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 1, 1924, at 110, 113 (“No student of American 
constitutional law can have the slightest doubt that Mr. Roosevelt’s vigorous challenge of judicial 
abuses was mainly responsible for a temporary period of liberalism which followed in the 
interpretation of the due process clauses, however much abhorrent the remedy of judicial recall 
appeared to both bar and bench.”). 
71. It is worth remembering that the Court could have lost that bet because the culture was 
deeply divided.  See, e.g., POST, supra note 36, at 43 (“Brown represented a courageous gamble.  
The Court’s embrace of the value of racial equality could have been a misreading of the national 
ethos; indeed the Court’s gamble was intensely controversial and came close to failing precisely 
because that ethos was in fact so divided.”).  It is also worth noting that the reasons for the country’s 
ultimate acceptance of Brown are controversial.  See generally Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial 
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The function of law that concerns itself with the expression of social 
values, therefore, actually encompasses two functions that relate 
paradoxically.  Law is shaped by social values at the same time that law itself 
shapes social values.72  “In this respect law must resemble literature a little.  
It will imitate life—or life will imitate it.”73  That relationship between law 
and social values can exist both at a given point in time and over time.74 
B. Sustaining Social Solidarity 
Another basic purpose of law, particularly in a culturally heterogeneous 
society such as our own,75 is “to maintain social cohesion as circumstances 
change.”76  That purpose of law has been characterized as reflecting concern 
with “the fate of ‘a common fate’, that is, in the durability of social relation-
ships across time.”77  That purpose has also been described as “promoting 
social stability and . . . achieving a form of mutual respect.”78  Some measure 
of social solidarity—of “political fraternity”—in the face of intense norma-
tive disagreement seems constitutive of the very existence of the community 
for whose benefit the legal order exists.79  Regarding the role of the Supreme 
 
Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7 (1994) (arguing that the chain of 
causation tying Brown to transformative racial change is very different from what has commonly 
been supposed); Michael J. Klarman, How Brown Changed Race Relations: The Backlash Thesis, 
81 J. AM. HIST. 81 (1994) (questioning conventional accounts of Brown’s importance and providing 
an alternative thesis stressing Brown’s indirect contribution to racial change). 
72. Indeed, in circumstances of cultural conflict, the act of expressing social values necessarily 
entails an effort to shape social values because the authoritative expresser of values must elect to 
enforce one set of values to a greater extent than another.  See, e.g., Robert Post, Law and Cultural 
Conflict, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 485, 492 (2003) (“When law is invoked to enforce ‘cultural values,’ 
therefore, it is often being used to advance one or another side of an ongoing cultural 
disagreement.”). 
73. AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 49, at 3. 
74. The term “paradoxical” denotes a synchronic relation.  It describes the structural 
relationship between timeless ideas.  “Dialectical,” by contrast, is a term of temporal extension.  It 
describes a relationship that moves in time.  It is a dynamic, diachronic notion.  A given relation can 
be both paradoxical and dialectical at the same time.  Examples include the structural relations 
identified in this inquiry: the relation between law and social values, and the relation between 
expressing social values and maintaining social cohesion.  For an exploration of the paradoxical and 
dialectical relation between law and culture, see generally Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 
Term—Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 4 (2003). 
75. Cf. generally RAWLS, supra note 44 (emphasizing the reasonable yet irreconcilable 
disagreements about basic questions of religion, morality, and philosophy that characterize modern, 
heterogeneous democracies). 
76. Alec Stone Sweet, Judicialization and the Construction of Governance, in ON LAW, 
POLITICS, & JUDICIALIZATION 55, 57 (Martin Shapiro & Alec Stone Sweet eds., 2002). 
77. Id. 
78. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 
50 (1999). 
79. See KRONMAN, supra note 15, at 93 (“The condition of political fraternity is one in which 
the members of a community are joined by bonds of sympathy despite the differences of opinion 
that set them apart on questions concerning the ends, and hence the identity, of their community.”).  
According to Kronman, “political fraternity” is what gives communities “their unity and preserves 
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Court in particular, “it is a function of the Court—in the sphere of its 
competence—to maintain continuity in the midst of change.”80 
Of course, near-collective assent to significant legal interpretations is 
often lacking at a particular time.  But if courts are to “organiz[e] political 
change so as to facilitate the survival of societies,”81 then they must attend to 
“the problem of stability.”82  This means, among other things, that courts 
must “anticipate[] the disputants’—or a community’s—reactions to [their] 
behaviour.”83  This further means that the values authoritatively expressed by 
governmental actors, including courts, must (over the long haul and to some 
extent) be those that different segments of a normatively heterogeneous na-
tion can recognize as their own.84  In certain deeply divisive cases—certain 
cases that Anthony Kronman has called “identity-defining” conflicts85—it 
may be appropriate for courts to “fashion settlements that avoid the declara-
tion of a clear winner or loser,” settlements that allow “each disputant [to] 
achiev[e] a partial victory.”86  In other identity-defining controversies, as 
when a government seeks to dismantle an apartheid social order, it may be 
appropriate for courts to take decisive action, sacrificing social stability over 
the short run in order to advance social solidarity and other important values 
over the long run.  How courts ought to respond to situations so as to sustain 
social solidarity is not a theoretical question; the answer in a given case nec-
essarily turns on the specific values at stake, the context, and the exercise of 
the faculty of judgment. 
Maintaining a significant measure of social solidarity over the long term 
does not require courts to credit all values regardless of their content.  The 
task of maintaining solidarity amidst heterogeneity is properly performed 
within the universe of reasonable, even if irreconcilable, disagreements that 
 
them from disintegration.  A community without political fraternity is no longer a community at 
all.”  Id. at 92. 
80. BICKEL, supra note 60, at 108–09. 
81. Sweet, supra note 76, at 72. 
82. RAWLS, supra note 44, at vi. 
83. Sweet, supra note 76, at 63. 
84. Of course, much more than well-functioning courts are needed to sustain social solidarity 
amidst normative dissensus.  For example, the people themselves have a vital role to play.  See 
Siegel, supra note 49, at 1343 (“[P]opular participation in constitutional deliberation, and the role 
expectations that sustain it, underwrite the legitimacy of government and the solidarity of a 
normatively heterogeneous community.”). 
85. See KRONMAN, supra note 15, at 88–89 (“In the political sphere, as in the personal, there 
are some choices that have what I call identity-defining consequences.  To varying degrees, such 
choices define the community that makes them in the same way that some personal choices define 
the individual who does.”); see id. at 90 (“[T]hose controversies that happen at any moment to be 
the most lively and important ones in a community—those with the largest implications for its 
direction and destiny—often present conflicts among values that reflect incomparable visions of 
what is most worthy in the community’s current practices or future possibilities . . . .”). 
86. Sweet, supra note 76, at 63.  To be clear, Sweet himself did not limit his focus to the most 
divisive cases. 
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may exist in a community.87  For example, the values that long supported 
social subordination based on race or gender in this country are properly re-
garded by courts as unreasonable and inadmissible.  Moreover, validating 
extreme views, even to only a modest extent, might undermine social soli-
darity rather than sustain it and would in any event prove impossible to 
reconcile with the function of law faithfully to express prevailing social 
values.  Of course, what qualifies as “reasonable” disagreement, as opposed 
to “unreasonable” or “the most extreme,” can be controversial when one 
moves from, say, apartheid to affirmative action.  Drawing the necessary 
lines, particularly when the values in question are determined to be unrea-
sonable but not extreme as measured by the number of present adherents, 
requires normative judgments that may themselves be based in contestable 
social values. 
C. Social Values, Social Solidarity, and the Constitution 
The Constitution functions in part to realize the twin purposes of law 
discussed above: expressing social values as social circumstances change and 
sustaining social solidarity amidst reasonable, irreconcilable disagreement.88  
The authority of the Constitution flows not only from its status as law but 
also from its status as the embodiment of our “fundamental nature as a 
people,” our national “ethos.”89  The Constitution has always swung 
pendulum-like between a document dominated by legal professionals90 and a 
popular text that enacts and embodies the American identity. 
Constitutional law inherits that instability.  Examples include whether 
race-conscious assignments of students to public schools are narrowly tai-
lored to advance a compelling state interest91 and whether a government 
regulation imposes an “undue burden” on a woman’s constitutional right to 
abortion.92  Justice Kennedy recently observed in Gonzales v. Carhart that 
 
87. See generally RAWLS, supra note 44, at 235–40 (imposing a similar reasonableness 
constraint). 
88. One might suggest that the two purposes of law upon which I focus also constitute purposes 
of politics.  That is no doubt true, which helps to explain why the boundary partially separating law 
from politics can be deeply ambiguous.  See generally, e.g., Robert C. Post & Neil S. Siegel, 
Theorizing the Law/Politics Distinction: Neutral Principles, Affirmative Action, and the Enduring 
Legacy of Paul Mishkin, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1473 (2007). 
89. Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Idea of a Constitution, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 167, 167 (1987). 
90. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 
46 (1997) (“[The] interpretation of the Constitution . . . is . . . essentially lawyers’ work—requiring 
a close examination of text, history of the text, traditional understanding of the text, judicial 
precedent, and so forth.”). 
91. See, for example, infra subpart IV(A) for a discussion of Parents Involved in Community 
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1. 
92. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992) (joint plurality 
opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.) (“In our view, the undue burden standard is the 
appropriate means of reconciling the State’s interest with the woman’s constitutionally protected 
liberty.”). 
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Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey93 “struck a 
balance.”94  That balance was fashioned out of respect for the conflicting 
normative commitments of each side of the abortion controversy.95  When-
ever a court “‘balances’ or ‘weighs’ incommensurate and potentially 
incompatible values,” it relies “upon contextual interpretations that are 
deeply influenced by implicit and inarticulate considerations characteristic of 
social values.”96 
Judicial opinions that invoke the authority of the Constitution as ethos 
are pervasive.  Justice Holmes, for example, sought to understand “our whole 
experience” as a nation in construing the Constitution on behalf of the Court: 
[W]hen we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act, like 
the Constitution of the United States, we must realize that they have 
called into life a being the development of which could not have been 
foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters.  It was enough 
for them to realize or to hope that they had created an organism; it has 
taken a century and has cost their successors much sweat and blood to 
prove that they created a nation.  The case before us must be 
considered in the light of our whole experience and not merely in that 
of what was said a hundred years ago.97 
Holmes insisted that “the provisions of the Constitution are not mathematical 
formulas having their essence in their form.”98  Rather, “they are organic liv-
ing institutions transplanted from English soil.  Their significance is vital not 
formal; it is to be gathered not simply by taking the words and a dictionary, 
but by considering their origin and the line of their growth.”99  In those 
statements, the Supreme Court endorsed the constitutional authority of 
American collective identity.  So did Chief Justice Marshall when he relied 
upon “the whole American fabric”100 and when he asserted that “[t]his provi-
sion is made in a constitution, intended to endure for ages to come, and 
consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs.”101 
Those examples, as well as many others,102 suggest that constitutional 
law has been legitimated throughout history in significant part by the Court’s 
 
93. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
94. Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1627 (2007). 
95. I argue in subpart IV(B) that Gonzales v. Carhart was a very different decision in that 
regard. 
96. Post & Siegel, supra note 88, at 1502 (citing T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law 
in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987)). 
97. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920). 
98. Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610 (1914). 
99. Id. 
100. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803). 
101. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819). 
102. For additional examples, see Neil S. Siegel, Umpires at Bat: On Integration and 
Legitimation, 24 CONST. COMMENT. (forthcoming 2008). 
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continual renegotiation and ultimate expression of popular commitments.103  
There remains much insight in Karl Llewellyn’s assertion that “[w]hatever 
the Court has said, it has shaped the living Constitution to the needs of the 
day as it felt them.”104  Our constitutional law has always been “historically 
conditioned and politically shaped.”105 
D. The Relation Between Social Values and Social Solidarity 
Those twin purposes of law—expressing social values on the one hand 
and maintaining social solidarity on the other—relate paradoxically.  In a 
particular case, the purpose of expressing values can sit in acute tension with 
the purpose of sustaining community.  Most values are not held by an entire 
community, so the more a court expresses certain values and attempts to 
move a society in the direction of their further realization, the more alienat-
ing the law can become to members of the subcommunity who do not share 
those values.  At the same time, Alexander Bickel seems correct in saying 
that “unless [government] is responsible it cannot in fact be stable.”106  Social 
solidarity will prove difficult to sustain over the long run when the law does 
not perform any expressing function, for then the values authoritatively ex-
pressed by government officials will not be ones to which the members of a 
society can collectively attach.  Accordingly, law’s expression of social val-
ues can conflict with law’s efforts to maintain community, even as the latter 
function relies upon the former function for its realization. 
One can investigate the relation between those purposes of law from the 
opposite direction and discover the same sort of relationship.  Efforts to 
maintain social cohesion can undermine efforts to express certain social val-
ues authoritatively, for attention to the former purpose may limit the universe 
of options within which the latter purpose may be pursued.  Yet it would be 
 
103. See, e.g., H. JEFFERSON POWELL, A COMMUNITY BUILT ON WORDS: THE CONSTITUTION 
IN HISTORY AND POLITICS 6 (2002) (“However counterintuitive it may seem, the integrity and 
coherence of constitutional law are to be found in, not apart from, controversy.”); Siegel, supra note 
63, at 1547 (“[A] history of debates over Brown . . . suggests how the contours of constitutional 
principle emerge from the crucible of constitutional politics.”). 
104. K.N. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 40 (1934); see 
also id. (“Theory that can face fact . . . is what we need.”). 
105. POWELL, supra note 103, at 6. 
106. BICKEL, supra note 60, at 29.  In The Morality of Consent, Bickel added the following, 
relying on Burke: 
And power should seek to rest on consent so that its distribution and its exercise may 
be stable—stability being a prime value, both as an end and as a means[]; as an end, 
because though truth may be preferable to peace, “as we have scarcely ever the same 
certainty in the one that we have in the other, I would, unless the truth were evident 
indeed, hold fast to peace”; and as a means, because stability is a source as well as a 
fruit of consent, making the beneficent exercise of power possible though by no means 
certain. 
BICKEL, supra note 50, at 15 (quoting Edmund Burke, Speech on the Acts of Uniformity (1772), 
reprinted in EDMUND BURKE: SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES 365, 368 (Peter J. Stanlis ed., 
2006)). 
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difficult for a court to express social values effectively over the long run in 
the absence of a significant measure of social cohesion.  The very idea of 
expressing fundamental social values presupposes the existence of a commu-
nity whose values may be expressed.  Moreover, a court likely cannot 
succeed in shaping social values without some basis in shared commitments 
from which to proceed and persuade.  Viewed from the vantage point of ei-
ther purpose of law, therefore, the relation between them is paradoxical, so 
that success in realizing one requires close attention to the status of the 
other.107 
III. Conceptualizing Judicial Statesmanship 
Judicial statesmanship means that judges must seek not only the “right 
answer” to legal questions as a matter of professional reason but also an an-
swer that sustains the social legitimacy of law.  Specifically, I suggest that 
judicial statesmanship charges judges with approaching cases so as to facili-
tate the ability of the legal order to legitimate itself over the long term by 
accomplishing the two preconditions and purposes of law discussed above: 
expressing social values as social circumstances change and sustaining social 
solidarity amidst reasonable, irreconcilable disagreement.108  In pursuing 
them, judicial statesmanship helps to ensure the practical realization of the 
rule of law.109 
 
107. Cf. Ben W. Heineman, Jr., Law and Leadership, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 596, 599–600 (2006) 
(“We are seeking lawyers who, in addition to exposing value tensions, can find a fair balance, in 
the ultimate course taken, between legitimate competing values. . . .  [D]ecisions are better informed 
with a sure grasp of legitimate values in tension and more durable with a fair balance of those 
values.”). 
108. Statesmanship is concerned primarily with the long view—that is, with succeeding over 
the long run rather than achieving a quick but pyrrhic victory: 
The perennial existence of bodies corporate and their fortunes, are things particularly 
suited to a man who has long views; who meditates designs that require time in 
fashioning; and which propose duration when they are accomplished.  He is not 
deserving of high rank, or even to be mentioned in the order of great statesmen, who, 
having obtained the command and direction of such a power as existed in the wealth, 
the discipline, and the habits of such corporations, . . . cannot find any way of 
converting it to the great and lasting benefit of his country. 
EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 329 (J.C.D. Clark ed., Stanford 
Univ. Press 2001) (1792); cf. Pitkin, supra note 89, at 168–69 (“To constitute, one must not merely 
become active at some moment but must establish something that lasts, which, in human affairs, 
inevitably means something that will enlist and be carried forward by others.  Unless we succeed in 
creating—together with others—something lasting, inclusive, principled, and fundamental, we have 
not succeeded in constituting anything.”). 
109. Kronman distinguishes “the concern for doctrinal coherence” and the concern “for the 
responsiveness of doctrine to social and economic circumstances” from the practice of judicial 
statesmanship, which entails “a concern for the bonds of fellowship that legal conflict strains but 
that must be preserved to avoid other, more destructive conflicts.”  KRONMAN, supra note 15, at 
118; see also id. at 343 (“One of the responsibilities of courts is to preserve the political order when 
it is threatened by conflicts between passionately held and profoundly divergent points of view.”).  
By contrast, I conceive of judicial statesmanship as attending to all three concerns—specifically, by 
tempering the judicial focus on the first with sensitivity to the second and third. 
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In this Part, I defend my account of judicial statesmanship by showing 
that it conceptually clarifies, integrates, and refines many of the reflections 
on the nature and importance of judicial statesmanship offered by the likes of 
de Tocqueville, Holmes, Brandeis, Frankfurter, and others.110  At the same 
time, my account cautions against embracing the suggestion that judicial 
statesmanship presumptively demands judicial restraint or strategies of con-
flict avoidance. 
A.  Judicial Statesmanship and Social Values 
Judicial statesmanship advises judges to recognize that a major purpose 
of law—and thus a ground of judicial legitimacy111—is the expression of 
public ideals.  Alexis de Tocqueville, for example, wrote that the “power” of 
Justices of the Supreme Court: 
is immense, but it is power springing from opinion.  [Justices] are all-
powerful so long as the people consent to obey the law; they can do 
nothing when they scorn it.  Now, of all powers, that of opinion is the 
hardest to use, for it is impossible to say exactly where its limits come.  
Often it is as dangerous to lag behind as to outstrip it. 
The federal judges therefore must not only be good citizens and 
men of education and integrity, qualities necessary for all magistrates, 
but must also be statesmen; they must know how to understand the spirit 
of the age, to confront those obstacles that can be overcome, and to steer 
out of the current when the tide threatens to carry them away, and with 
them the sovereignty of the Union and obedience to its laws.112 
 
110. The work of several prominent commentators suggests that statesmanship has a rich 
history in the law and politics of our nation.  See, e.g., KRONMAN, supra note 15, at 11–17 
(describing the American ideal of the lawyer–statesman in the nineteenth century and beyond); 
Bromwich, supra note 49, at 46–52 (describing Abraham Lincoln as a statesman of great character 
who used political persuasion to advance his understanding of American ideals); cf. Heineman, 
supra note 107, at 601–02 (offering examples of American statesmen, including judges).  For 
historical background on the ideal of statesmanship in American law and life, see generally PAUL D. 
CARRINGTON, STEWARDS OF DEMOCRACY: LAW AS A PUBLIC PROFESSION (1999); ROBERT A. 
FERGUSON, LAW AND LETTERS IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1984); ROBERT A. FERGUSON, READING 
THE EARLY REPUBLIC 163–66 (2004); Paul D. Carrington, The Theme of Early American Law 
Teaching: The Political Ethics of Francis Lieber, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 339 (1992); and Robert W. 
Gordon, Lawyers as the “American Aristocracy”: A Nineteenth-Century Ideal that May Still Be 
Relevant, 20 STAN. LAW. 2 (1985).  Accordingly, our country is not in the same position regarding 
statesmanship as Alisdair MacIntyre has argued we are in regarding morality or virtue—namely, 
repeating nostrums torn from the contexts that would have been needed to make those nostrums live 
and vibrant.  See ALISDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 1–2 (1981).  
Statesmanship remains a living (if controversial) tradition, not a set of disconnected nostrums that 
are properly viewed with cynicism. 
111. See supra notes 51, 67 and accompanying text (discussing grounds of judicial legitimation 
and the relation of legitimation to accomplishing the purposes of the institution of law). 
112. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 150–51 (J.P. Mayer ed., George 
Lawrence trans., Doubleday & Co. Anchor Books ed. 1969) (1835); see also Editorial, Can the 
Supreme Court Guarantee Toleration?, NEW REPUBLIC, June 17, 1925, at 85, 87 (“To a large extent 
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In that stunning passage, de Tocqueville instructed that judges who 
understand “the spirit of the age” are better able to craft constitutional law 
that legitimates itself through skillful expression of the social values of the 
time.  They are in a better position to register and express those values.  
Woodrow Wilson agreed that “the Constitution of the United States is not a 
mere lawyers’ document: it is a vehicle of life, and its spirit is always the 
spirit of the age.”113 
Judicial statesmanship, however, requires more of judges than 
apprehension of “the spirit of the age” at a given moment in time.  Because 
social values are continuously evolving and social conditions are always 
changing—“repose,” after all, “is not the destiny of man”114—statesmanship 
encourages judges to approach cases so as to enable the legal system to 
maintain pace with those changes, to “bring the public administration of jus-
tice into touch with changed moral, social or political conditions.”115  
Statesmanship, in other words, would have judges exercise the power of ju-
dicial review not only “with insight into social values” but also “with 
suppleness of adaptation to changing social needs.”116  Frankfurter thus 
endorsed “Lord Haldane’s comments on the personnel of the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council,” which “reflect the same considerations 
which have largely determined selection for the Supreme Court.”117  Haldane 
counseled: 
training calculated to give what is called the statesmanlike outlook to 
the judge—that is to say, the outlook which makes him remember that 
with a growing Constitution things are always changing and 
developing, and that you cannot be sure that what was right ten years 
ago will be right to-day.118 
 
the Supreme Court, under the guise of constitutional interpretation of words whose contents are 
derived from the disposition of the Justices, is the reflector of that impalpable but controlling thing, 
the general drift of public opinion.”). 
113. WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 69 (1908). 
114. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167, 181 
(1920). 
115. Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 
14 AM. LAW. 445, 445 (1906). 
116. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 94 (1921). 
117. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 4, at 317. 
118. Viscount Haldane, The Work for the Empire of the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council, 1 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 143, 148 (1922).  In a letter congratulating George Sutherland on his 
appointment to the Court, Chief Justice Taft stressed the role of judicial statesmanship in adapting 
the Constitution to changing circumstances: 
I do not minimize at all the importance of having Judges of learning in the law on the 
Supreme Bench, but the functions performed by us are of such a peculiar character that 
something in addition is much needed to round out a man for service upon that Bench, 
and that is a sense of proportion derived from a knowledge of how Government is 
carried on, and how higher politics are conducted in the State.  A Supreme Judge must 
needs keep abreast of the actual situation in the country so as to understand all the 
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Holmes, in an oft-quoted passage, captured the reality of ceaseless 
social change to which the law must be responsive: 
 The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.  The 
seed of every new growth within its sphere has been a felt necessity.  
The form of continuity has been kept up by reasonings purporting to 
reduce every thing to a logical sequence; but that form is nothing but 
the evening dress which the new-comer puts on to make itself 
presentable according to conventional requirements.  The important 
phenomenon is the man underneath it, not the coat; the justice and 
reasonableness of a decision, not its consistency with previously held 
views.  No one will ever have a truly philosophic mastery over the law 
who does not habitually consider the forces outside of it which have 
made it what it is.  More than that, he must remember that as it 
embodies the story of a nation’s development through many centuries, 
the law finds its philosophy not in self-consistency, which it must 
always fail in so long as it continues to grow, but in history and the 
nature of human needs.119 
Justice Scalia’s recent counter that “the soul of the law . . . is logic and 
reason”120 seems calculated to war with Holmes’s implicit defense of part of 
the practice of judicial statesmanship.  To turn Scalia’s language against his 
cause, statesmanship insists that “the soul of the law” not be deployed to 
snuff out its life. 
Maintaining proper pace with changes in society requires judges to 
balance fidelity to rule-of-law values, which confers legal legitimacy on 
courts, with fidelity to social values, which confers social legitimacy.121  
 
phases of important issues which arise, with a view to the proper application of the 
Constitution, which is a political instrument in a way, to new conditions. 
Letter from William Howard Taft to George Sutherland (Sept. 10, 1922), microformed on William 
H. Taft Papers, Reel 245 (Library of Cong., 1969). 
119. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Book Notices, 14 AM. L. REV. 233, 234 (1880).  For a cogent 
history of the rise of legal realism and its repudiation of the idea of an unchanging law discernible 
through abstract logic and reason, see EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC 
THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM & THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 74–94 (1973). 
120. Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553, 2582 (2007) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in the judgment). 
121. Professor Fallon distinguishes between “legal” and “sociological” legitimacy.  See Richard 
H. Fallon, Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1790–91 (2005) (“When 
legitimacy functions as a legal concept, legitimacy and illegitimacy are gauged by legal norms.  As 
measured by sociological criteria, the Constitution or a claim of legal authority is legitimate insofar 
as it is accepted (as a matter of fact) as deserving of respect or obedience—or, in a weaker usage . . . 
insofar as it is otherwise acquiesced in.”); see also Friedman, supra note 61, at 1387 (“[T]he work 
of constitutional judges must have both ‘legal’ and ‘social’ legitimacy.  Social legitimacy, as 
distinguished from legal legitimacy, looks beyond jurisprudential antecedents of constitutional 
decisions and asks whether those decisions are widely understood to be the correct ones given the 
social and economic milieu in which they are rendered.” (footnote omitted)); cf. Harry M. Clor, 
Judicial Statesmanship and Constitutional Interpretation, 26 S. TEX. L.J. 397, 398 (1985) 
(“American thinking about the nature and function of courts of law has always been characterized 
by a kind of duality.”). 
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Elsewhere Robert Post and I have attempted to theorize that dialectical 
tension.122  For present purposes, it suffices to note that an evolving society 
must look forward in addition to looking back, and courts that continuously 
prevent the society from doing so eventually will lose their legitimacy.123  
Accordingly, judicial statesmanship recognizes that judges must do more 
than maintain fidelity to the value of logical consistency.  They also owe fi-
delity to the evolving ideals of the society they serve.124  As Frankfurter put 
it, “Law presupposes sociological wisdom as well as logical unfolding.”125 
Judicial statesmanship, however, demands more than the processing and 
expression of extant social values.  The judge must shape and refine as he 
expresses; he must be “a man of vision who harnesse[s] his science to the 
achievement of his vision.”126  Judges, in short, are charged with authorita-
tively expressing certain values and not others, with putting the power and 
prestige of the law behind the ones they embrace in an effort to “sort[] out 
the enduring values of a society.”127  That is plainly what the Brown Court 
did128 and what courts have done time and again in many areas of constitu-
tional law. 
But this is hardly to suggest that “anything goes” in the realm of judicial 
statesmanship.  Judges are not free to endorse whatever set of values they 
wish.  Quite the contrary, the Court “labors under the obligation to 
 
122. See Post & Siegel, supra note 88, at 1497–500, 1503 (identifying weak and strong 
dilemmas that may arise when courts must choose between norms of professional practice and the 
logic of popular values). 
123. See, e.g., supra notes 58–61 and accompanying text (discussing the New Deal crisis and 
the Lochner Era). 
124. In some contexts, law’s incorporation of social values may prove highly effective at 
achieving rule-of-law values like consistency.  People who do not possess the expertise of legal 
professionals may be able to discern whether judges are accurately and consistently applying social 
values.  See Post & Siegel, supra note 88, at 1499–500. 
125. FRANKFURTER, The Judicial Process, supra note 6, at 35; see also Frankfurter, Twenty 
Years, supra note 4, at 931 (“The eternal struggle in the law between constancy and change is 
largely a struggle between the forces of history and the forces of reason, between past reason and 
present needs.”). 
126. FRANKFURTER, Tenth Anniversary, supra note 8, at 118; cf. SELZNICK, supra note 2, at 
135–36 (“Leadership goes beyond efficiency (1) when it sets the basic mission of the organization 
and (2) when it creates a social organism capable of fulfilling that mission.”). 
127. BICKEL, supra note 60, at 26; see also id. at 239 (“[T]he Court . . . is at once shaper and 
prophet of the opinion that will prevail and endure.”); KRONMAN, supra note 15, at 15 (“[O]ne 
important part of what [the lawyer-statesman] does is to offer advice about ends.  An essential 
aspect of his work, as he and others see it, is to help those on whose behalf he is deliberating come 
to a better understanding of their own ambitions, interests, and ideals and to guide their choice 
among alternative goals.”).  Kronman conceives of “the core of statesmanship” in the judicial arena 
no differently than he views it in other arenas.  See id. at 340–41 (“[The] aspect of the judge’s job 
that constitutes the core of statesmanship in all its different guises, including the judicial one[, is] 
his obligation to preserve the bonds of political fraternity, to strengthen the willingness of opposing 
groups to continue as members of a common enterprise even when there is no shared standard to 
resolve their disputes.”). 
128. See supra notes 62–66, 71 and accompanying text (discussing Brown). 
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succeed.”129  And as Brown underscores, success may be far from certain.  
Success requires regular attempts at education and persuasion,130 not declara-
tions of consensus by judicial fiat or routine resort to coercion.131  Moreover, 
as I develop in the next subpart, success may at times require moderation and 
a vantage point that encompasses the reasonable commitments of different 
parts of a divided nation. 
Success also requires a sensitive understanding of the traditions and 
character of the country: 
 Except insofar as we do, what we think we have is powerless and 
will soon disappear.  Except insofar as, in doing, we respect what we 
are—both our actuality and the genuine potential within us—our 
doing will be a disaster.  Neglect any one of these dimensions, and 
you will get the idea of our United States Constitution very wrong.132 
Because the Constitution functions in part as the repository of our 
“fundamental nature as a people”133—because it gives voice to the deepest 
values of the nation—“there is a sense, after all, in which our constitution is 
sacred and demands our respectful acknowledgement.”134  Judges ignore at 
their peril the limits imposed by a shared past.135 
 
129. BICKEL, supra note 60, at 239 (“The Court is a leader of opinion, not a mere register of it, 
but it must lead opinion, not merely impose its own; and—the short of it is—it labors under the 
obligation to succeed.”). 
130. See, e.g., id. at 26 (“Their insulation and the marvelous mystery of time give courts the 
capacity to appeal to men’s better natures, to call forth their aspirations, which may have been 
forgotten in the moment’s hue and cry. . . .  Hence it is that the courts, although they may somewhat 
dampen the people’s and the legislatures’ efforts to educate themselves, are also a great and highly 
effective educational institution.”); BICKEL, supra note 9, at 91 (“Virtually all important decisions 
of the Supreme Court are the beginnings of conversations between the Court and the people and 
their representatives.”); KRONMAN, supra note 15, at 101 (“[A] statesman must accept the fact that 
he is only one among many and persuade others to adopt his point of view.  He cannot force his 
convictions on them but must win their support by making arguments they will accept.”); cf. 
SELZNICK, supra note 2, at 150 (“It has been well said that the effective leader must know the 
meaning and master the techniques of the educator.”); Heineman, supra note 107, at 600 (“[M]uch 
of leadership today is not command and control of the troops but persuasion, motivation, and 
empowerment of teams around a shared vision.”). 
131. See, e.g., BICKEL, supra note 60, at 28 (“[T]he Court has ways of persuading before it 
attempts to coerce, and . . . over time, sustained opinion running counter to the Court’s 
constitutional law can achieve its nullification . . . .”). 
132. Pitkin, supra note 89, at 169; cf. SELZNICK, supra note 2, at 26 (“[T]he purposes we have 
or can have depend on what we are or what we can be.  In statesmanship no less than in the search 
for personal wisdom, the Socratic dictum—know thyself—provides the ultimate guide.”); id. at 27 
(“This is not to say that the leader is free to do as he wishes, to mold the organization according to 
his heart’s desire, restrained only by the quality of his imagination and the strength of his will.  Self-
knowledge means knowledge of limits as well as of potentialities.”). 
133. Pitkin, supra note 89, at 167. 
134. Id. at 169. 
135. In criticizing the excesses of the French Revolution, Edmund Burke powerfully articulated 
the balance between conservation and creation that the practice of statesmanship requires: 
I cannot conceive how any man can have brought himself to that pitch of presumption, 
to consider his country as nothing but carte blanche, upon which he may scribble 
whatever he pleases.  A man full of warm speculative benevolence may wish his 
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The foregoing points about the practice of judicial statesmanship echo 
Philip Selznick’s path-marking work on leadership in administration.136  Just 
as the “[t]he executive becomes a statesman as he makes the transition from 
administrative management to institutional leadership,”137 and just as the 
statesman at the helm of an organization seeks “[t]o infuse with value beyond 
the technical requirements of the task at hand,”138 so too the statesmanlike 
judge supplements her commitment to technical legal reason with an exqui-
site sensitivity to the values of the community she is in part responsible for 
governing. 
B. Judicial Statesmanship and Social Solidarity 
Judicial statesmanship charges judges with accomplishing another, 
related purpose of law.  “[M]aintain[ing] social cohesion as circumstances 
change”139 can be a formidable challenge, particularly when the society is 
culturally heterogeneous and encompasses divisions on matters of personal 
and collective identity.  Examples in contemporary America include gov-
ernment regulation of abortion, the use of race in educational settings, 
government funding of religion or symbolic endorsement of religion, capital 
punishment, gay rights, and physician-assisted suicide.  Each of those issues 
is the site of cultural conflict140 over incommensurable values.141 
Like the rest of us, judges possess life experiences and ideological 
commitments that ineluctably inform their legal interpretations.  Unlike 
 
society otherwise constituted than he finds it; but a good patriot, and a true politician, 
always considers how he shall make the most of the existing materials of his country.  
A disposition to preserve, and an ability to improve, taken together, would be my 
standard of a statesman. 
BURKE, supra note 108, at 328. 
136. See generally SELZNICK, supra note 2.  For a thoughtful interpretation, see generally Hugh 
Heclo, The Statesman: Revisiting Leadership in Administration, in LEGALITY AND COMMUNITY: 
ON THE INTELLECTUAL LEGACY OF PHILIP SELZNICK 295 (Robert A. Kagan et al. eds., 2002). 
137. SELZNICK, supra note 2, at 4 (emphasis omitted). 
138. Id. at 17 (emphasis omitted). 
139. Sweet, supra note 76, at 57. 
140. There is substantial disagreement regarding the actual degree of cultural conflict in 
America today; compare, for instance, JOHN KENNETH WHITE, THE VALUES DIVIDE: AMERICAN 
POLITICS AND CULTURE IN TRANSITION (2003), with MORRIS P. FIORINA WITH SAMUEL J. 
ABRAMS & JEREMY C. POPE, CULTURE WAR?  THE MYTH OF A POLARIZED AMERICA (2005).  
Fiorina finds significant polarization among political elites but not much polarization among most 
Americans.  See, e.g., id. at 28 (“[T]he thin stratum of elected officials, political professionals, and 
party and issue activists who talk to the media are indeed more distinct, more ideological, and more 
polarized than those of a generation ago.”); id. at 77 (“There is little indication that voters are 
polarized now or that they are becoming more polarized . . . .”); id. at 78 (“For as long as we have 
had data political scientists have known that political elites are more polarized than the mass of 
ordinary Americans.”).  Even if Fiorina is right that America as a whole is not as polarized as it may 
at times appear, serious polarization among those Americans who are most active in the public life 
of the nation raises concerns about maintaining social solidarity that animate part of the practice of 
judicial statesmanship. 
141. For a nice discussion of the problem of incommensurability, see KRONMAN, supra note 
15, at 104, 161, 341–42, 375–76. 
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many of us, however, judges who practice statesmanship attempt to step out-
side their own experiences and commitments by approaching cases with a 
genuine regard for the reasonable concerns of both sides.142  They entertain 
those concerns with a combination of what Kronman has called sympathy 
and detachment.143  Statesmanlike judges endeavor to speak for the whole 
rather than the part; they cultivate “[t]he capacity to transcend [their] own 
limitations, the imagination to see society as a whole.”144  Such judges 
deliberate in a way that allows them to experience conflict from the 
incompatible perspectives of each side without necessarily adopting either 
perspective as their own.145 
Practicing statesmanship does not require judges continuously to give 
each pole of controversy “half a loaf.”  Other purposes of law make their 
demands, including those advanced by fidelity to rule-of-law values and the 
integrity of professional legal reason.  The idea of judicial statesmanship en-
tails certain limits that the practice of statesmanship in other settings may 
not.  Moreover, the “nomos” that constitutional law embodies146 need not be 
 
142. See, e.g., Frankfurter, Twenty Years, supra note 4, at 917 (“Once recognize [sic] the true 
nature of the judicial process in these constitutional cases, and the determining factors in the 
qualifications of a Justice become his background, the range of his experience, and his ability to 
transcend his experience.” (emphasis added)). 
143. See KRONMAN, supra note 15, at 66–87, 114.  He writes: 
Political deliberation too requires an ability to combine the opposing attitudes of 
sympathy and detachment, the ability to place oneself imaginatively in the position of 
others and to entertain their concerns in the same affirmative spirit they do, while 
remaining uncommitted to the values and beliefs that give these concerns their force.  
Only the person who has surveyed, with sympathetic detachment, the conflicting 
interpretations that different members of his community offer of its goals is in a 
position to say whether his own preliminary views should be revised and to make an 
informed choice among the alternatives before him. 
Id. at 97–98. 
144. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 4, at 317; cf. SELZNICK, supra note 2, at 9 
(“[W]ithin every association there is the same basic constitutional problem, the same need for an 
accommodative balance between fragmentary group interests and the aims of the whole, as exists in 
any polity.”); id. at 141 (“There is a need to see the enterprise as a whole and to see how it is 
transformed as new ways of dealing with a changing environment evolve.”).  According to 
Kronman, the lawyer–statesman ideal in the nineteenth century viewed the statesman as “a devoted 
citizen,” one who “cares about the public good and is prepared to sacrifice his own well-being for 
it.”  KRONMAN, supra note 15, at 14; see also id. at 35 (describing the lawyer–statesman as “a 
public-spirited participant in those deliberative debates concerning the meaning of the common 
good”). 
145. Kronman understands statesmanship as a trait of character that some people possess to a 
greater extent than others and that is acquired only by developing sound judgment.  See KRONMAN, 
supra note 15, at 2–3, 15–16, 21, 24, 26, 35, 76, 161, 363.  Selznick, by contrast, conceives of 
statesmanship “as a specialized form of activity, a kind of work or function.”  SELZNICK, supra note 
2, at 22.  Those scholars thus identify differently how the virtue of statesmanship acquires its 
content—from the character of individuals or from the role they perform in a social system.  They 
agree, however, that statesmanship is a virtue of action.  The account of judicial statesmanship that I 
develop in this inquiry incorporates both understandings as relevant to judicial role. 
146. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 
97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4 (1983) (“We inhabit a nomos—a normative universe.”).  As Cover explains, 
“nomos” is so important because it expresses “identity.”  Id. at 28. 
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that of the political median in the country in order for constitutional law to 
legitimate itself over the long run, particularly when expressing social values 
constitutes another, potentially conflicting purpose of law that statesmanship 
seeks to accomplish.  Depending on the circumstances and the values at 
stake, the judicial statesman may need to take decisive action.  Likely in-
stances include the Court’s efforts to end the constitutional crisis of 1937 and 
its later efforts finally to begin dismantling an apartheid social order.147  
Brown v. Board of Education proved terribly divisive and disruptive of social 
cohesion over the short and medium run because the Court intervened deci-
sively on behalf of one side of an intense social conflict.148  Almost no one 
today, however, would suggest that the Court should have exhibited greater 
statesmanlike sensitivity to inclusiveness and social stability by continuing to 
proceed from within the paradigm of Plessy v. Ferguson.  Statesmanship 
most required the Court to attempt to shape social values in a decidedly dif-
ferent direction.149 
At other times, however, statesmanlike judges appreciate that 
maintaining some measure of community over the long run—engaged dissent 
 
147. See supra subpart II(A). 
148. Notably, however, the Court did not morally condemn states that practiced racial 
segregation in public education.  It focused instead on the harm that segregation imposed on black 
children.  Compare Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (“To separate [black 
schoolchildren] from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a 
feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a 
way unlikely ever to be undone.”), with, e.g., Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the 
Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 424 (1960) (“[I]f a whole race of people finds itself 
confined within a system which is set up and continued for the very purpose of keeping it in an 
inferior station, and if the question is then solemnly propounded whether such a race is being treated 
‘equally,’ I think we ought to exercise one of the sovereign prerogatives of philosophers—that of 
laughter.”).  In several ways, Brown exhibited a significant measure of moderation.  See RICHARD 
KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK 
AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 745, 536–750 (2d ed. 2004) (discussing the Brown Court’s 
decisions to list the Kansas case first so as not to portray racial segregation as exclusively a 
Southern practice; to reset the cases for oral argument twice so as to build unanimity among the 
Justices and allow time to pass between the holding of unconstitutionality and the imposition of a 
remedy; to limit the focus to public education; and to build flexibility into the decree by requiring 
desegregation “with all deliberate speed” (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 
(1955))).  The Court subsequently postponed deciding the constitutionality of antimiscegenation 
laws.  See infra note 183 (discussing the Court’s controversial handling of that issue).  Scholars 
today debate whether such moderation was statesmanlike in its concern about public legitimacy or 
was instead “unnecessary and probably counterproductive.”  Jack M. Balkin, Brown v. Board of 
Education—A Critical Introduction, in WHAT “BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION ” SHOULD HAVE 
SAID 3, 41 (2001). 
149. Some of the most difficult conceptual terrain for an account of judicial statesmanship to 
navigate is the work that the idea of “reasonableness” should do.  There are times when only history 
can decide whether a judge who rejected a deeply held but unreasonable societal commitment was 
proceeding in a statesmanlike manner because the commitment was unreasonable or was acting in 
an unstatesmanlike fashion because the commitment was deeply held.  Although the hindsight 
problem is real and potentially substantial in particular settings, it does not follow that the practice 
of judicial statesmanship is abjectly dependent on the future.  Part IV, for example, offers an 
evaluation in the present of the likelihood that two recent judicial opinions will prove statesmanlike 
over the long run. 
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if not near-universal assent150—requires what Learned Hand winningly called 
“the spirit of moderation.”151  That spirit entails, among other things, a sin-
cere effort by judges to reach out to both sides in a “culture war”152 and to 
fashion a form of constitutional law that, at least to some extent, 
symbolically and actually reflects the values of each side.153 
Understanding that the Constitution “is made for people of 
fundamentally differing views,”154 practitioners of judicial statesmanship do 
not regularly put all the legal and cultural weight of the Court behind one 
party to the fight, and they do not gratuitously dismiss or belittle the concerns 
of one side.155  Their challenge, Frankfurter wrote, “is to arrive at an 
accommodation of the contending claims,” a task that, “for any conscientious 
judge, is the agony of his duty.”156  Alexander Bickel agreed with his mentor, 
writing that “[t]he Court’s first obligation” is “to invent compromises and 
accommodations before declaring firm and unambiguous principles.”157 
Just as attempts to express evolving social ideals can implicate tensions 
with rule-of-law values, so too can attempts to fashion law that sustains 
 
150. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 63, at 1546 (“For a norm that can elicit the fealty of a divided 
nation forges community in dissensus, enabling the debates through which the meaning of a 
nation’s constitutional commitments evolves in history.”). 
151. HAND, supra note 1, at 164.  Elsewhere Judge Hand movingly proclaimed that “[t]he spirit 
of liberty is the spirit which is not too sure that it is right; the spirit of liberty is the spirit which 
seeks to understand the minds of other men and women; the spirit of liberty is the spirit which 
weighs their interests alongside its own without bias.”  LEARNED HAND, The Spirit of Liberty, in 
THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY, supra note 1, at 189, 190.  Burke also emphasized moderation in describing 
the practice of statesmanship.  See BURKE, supra note 108, at 187 (“These opposed and conflicting 
interests . . . render deliberation a matter not of choice, but of necessity; they make all change a 
subject of compromise; which naturally begets moderation . . . .”); id. at 341 (“We compensate, we 
reconcile, we balance.  We are enabled to unite into a consistent whole the various anomalies and 
contending principles that are found in the minds and affairs of men.”). 
152. Justice Scalia has explicitly invoked that martial imagery.  See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“It is clear . . . that the Court has taken sides in the 
culture war . . . .”); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 652 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I think it no 
business of the courts . . . to take sides in this culture war.”). 
153. See, e.g., Paul J. Mishkin, The Uses of Ambivalence: Reflections on the Supreme Court 
and the Constitutionality of Affirmative Action, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 907, 922 (1983) (admiring 
Justice Powell’s controlling opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 
265 (1978) because, among other things, it “both symbolically and actually recognized the 
legitimacy of deeply held moral claims on both sides”); Post, supra note 74, at 76 (observing that in 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) and Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003), the Court 
“intervene[d] into a fierce controversy within constitutional culture about the legitimacy of 
affirmative action in a way that recognize[d] and legitimate[d] concerns on both sides of the 
dispute”). 
154. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
155. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 
557, 570 (1995) (Souter, J.) (“[Respondent] understandably seeks to communicate its ideas as part 
of the existing parade, rather than staging one of its own.”); id. at 571 (“The Massachusetts public 
accommodations law under which respondents brought suit has a venerable history.”); id. at 581 
(“Our holding today [rejecting respondent’s position] rests not on any particular view about the 
Council’s message but on the Nation’s commitment to protect freedom of speech.”). 
156. FRANKFURTER, The Judicial Process, supra note 6, at 43. 
157. BICKEL, supra note 50, at 26. 
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community.  In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,158 for 
example, Justice Powell sought to achieve the value of reducing social 
tension over affirmative action in higher education (while allowing the prac-
tice to continue) in part by asserting that affirmative-action programs 
awarding every applicant “individualized consideration” did not employ fa-
cial racial distinctions,159 a suggestion that was plainly false.160  Twenty-five 
years later, Justice O’Connor approached the same dilemma differently.  
Like Powell, she seemed to want to allow universities to engage in affirma-
tive action.  Unlike Powell, however, she was prepared to concede that such 
programs were based in part upon race.  She instead sought to protect the 
programs by applying strict scrutiny in a manner that was sufficiently defer-
ential as to be inconsistent with the generally accepted meaning of the test.161 
It need not be the case, however, that the practice of judicial 
statesmanship requires courts to achieve desired social consequences only 
through reasoning that is inconsistent with the requirements of professional 
reason.  For example, Justices Powell and O’Connor appeared concerned 
about how differently designed affirmative-action programs would differen-
tially affect racial balkanization in America, even if the net operative results 
of the programs were the same.162  That concern may explain why Powell 
preferred the use of race as a “plus” factor to the use of racial quotas and why 
O’Connor favored the use of Powell’s opaque “plus” to an explicit award of 
twenty points on the basis of race.163  Nothing about an antibalkanization 
principle would contradict legal reason, however, and those Justices might 
have considered articulating such a principle candidly and distinguishing 
permissible means of race-conscious state action from impermissible means 
 
158. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
159. Id. at 318 n.52.  Justice Powell wrote: 
It has been suggested that an admissions program which considers race only as one 
factor is simply a subtle and more sophisticated—but no less effective—means of 
according racial preference than the [petitioner’s set-aside] program.  A facial intent to 
discriminate, however, is evident in petitioner’s preference program and not denied in 
this case.  No such facial infirmity exists in an admissions program where race or 
ethnic background is simply one element—to be weighed fairly against other 
elements—in the selection process. 
Id. at 318 (opinion of Powell, J.). 
160. For a discussion, see Post & Siegel, supra note 88, at 1491–92. 
161. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003) (deferring to the “educational 
judgment” of the University of Michigan Law School in holding that attaining a diverse student 
body is a compelling state interest under strict scrutiny).  For a discussion of Justice O’Connor’s use 
of strict scrutiny in Grutter, see Post, supra note 74, at 57–58, 57 & n.257. 
162. To balkanize is “to break up (as a region or group) into smaller and often hostile units.”  
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 87 (11th ed. 2006).  For an extended 
development of the argument in the text, see generally Post & Siegel, supra note 88, and Neil S. 
Siegel, Race-Conscious Student Assignment Plans: Balkanization, Integration, and Individualized 
Consideration, 56 DUKE L.J. 781 (2006). 
163. See generally Siegel, supra note 162, at 799, 794–800 (arguing that the balkanizing effects 
of using racial classifications in university admissions might increase “if such use were more 
apparent than necessary to accomplish the objective at hand”). 
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on that basis.164  As I show in subpart IV(A), Justice Kennedy did essentially 
that in his controlling opinion in the student-assignment cases recently de-
cided by the Court. 
To reiterate, however, judges who are attuned to considerations of 
statesmanship comprehend that they are responsible to more than rule-of-law 
values.  For example, exclusive fidelity to Wechsler’s notion of a “neutral 
principle[]”165 might render it difficult at critical times to fashion constitu-
tional law that can sustain the allegiance of a divided nation.  Wechsler was 
therefore incorrect to suggest that the only alternative to “entirely principled” 
decisions was for a court to act “as a naked power organ,”166 one that “would 
become the partisan of a particular set of ethical or economical opinions.”167  
On the contrary, defining professional norms in the relentlessly rigorous way 
that Wechsler espoused might force courts to choose sides in divisive con-
flicts to a greater extent than a concern to sustain social solidarity over the 
long run would counsel. 
Justice Scalia recently illustrated that point in an Establishment Clause 
standing case.  There he chided the plurality composed of Chief Justice 
Roberts, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Alito, insisting that “[i]f this Court is 
to decide cases by rule of law rather than show of hands, we must surrender 
to logic and choose sides.”168  Choosing sides, however, can be a heavy price 
to pay in the most divisive cases, which is why unyielding fidelity to legal 
logic is fortunately not the only proper basis for deciding them.  Judges must 
accomplish multiple purposes of law, and the rule of law itself demands that 
judges attend to the conditions of law’s own legitimation.  When trust in law 
is strained, as it can be in deeply divisive disputes over constitutional 
identity, the virtue of judicial statesmanship is especially valuable and 
produces leadership. 
C. Judicial Statesmanship, Legal Principle, and Judicial Restraint 
As the foregoing discussion emphasizes, it may be no easy task in 
particular cases for judges appropriately to balance fidelity to those 
preconditions and purposes of law that judicial statesmanship seeks to 
 
164. See Post & Siegel, supra note 88, at 1503–04 (developing the antibalkanization rationale).  
A key question is the extent to which candidly declaring such a principle in Bakke or Grutter and 
Gratz would have undermined the intended effect of the Court’s speech, which was to reduce social 
tension over affirmative action in higher education while allowing such admissions programs to 
continue.  For a discussion, see id. at 1504–07. 
165. Wechsler, supra note 56, at 17. 
166. Id. at 19. 
167. Id. (quoting Otis v. Parker, 187 U.S. 606, 609 (1903)). 
168. Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553, 2573 (2007) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in the judgment).  I do not mean to imply approval of the particular distinction drawn by 
the plurality in Hein—that is, the distinction between specific and general congressional 
appropriations for purposes of taxpayer standing under Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).  I intend 
my point to be general in the same way that Justice Scalia intended his point to be general. 
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accomplish with fidelity to other purposes of law.169  Likewise, it seems 
impossible to specify as a theoretical matter how judges ought to set that 
balance.  Beyond advising them not to sacrifice completely one set of 
concerns to the other as a matter of course, it seems appropriate to endorse 
the exercise of tact, judgment, prudence, discretion, and sensitivity to consid-
erations of timing.170  The relevance of such ideas and others like them 
indicates the presence of a problem that is incapable of theoretical resolution. 
On the one hand, it should be clear that there is more to judging than 
judicial statesmanship.  That is because there are other preconditions and 
purposes of law beyond those that statesmanship seeks to accomplish.  The 
values associated with the semiautonomous integrity of professional legal 
reason can make potentially competing demands in a given case.  As dis-
cussed in subpart III(B), Justices Powell and O’Connor may have viewed the 
problem of affirmative action in higher education as implicating just that sort 
of conflict.171  Judges should not take lightly the demands of legal principle.  
Anything taken to an extreme, including statesmanship, can corrupt.172 
 
169. See supra subpart II(A) (discussing other purposes of law). 
170. On the importance of timing, see FELIX FRANKFURTER, Franklin D. Roosevelt, in OF LAW 
AND MEN: PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FELIX FRANKFURTER, 1939–1956, supra note 6, at 362, 362 
(“Not least of the arts of statesmanship is that of correct timing, of knowing what to say and 
when.”).  Only the statesman, Plato wrote, “know[s] when to embark on and initiate courses of 
action which are particularly important to a state.”  PLATO, STATESMAN 76 (Julia Annas & Robin 
Waterfield eds., Robin Waterfield trans., Cambridge University Press 1995) (circa 350 B.C.); see 
also BICKEL, supra note 50, at 15–16 (“The eastern politicians never do anything without the 
opinion of the astrologers on the fortunate moment. . . .  Statesmen of a more judicious prescience 
look for the fortunate moment too; but they seek it, not in the conjunctions and oppositions of the 
planets, but in the conjunctions and oppositions of men and things.  These form their almanac.” 
(quoting EDMUND BURKE, A LETTER FROM MR. BURKE TO A MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL 
ASSEMBLY; IN ANSWER TO SOME OBJECTIONS TO HIS BOOK ON FRENCH AFFAIRS 58 (Paris, Pall-
Mall 1791))). 
171. Cf. Sandra Day O’Connor, A Tribute to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 101 HARV. L. REV. 
395, 396 (1987) (“Indeed, at times, I think he may have been willing to sacrifice a little consistency 
in legal theory in order to reach for justice in a particular case.”).  O’Connor could just have readily 
been describing her own approach to judging. 
172. Holmes thus “timidly suggest[ed]” to Frankfurter to exercise: 
caution in the use of the word statesmanship with regard to judges.  Of course, it is true 
that considerations of the same class come before their minds that have to be or ought 
to be the motives of legislators, but the word suggests a more political way of thinking 
than is desirable and also has become slightly banal.  I didn’t think the late Chief 
Justice [Edward D. White] shone most when he was political.  A statesman would 
consider whether it was wise to bring to the mind of Congress what it might do in this 
or that direction—but it seems to me wrong to modify or delay a decision upon such 
grounds.  When economic views affect judicial action I should prefer to give such 
action a different name from that which I should apply to the course of Wilson or 
Lodge. 
Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Felix Frankfurter (Sept. 9, 1923), in HOLMES & 
FRANKFURTER: THEIR CORRESPONDENCE, 1912–1934, at 159, 160 (Robert M. Mennel & Christine 
L. Compston eds., 1996).  Bickel described Holmes’s advice to Frankfurter “merely as a hedge 
against what might come after, as a prudent qualification.”  BICKEL, supra note 9, at 21. 
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On the other hand, the institution of law itself requires judicial attention 
to other purposes of law and to the political conditions for sustaining respect 
for legality: 
 No society, certainly not a large and heterogeneous one, can fail in 
time to explode if it is deprived of the arts of compromise, if it knows 
no ways of muddling through.  No good society can be unprincipled; 
and no viable society can be principle-ridden.  But it is not true in our 
society that we are generally governed wholly by principle in some 
matters and indulge a rule of expediency exclusively in others.  There 
is no such neat dividing line. . . .  Most often, . . . and as often as not in 
matters of the widest and deepest concern, such as the racial problem, 
both requirements exist most imperatively side by side: guiding 
principle and expedient compromise.  The role of principle, when it 
cannot be the immutable governing rule, is to affect the tendency of 
policies of expediency.  And it is a potent role.173 
Bickel was brushing up against important truths in insisting that “[o]ur 
democratic system of government exists in this Lincolnian tension between 
principle and expediency, and within it judicial review must play its role.”174  
Bickel’s whole understanding of law as an institution contrasts sharply with 
the partial understanding sometimes expressed by Justice Scalia175 or force-
fully stated by Gerald Gunther.  Gunther insisted that “the 100% insistence 
on principle, 20% of the time”176 will not do, for “if devotion to principled 
adjudication is to be taken seriously, tolerance must have its bounds, 
doctrinal integrity must be more than a sometime goal.”177  Judges must 
negotiate the various purposes of law that the legal system exists to vindicate.  
The judicial statesman also functions inside the law because the grounds of 
the legitimation of law are properly regarded as part of the law. 
In light of the context specificity on which the practice of judicial 
statesmanship necessarily turns, it seems inappropriate to endorse as a gen-
eral matter Frankfurter’s devotion to judicial restraint—that is, judicial 
deference to legislatures.178  It seems equally inappropriate to award pride of 
place to the techniques of conflict avoidance championed by the early 
Bickel179 or, more recently, by Cass Sunstein.180  So much turns on the 
 
173. BICKEL, supra note 60, at 64; cf. SELZNICK, supra note 2, at 1 (“In our time, there is no 
abatement of the need to continue the great discussion [about statesmanship], to learn how to 
reconcile idealism with expediency . . . .”). 
174. BICKEL, supra note 60, at 68. 
175. But see infra notes 195–97 and accompanying text (discussing Scalia’s apprehension of 
the need at times for judges to deviate from his own conception of legal principle). 
176. Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the “Passive Virtues”—A Comment on Principle and 
Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1964). 
177. Id. at 25. 
178. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
179. See generally BICKEL, supra note 60 (urging use of the “passive virtues,” such as standing 
doctrine, in order to protect legal principles from being distorted by the need to maintain public 
legitimacy). 
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particular situation, and the proper relation among the various alternatives “is 
itself a matter for the judgment of statesmen.”181 
Sometimes restraint will be appropriate, as when legislatures are 
expressing social ideals in ways that do not conflict with fundamental 
constitutional values.  Restraint may also be appropriate when the social 
problem at hand is difficult to address effectively and the consequences of 
judicial intervention are highly uncertain.182  At other times, conflict 
avoidance, at least for the time being, may be the path of statesmanship, as 
when the country is bitterly divided and legal intervention at that moment 
might increase balkanization and thwart vindication of the very values that 
would justify the intervention.183  But at still other times, judges can best ac-
complish the preconditions and purposes of law for which judicial 
statesmanship is responsible by intervening in the right sort of way: by ac-
knowledging conflict, not avoiding it.  The situation may require decisive 
action in the wake of such acknowledgment, or it may require efforts to 
ameliorate conflict—or at least to keep it to a manageable level—through 
crafting law that to some extent reflects the values of each side.184 
D. Some Objections 
I offer the foregoing as a sketch, a rough conceptual account of the thing 
Brandeis,185 Frankfurter,186 and others have called judicial statesmanship.  
 
180. See generally SUNSTEIN, supra note 78 (advocating use of judicial minimalism in order, 
among other things, to sustain solidarity and to make judicial errors less frequent and less 
damaging). 
181. BICKEL, supra note 9, at 34. 
182. See, for example, the analysis infra subpart IV(A) of Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Parents 
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1. 
183. An example, albeit a very controversial one, may be Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985 (1956), 
which dismissed a challenge to Virginia’s antimiscegenation statute despite its incompatibility with 
the equal-protection principles articulated in Brown.  See Siegel, supra note 36, at 2017 (“Principle 
lost the battle . . . but at least principle put itself in a position not to lose the war.”).  When the 
legitimacy of Brown was more secure, the Court unanimously invalidated the law as a violation of 
equal protection and due process.  Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
184. For further discussion, see infra subpart IV(B), contrasting the majority opinion in 
Gonzales v. Carhart with the plurality opinion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey.  My suggestion that judicial statesmanship does not necessarily counsel 
judicial restraint is illustrated by the analysis in Part IV, where I argue that Justice Kennedy’s 
controlling opinion in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 was 
more statesmanlike than his opinion for the Court in Gonzales v. Carhart.  Kennedy voted to 
invalidate the race-conscious student-assignment plans at issue in Parents Involved but wrote the 
majority opinion facially upholding the federal ban on a controversial method of abortion in 
Gonzales v. Carhart. 
185. See, e.g., Melvin I. Urofsky, The Brandeis-Frankfurter Conversations, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 
299, 314 (“But in these constitutional cases, since what is done is what you [i.e., Frankfurter] call 
statesmanship, nothing is ever settled—unless statesmanship is settled & at an end.” (quoting 
Brandeis)). 
186. See, e.g., FRANKFURTER, The Court and Statesmanship, supra note 12, at 34; Edward A. 
Purcell, Jr., Reconsidering the Frankfurterian Paradigm: Reflections on Histories of Lower Federal 
Courts, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 679, 702 (1999) (observing that for Frankfurter, the Court was “a 
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The danger in attempting such an account is that it becomes relatively 
“loose” relatively quickly, as it must in light of the nature of the phenomenon 
under investigation.  To repeat an earlier confession, it is difficult to make 
general statements about this subject. 
My account, however, does help to explain the vagueness one 
ineluctably encounters in thinking about judicial statesmanship.  Vagueness 
is to be expected when the purposes of law that statesmanship seeks to ac-
complish are multiple and relate paradoxically.  There is a trade-off between 
analytical tractability and overall accuracy in offering an account of judicial 
statesmanship, and I have elected to emphasize the latter in order to do jus-
tice to the ambiguities that seem to me inherent in a complex social practice. 
Another problem concerns the proper bounds of judicial statesmanship.  
May all judges properly practice it, or only federal judges, or only Supreme 
Court Justices?  May judges properly practice judicial statesmanship in all 
cases or only in constitutional cases?  Is statesmanship appropriate regardless 
of the subject matter of the controversy at hand or only in particularly divi-
sive cases—those implicating questions of personal and community identity? 
Those are complex questions, and I do not have sufficient answers to 
them.  I do, however, offer three observations.  First, it seems unlikely that 
crisp general bounds of the kind suggested above can persuasively be articu-
lated and defended in light of the general preconditions and purposes of law 
that statesmanship seeks to accomplish.  It is not as if they are implicated 
only when certain kinds of judges must decide specific categories of cases. 
Second, the question of the propriety of judicial statesmanship seems 
more a matter of degree rather than a matter of “yes” or “no.”  Various pur-
poses of law may need to be balanced in a given case.  It therefore seems 
unlikely that statesmanship is a one-size-fits-all sort of phenomenon, such 
that there exists a discrete universe of cases calling for statesmanship and 
another discrete universe calling for no statesmanship. 
Third, it nonetheless seems probable that in the federal courts, the 
practice of judicial statesmanship will be most necessary when the Supreme 
Court of the United States considers constitutional controversies involving 
conflicts over questions of personal and collective identity.  Those are the 
cases in which: (1) the discretion and power of judges are at a maximum; (2) 
the social consequences of judicial decisions can have the greatest (positive 
or negative) impact on the preconditions and purposes of law that statesman-
ship seeks to accomplish; and (3) rule-of-law values can most appropriately 
be compromised in pursuit of other public ideals. 
Situated at the top of the judicial hierarchy, Supreme Court Justices 
have more discretion and authority than other judges.  That is particularly 
 
forum for ‘statesmanship.’  In that new role, the Court had to recognize the nondeterminative nature 
of the Constitution’s vague provisions, the wisdom and propriety of deferring to legislative 
judgments, and the unavoidable need ‘to gather meaning not from reading the Constitution but from 
reading life’” (citations omitted) (quoting FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 4, at 310)). 
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true in constitutional cases, where the text at issue is often open-ended and 
the constraints imposed by stare decisis are conventionally understood to be 
less demanding.187  In identity-defining cases, moreover, people care most 
about the social values that the law authoritatively will endorse, and deci-
sions may require a choice among deeply held but incommensurable 
commitments.  That is why such cases threaten social solidarity to a greater 
extent than do other kinds of conflicts.188  That is also why the content of the 
social values authoritatively expressed by courts in such cases tends to matter 
more than the consistency of that content with the values expressed in prior 
decisions. 
Besides charges of excessive vagueness and boundary problems, 
another criticism sounds in legality.  Judicial statesmanship, an 
unsympathetic reader might suggest, is just a euphemism for political ap-
proval of the lawless conduct, however well intended, in which judges 
sometimes engage.  One version of the argument maintains that judges sit on 
courts of law, and thus they should simply do their jobs of interpreting and 
applying the law by following the rules laid down in the various conventional 
sources of law—that is, the text of the Constitution, historical understandings 
of the text, relevant statutes, past judicial decisions, etc.189 
Several responses seem pertinent.  First, statesmanship need not serve 
only as a safety valve deployed to justify avoidance of the “right answer” as 
a matter of professional reason in particular cases.  Statesmanship may also 
contribute substantially to the design of legal doctrines in the first place, 
particularly when the expression of evolving social values and the promotion 
of social solidarity are internal to one’s approach to constitutional 
interpretation.  Moreover, at least some of those doctrines could take a fairly 
rule-like cast.  For example, the rule of Bolling v. Sharpe190 may be most 
defensible on grounds of statesmanship, and that rule is fairly determinate in 
application. 
 
187. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2734 (2007) 
(“[T]he Court applies stare decisis more ‘rigidly’ in statutory than in constitutional cases.”). 
188. Kronman describes “the destructive force let loose in these identity-defining moments,” 
KRONMAN, supra note 15, at 96: 
In all but the simplest communities, disagreements are bound to arise concerning its 
aims and ambitions, and how such disagreements are resolved is often decisive for the 
community’s identity.  Disagreements of this sort put great strain on a community.  
Like powerful conflicts within a person’s soul, they exert centrifugal force that 
threatens to pull the community apart and destroy its unity. 
Id. at 95–96. 
189. Justices Scalia and Thomas often espouse similar views.  See supra note 90; infra note 
199. 
190. See 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (construing the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to 
require the federal government to comply with equal-protection principles even though the 
Constitution does not contain an Equal Protection Clause applicable to the federal government); id. 
at 500 (“In view of our decision that the Constitution prohibits the states from maintaining racially 
segregated public schools, it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser 
duty on the Federal Government.”). 
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Second, and again from an interpretive perspective that conceives of 
statesmanship as internal to the practice of constitutional interpretation, there 
is good reason to question the realism of regarding federal judges, 
particularly Supreme Court Justices, as severely constrained in constitutional 
cases.  One need not agree with Judge Posner that the Justices operate on “an 
ocean of discretion”191 to appreciate that the body of open water on which 
they swim (or sink) is large indeed.192  It is hardly novel to suggest that the 
pertinent constitutional text itself is often indeterminate and that the potential 
source materials for gleaning its meaning in particular settings can be both 
numerous and contested.193  That is why it makes a great deal of difference 
who in particular sits on the Supreme Court of the United States.194 
Third, it bears repeating that judicial statesmanship is best derived in 
part from the political foundations of the rule of law.  Because law is not 
self-validating, judges must account for the terms of the law’s own 
legitimation, however that law is understood to have been arrived at.  In the 
long run, judges cannot avoid statesmanship because they must achieve pub-
lic acceptance.  If unqualified by statesmanship, therefore, neither 
originalism nor a relentlessly principled progressive jurisprudence can 
achieve what courts must achieve in order to discharge their responsibilities 
and maintain the rule of law.195 
Accordingly, statesmanship has a role to play even if one’s theory of 
interpretation rejects the expression of contemporary values and the mainte-
nance of solidarity as purposes of law and as internal to the practice of 
interpretation.  Even if one believes that a theory of interpretation goes to the 
 
191. Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term—Foreword: A Political Court, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 32, 41 (2005).  Of course, the assertion that Justices are not severely constrained is 
hotly contested in much of the legal literature, particularly among originalists. 
192. Even for those who believe that the relevant legal materials are rarely underdeterminate, 
judicial statesmanship may still be relevant to those parts of the job of judging that undoubtedly 
entail the exercise of discretion—for example, the use of the certiorari power and the manner in 
which a judge crafts an opinion. 
193. In addition to the text, other potential sources of constitutional meaning include the 
original intent(s) of those who wrote or ratified the text, the original meaning(s) of the text (stated at 
various possible levels of abstraction), considerations of constitutional structure, Supreme Court 
precedent (which does not bind the Justices), American tradition and historical practice (stated at 
various possible levels of abstraction), fundamental social values, and possibly other considerations 
as well. 
194. For a discussion of the “umpire analogy” employed by Chief Justice Roberts during his 
confirmation hearings that charges the analogy with occluding the reality of the situation, see 
generally Siegel, supra note 102. 
195. Thus, for example, some originalists worry about precedent and Brown.  See, e.g., supra 
note 65 (discussing attempts to defend Brown on originalist grounds).  Some originalists also worry 
about far more than precedent and Brown.  See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 
57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 861 (1989) (“[S ]tare decisis alone is not enough to prevent originalism 
from being what many would consider too bitter a pill.”); Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk 
30 (Feb. 18, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (labeling Justice Scalia a moderate 
originalist in light of his confession in the above article that most originalists would temper 
originalism with some deference to social changes other than judicial precedent and his strong 
intimation that he would as well). 
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rule-of-law component of a decision—to the “right answer” in terms of 
“logic and reason”196—and that statesmanship is entirely extrinsic to that 
component, statesmanship may still be necessary to qualify the ability of a 
court straightforwardly to adopt the rule-of-law conclusion.  In other words, 
statesmanship can take some of the pressure off of—or simply offer another 
way of thinking about—the debate over theories of interpretation.  For 
example, Justice Scalia’s relatively moderate brand of originalism can be 
understood as reflecting his wise recognition that originalism must at times 
be qualified by statesmanship.197 
Whatever one’s theory of constitutional interpretation, statesmanship 
advises judges to subscribe to what Weber called “an ethic of responsibility, 
in which case one has to give an account of the foreseeable results of one’s 
action.”198  Judges ought to regard themselves as responsible for—as author 
of—the reasonably foreseeable social consequences of their official 
actions.199  That “demand” upon them—“to make some forecast of the 
 
196. See supra note 120 and accompanying text (quoting Justice Scalia). 
197. See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 195, at 861 (“I am confident that public flogging and hand-
branding would not be sustained by our courts, and any espousal of originalism as a practical theory 
of exegesis must somehow come to terms with that reality.”).  This passage clearly demonstrates 
Scalia’s understanding that judges cannot proceed with strictly originalist premises because law 
must express evolving social values. 
198. MAX WEBER, POLITICS AS A VOCATION 47 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills trans., Fortress 
Press 1965) (1919); cf. SELZNICK, supra note 2, at 142 (“[T]he need for institutional 
responsibility . . . accounts for much of what we mean by statesmanship.”).  Weber himself 
conceived of judges as bureaucrats, not as political actors.  See, e.g., WEBER, supra, at 12–13 
(contrasting “leading politicians” with “expert officialdom,” including “the trained jurist”).  But 
then Weber likely did not have in mind judges with the discretion and power of federal judges in 
modern America, especially U.S. Supreme Court Justices. 
199. See WEBER, supra note 198, at 20 (“The honor of the political leader, of the leading 
statesman, . . . lies precisely in an exclusive personal responsibility for what he does, a 
responsibility he cannot and must not reject or transfer.”).  Justice Thomas recently voiced a 
profoundly different understanding of judicial role: 
The dissent accuses me of “feel[ing] confident that, to end invidious discrimination, 
one must end all governmental use of race-conscious criteria” and chastises me for not 
deferring to democratically elected majorities.  Regardless of what Justice BREYER’s 
goals might be, this Court does not sit to “create a society that includes all Americans” 
or to solve the problems of “troubled inner city schooling.”  We are not social 
engineers.  The United States Constitution dictates that local governments cannot make 
decisions on the basis of race.  Consequently, regardless of the perceived negative 
effects of racial imbalance, I will not defer to legislative majorities where the 
Constitution forbids it. 
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2779 n.14 (2007) 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (citations omitted).  Justice Scalia has at times recorded similar views.  
See, e.g., Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913, 920 (2004) (mem. of Scalia, J.) (“To expect 
judges to take account of political consequences—and to assess the high or low degree of them—is 
to ask judges to do precisely what they should not do.”).  That understanding of judicial role is 
hardly limited to conservative Justices.  See, e.g., Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original 
Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226, 
226 (1988) (“In a 1968 television interview, Justice Black was asked about certain unpopular 
constitutional decisions of the Supreme Court.  ‘Well,’ he replied, ‘the Court didn’t do it . . . .  The 
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consequences of [their] action[s]”—Frankfurter described as “perhaps the 
heaviest.”200  Judges should not often be moved by the words “fiat justicia, 
ruat coelum.”201  There is undeniable judicial heroism associated with the 
sentiment expressed by those words.202  In truth, however, there could be no 
justice—or any other social good, including the rule of law—if the heavens 
were actually to fall. 
Statesmanship counsels judges to understand well their power to 
undermine the political trust that sustains the rule of law by intervening in 
divisive cultural conflicts without the reasonable concerns of all in mind.  
Statesmanship advises them to be genuinely humbled by their power203 and 
to wield it wisely, with judgment, and with a sense of “proportion.”204  
Judges should seek always to “measur[e] up to their own doings.”205  In so 
acting, they remain within the law by providing crucial support for the rule of 
law, particularly when it is threatened by profound disputes over the identity 
of the community. 
 
Constitution did it.’” (omission in original) (quoting Justice Black and The Bill of Rights (CBS 
television broadcast Dec. 3, 1968))). 
200. FRANKFURTER, The Judicial Process, supra note 6, at 39. 
201. “Let justice be done though the Heavens may fall.” 
202. See, e.g., Douglas O. Linder, Without Fear or Favor: Judge James Edwin Horton and the 
Trial of the “Scottsboro Boys,” 68 UMKC L. REV. 549, 578 (2000).  Recounting the actions of 
Judge James Horton during the racially charged “Scottsboro Boys” Alabama rape case from the 
early 1930s, Professor Linder writes: 
Despite the knowledge that setting aside the Patterson verdict would likely mean an 
end to his judicial career, the decision for Horton was not a difficult one.  A judge must 
do his duty.  “My mother early taught me a phrase she said was her father’s motto,” 
Horton later recalled.  “It has frequently come to mind in difficult situations.”  The 
phrase Horton learned on his mother’s knee was “Justitia fiat coelum ruat”—“Let 
justice be done though the Heavens may fall.” 
Id. 
203. Cf. BURKE, supra note 108, at 340 (“The true lawgiver ought to have an [sic] heart full of 
sensibility.  He ought to love and respect his kind, and to fear himself.”). 
204. Id. at 341; accord Letter from William Howard Taft to George Sutherland, supra note 118 
(“[T]he functions performed by us are of such a peculiar character that something in addition is 
much needed to round out a man for service upon that Bench, and that is a sense of proportion 
derived from a knowledge of how Government is carried on, and how higher politics are conducted 
in the State.” (emphasis added)). 
205. WEBER, supra note 198, at 54.  Delivering remarks at a memorial meeting of the bar of the 
Supreme Court of the United States, Judge Henry Friendly invoked a passage of Martin Buber, 
which “could have been Felix Frankfurter’s credo and fairly summarizes his life,” HENRY J. 
FRIENDLY, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in BENCHMARKS 318, 323 (1967): 
I call a great character one who by his actions and attitudes satisfies the claims of 
situations out of deep readiness to respond with his whole life, and in such a way that 
the sum of his actions and attitudes expresses at the same time the unity of his being in 
its willingness to accept responsibility. 
Id. at 323–24 (emphasis added) (quoting MARTIN BUBER, BETWEEN MAN AND MAN 114 (Beacon 
Press paperback ed. 1955) (1947)); cf. HENRY J. FRIENDLY, Judge Learned Hand, in 
BENCHMARKS, supra, at 308, 310 (“[Judge Hand was] the last of those great men who, in the first 
decades of this century, remolded our law.  Although he would have denied any such pre-eminence 
with a not inconsiderable show of indignation, in his innards he knew of it, and of the 
responsibilities attending it.” (emphasis added)). 
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Next, I consider the objection that views about judicial statesmanship 
are heavily influenced by views about the particular values that courts elect 
or decline to enforce.  For example, a critic might charge that I would not be 
inclined to view Bakke and Grutter206 as instances of judicial statesmanship if 
I were persuaded that the government treats its citizens unjustly whenever it 
distributes benefits and burdens on the basis of race.  There is undeniable 
truth in that suggestion, and my account of judicial statesmanship helps to 
explain why views on statesmanship are influenced (although not exclusively 
determined) by views on substantive values.  A judicial statesman has ends 
that she wants to accomplish; one is always a statesman (or not) from a point 
of view.  As would-be statesmen recede into the past, so that the future is 
known and the causes they championed become less controversial, an inter-
pretive community can generate greater consensus on the question whether 
they qualify as statesmen.  But when potential statesmen are betting on the 
future in the present regarding issues that do and will affect us, our own pre-
dictions and understandings of the values and identity of the community—
our own potential for statesmanship—must increasingly be implicated in our 
judgments of judicial statesmanship.  The question of judicial statesmanship 
focuses on how the would-be statesman acts to further the values, identity, 
and solidarity of the polity.  Among the things that statesmanship entails, 
therefore, is a substantive vision of the political community.  There are no 
mechanical, value-free indicia of statesmanship. 
Yet my account also demonstrates that talk of judicial statesmanship is 
not misleading or superfluous because it is coextensive with talk of one’s 
own values.  For example, I disagree strongly with the doctrinal analyses 
supporting the judgments in Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow207 
and Van Orden v. Perry,208 and like Justice Scalia I perceive no relevant 
difference between the question that the Court decided in Lawrence v. 
Texas209 and the question of the constitutionality of bans on gay marriage, 
which the Court purported to leave for another day.210  Yet I recognize the 
 
206. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
207. See 542 U.S. 1 (2004) (reversing a lower court judgment invalidating a school-district 
policy requiring teacher-led recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance but avoiding the merits of the 
constitutional claim by holding that the respondent–father lacked prudential standing). 
208. 545 U.S. 677 (2005).  In McCreary County, Kentucky v. ACLU of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844 
(2005) and Van Orden v. Perry, the Court held 5–4 that the McCreary County Ten Commandments 
display violated the Establishment Clause but that the Van Orden monument did not.  McCreary 
County, 545 U.S. at 881; Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 692.  Only Justice Breyer was in the majority in 
both cases, and his narrow concurrence in the judgment was decisive in Van Orden.  Breyer 
declared that he was acting to reduce the “divisiveness” that Ten Commandments cases generate.  
Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 698 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).  He sent a strong signal that 
advocates of church–state separation should not challenge longstanding displays and that their 
ideological adversaries should not build new ones.  See id. at 703–04. 
209. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
210. In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court overruled Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), 
announcing a right of sexual privacy in the home that extends to homosexuals.  Lawrence, 539 U.S. 
at 578.  Yet the Court seemed ambivalent about whether the right sounded in liberty or equality, see 
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fundamental importance in those cases of the practice of judicial statesman-
ship that seemed partially to animate each majority opinion.  Statesmanship 
requires judges not simply to enforce their own values but to assess all of the 
implicated values in light of their best sense of what will work in the 
situation—to consider what the situation demands in light of the various 
preconditions and purposes of law that help to sustain the long-term legiti-
mation of the legal system.  Statesmanship insists that judges respond to 
cases not just with their own values in mind but with an appreciation of so-
cial values from the standpoint of the nation as a whole and with an eye to 
maintaining social solidarity over the long run.211  Accordingly, while one’s 
substantive values necessarily affect one’s judgments about what statesman-
ship requires, statesmanship is no mere property of the substance of a view.  
Statesmanship is most critically a property of how persons with a particular 
view act. 
Finally, I consider a series of objections that concern the relationship 
between judicial role and the pursuit of legitimacy.  A critic might argue that 
judges should not concern themselves with legitimacy, either because doing 
so is counterproductive or because doing so is inappropriate.  Alternatively, a 
critic might insist that judges should concern themselves with legitimacy but 
not in the ways I have suggested.  I consider each objection in turn. 
There may be goals that are best achieved when one is not focusing on 
accomplishing them.  It seems improbable, however, that courts are most 
likely to sustain their legitimacy over the long run by never self-consciously 
considering the impacts of what they do on popular acceptance of their 
authority.  As discussed in subpart II(A), for example, the Lochner Court 
eventually faced a crisis of legitimacy that was avoidable and that likely 
would have been avoided had the Court focused explicitly on whether it was 
consistent with the maintenance of its own legitimacy to prohibit the political 
branches from taking decisive action during the Great Depression.  The 
Taney Court also would have been wise to contemplate the limits on its au-
thority to settle the slavery question.212  Those examples may be dramatic, 
but the point they exemplify seems generally applicable: courts that do not 
work at maintaining their own legitimacy, at least to some extent, are likely 
over the long run to possess less of it. 
 
id. at 575, avoided the language of fundamental rights and strict scrutiny, and suggested that the 
issue of gay marriage was distinguishable without explaining why or how, see id. at 578.  If the 
Court followed to its logical conclusion its defense of the dignity of intimate homosexual 
relationships and the state’s lack of authority to demean homosexuals, id. at 560, 567, 575, 578, 
prohibitions of gay marriage would almost certainly violate equal protection.  Yet the Court 
explicitly avoided that conclusion.  Id. at 578. 
211. Thus, results may matter to the judicial statesman but then so do judicial rhetoric, 
reasoning, and other considerations as well. 
212. See generally Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by 
constitutional amendments, U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV. 
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According to the next criticism, courts should simply “do their jobs,” as 
a result of which they will earn legitimacy; courts should leave the conscious 
pursuit of judicial legitimacy to other governmental and private institutions.  
Because I understand expressing social values and sustaining social solidarity 
to be fundamental purposes of law and thus part of what it means for courts 
to “do their jobs,” there is less distance between that objection and my ac-
count of judicial statesmanship than might at first appear.  But because I also 
conceive of legitimation as a precondition of effective law, the objection re-
tains some force.  For example, there may be times when statesmanship 
would counsel compromising the scope of the vindication of a constitutional 
claim.  It is also possible that judicial sensitivity to popular reactions could 
encourage citizens to undermine the authority of courts that issue disap-
pointing rulings. 
Such concerns counsel caution, but they are not the whole story.  Law 
cannot achieve any of its purposes, including the protection of individual 
rights, unless the preconditions for fulfilling its social functions are estab-
lished and sustained.  And as I have argued, legitimation is one such 
precondition.  Moreover, while the political branches and other institutions 
have essential roles to play in maintaining those preconditions—for example, 
by supporting the ideal of judicial independence—it seems unlikely that their 
activities could suffice by themselves.  Like the rest of us, courts are ulti-
mately judged not just by what others say about them but by what they do.  It 
follows that an attribute of judicial role must be to ensure legitimation. 
The last objection concedes that courts should consciously pursue 
legitimacy, at least to some extent.  It nonetheless argues that courts should 
do so in different ways—specifically, by emphasizing a sharp divide between 
law and politics, thereby validating popular beliefs or aspirations about the 
autonomy of law.213  I have considered that perspective at length 
elsewhere.214  Here I will observe only that such an approach is insufficient 
by itself to legitimate the legal system.  If citizens want judicial “umpires,”215 
 
213. Justice Scalia suggested such a view in his Casey dissent: 
  As long as this Court thought (and the people thought) that we Justices were doing 
essentially lawyers’ work up here—reading text and discerning our society’s traditional 
understanding of that text—the public pretty much left us alone.  Texts and traditions 
are facts to study, not convictions to demonstrate about.  But if in reality our process of 
constitutional adjudication consists primarily of making value judgments; if we can 
ignore a long and clear tradition clarifying an ambiguous text . . . ; if, as I say, our 
pronouncement of constitutional law rests primarily on value judgments, then a free 
and intelligent people’s attitude towards us can be expected to be (ought to be) quite 
different.  The people know that their value judgments are quite as good as those taught 
in any law school—maybe better.  If, indeed, the “liberties” protected by the 
Constitution are, as the Court says, undefined and unbounded, then the people should 
demonstrate, to protest that we do not implement their values instead of ours. 
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 1000–01 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
214. See Post & Siegel, supra note 88, at 1507–11; Siegel, supra note 102. 
215. See supra note 194 (noting John Roberts’s use of the “umpire analogy” during his 
confirmation hearings to become Chief Justice of the United States). 
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they also want judges who call the game “their way,” at least to some extent 
some of the time.  To return to a lesson of Lochner, no amount of talk about 
the autonomy of law and the constitutional necessity of shutting down 
President Roosevelt’s legislative program was able to save the Court during 
the crisis of the New Deal.216  Likewise, no amount of such talk could have 
muted Southern reaction to Brown.217 
IV. Judicial Statesmanship or Its Absence: The Kennedy Court(s) 
In this Part, I examine two momentous interventions by the Supreme 
Court during its October 2006 Term.  My aim is not to analyze comprehen-
sively the decisions or opinions in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. 
Seattle School District No. 1 and Gonzales v. Carhart.  My purpose, rather, is 
to illustrate the importance of judicial statesmanship in negotiating some of 
the most divisive controversies in contemporary constitutional law, 
controversies that require judges to act in ways that maintain the sources of 
law’s own legitimacy.  I focus on Justice Kennedy’s opinions because they 
proved decisive in Parents Involved and Gonzales v. Carhart and because the 
contrast between the two opinions is illuminating.218 
 
216. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (quoting Barry Friedman’s discussion of 
Lochner). 
217. In this Article, I do not canvas comprehensively the potential list of judges who have 
practiced judicial statesmanship.  There are, of course, examples beyond some of the work (or 
extrajudicial writings) of Holmes, Brandeis, Frankfurter, Warren, Powell, and O’Connor.  For 
example, one could make a case for Justices Marshall, Hughes, and Jackson.  In important opinions, 
each arguably succeeded in expressing social values with an appreciation of both the limits of the 
past and the needs of the present and future.  See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 
343 U.S. 579, 634–55 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (articulating a realistic framework for 
adjudicating the constitutionality of assertions of executive authority that promised both meaningful 
limits on executive power and substantial flexibility to exercise it as a post-World War II 
superpower); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (Hughes, C.J.) (holding 
that the regulation of intrastate activities with a “close and substantial relation to interstate 
commerce” was a constitutional exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause, 
signaling an end to the Court’s invalidation of much New Deal economic legislation); McCulloch v. 
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (Marshall, C.J.) (broadly construing the scope of 
Congress’s powers and prohibiting state taxation of the federal government, thereby facilitating the 
supremacy of the federal government over the states); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 
(1803) (Marshall, C.J.) (claiming the power of judicial review but declining to exercise it in a way 
that could have provoked a crisis of judicial legitimacy); see also, e.g., R. Kent Newmyer, John 
Marshall as an American Original: Some Thoughts on Personality and Judicial Statesmanship, 71 
U. COLO. L. REV. 1365, 1376 (2000) (“Marshall’s instinct was to balance principle and doctrine 
with down-home practicality—a sense of what the American people needed and what history would 
allow.”). 
218. To be sure, Kennedy was not writing for himself alone in Gonzales v. Carhart, as he was 
in Parents Involved, and his freedom of action was arguably less than it would have been had he 
been writing only for himself, particularly considering the need for internal statesmanship—that is, 
statesmanship vis-à-vis one’s colleagues on a collegial court.  See supra note 15 (noting the 
phenomenon of internal statesmanship).  In a case of such magnitude, however, Kennedy could 
have elected to write separately in Gonzales v. Carhart, just as he did in Parents Involved, if he was 
not prepared to endorse any of the views that his colleagues in the majority wanted to express in the 
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I proceed by inquiring whether each Kennedy opinion attends 
sufficiently to the preconditions and purposes of law that judicial 
statesmanship is charged with accomplishing.  Applying the rough criteria 
that I identified in Part III, I investigate the extent to which each opinion 
faithfully expresses contemporary social values, is likely to help sustain so-
cial solidarity over the long run, and is likely to succeed in shaping social 
values over the long run.  I conclude that Kennedy’s controlling opinion in 
Parents Involved seems in important ways to exhibit the practice of judicial 
statesmanship but that his majority opinion in Gonzales v. Carhart will in 
most respects likely prove a failure of statesmanship.219 
A. Parents Involved 
In Parents Involved, the Court considered the extent to which local 
communities could use race as a factor in student assignment in the absence 
of a federal court order requiring such use.220  Framed precisely, the question 
presented was the extent to which the Equal Protection Clause allowed the 
school districts in Seattle, Washington, and Jefferson County, Kentucky, to 
use racial criteria—whether explicit racial classifications or implicit race 
consciousness—in assigning students to elementary or secondary schools on 
a nonmerit basis.221  The school boards asserted that two interests justified 
their use of race in student assignment: securing the civic, social, and educa-
tional benefits alleged to be associated with racially integrated schools and 
reducing minority-student isolation in educationally inferior schools.222 
The cases generated a 4–1–4 split within the Court.  The three-way 
fracture brought immediately to mind Regents of the University of California 
v. Bakke,223 the decision in which the Supreme Court first articulated 
constitutional standards for affirmative action in higher education.224  Chief 
Justice Roberts, in a plurality opinion that was joined by Justices Scalia, 
Thomas, and Alito,225 appeared to prohibit broadly the use of race in student 
 
opinion of the Court.  It therefore seems fair to hold Kennedy (although not only Kennedy) 
responsible for the content of the majority opinion in Gonzales v. Carhart. 
219. Because some of the relevant questions are empirical and the associated answers are 
uncertain at this point, the assessments I offer in the following pages are unavoidably preliminary 
and somewhat speculative. 
220. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2746 (2007) 
(plurality opinion of Roberts, C.J.). 
221. Id. at 2748–49. 
222. Id. at 2755–59.  For an analysis of those interests, see Siegel, supra note 162, at 814–33. 
223. For a discussion of Powell’s opinion in Bakke, see Post & Siegel, supra note 88, at 1489–
97 and Siegel, supra note 162, at 790–94. 
224. Because Justice Kennedy joined parts of the Chief Justice’s opinion, Parents Involved, 127 
S. Ct. at 2745, the split in Parents Involved was not as “clean” as it was in Bakke.  But it seems 
more appropriate to characterize Parents Involved as 4–1–4, rather than 5–4, because Kennedy’s 
approach differed significantly from both that of the plurality and that of the dissent. 
225. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2746.  Justice Thomas also wrote a concurrence in 
which he strongly defended “a color-blind interpretation of the Constitution.”  Id. at 2768 (Thomas, 
J., concurring); see also supra note 199 (quoting the Thomas opinion). 
1004 Texas Law Review [Vol. 86:959 
 
assignment.  Roberts seemed to perceive no compelling interest supporting 
such use, concluding that Seattle and Jefferson County had engaged in un-
constitutional race balancing.226  Roberts articulated forcefully the 
anticlassification conception of equal protection,227 provocatively insisting 
that “[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discrimi-
nating on the basis of race.”228  He made that assertion even though the 
underlying empirics are not obvious and may be context sensitive and even 
though the Seattle and Jefferson County school boards had not in fact as-
serted that they were using race in student assignment in order to stop 
discrimination on the basis of race. 
Justice Breyer authored a long, passionate dissent that was joined by 
Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg.229  Breyer would have upheld assign-
ment plans that employ racial classifications or other forms of race 
consciousness in pursuit of racial integration, including the plans in question.  
He acknowledged “that there is a cost in applying ‘a state-mandated racial 
label,’”230 but he did not identify any constitutional limits on the use of race 
 
226. Roberts wrote: 
The parties and their amici dispute whether racial diversity in schools in fact has a 
marked impact on test scores and other objective yardsticks or achieves intangible 
socialization benefits.  The debate is not one we need to resolve, however, because it is 
clear that the racial classifications employed by the districts are not narrowly tailored 
to the goal of achieving the educational and social benefits asserted to flow from racial 
diversity.  In design and operation, the plans are directed only to racial balance, pure 
and simple, an objective this Court has repeatedly condemned as illegitimate. 
Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2755 (plurality opinion of Roberts, C.J.).  One might argue that 
Roberts’s opinion was more incrementalist than I have suggested—that he viewed the plans at issue 
as narrowly tailored to advance only unconstitutional race balancing and that he did not decide 
whether such a plan could advance a compelling interest.  Yet Roberts offered no support for the 
ideal of racial integration and expressed no concern about the harms of racial isolation.  He instead 
equated race-conscious student assignments with “discrimination on the basis of race.”  Id. at 2768.  
It therefore seems unlikely that he and his colleagues in the plurality would approve any race-
conscious assignment plan.  Justice Thomas agreed with that reading of the plurality opinion.  See 
id. (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Today, the Court holds that state entities may not experiment with 
race-based means to achieve ends they deem socially desirable.”); accord id. at 2791 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“The plurality opinion is at least open to the 
interpretation that the Constitution requires school districts to ignore the problem of de facto 
resegregation in schooling.”). 
227. See generally Balkin & Siegel, supra note 63 (analyzing the interaction between 
anticlassification and antisubordination perspectives). 
228. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2768 (plurality opinion of Roberts, C.J.). 
229. See id. at 2800 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  Justice Stevens also wrote a short dissent in which 
he announced his “firm conviction that no Member of the Court that [he] joined in 1975 would have 
agreed with today’s decision.”  Id. at 2800 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  It is not clear whether he was 
referring in part to the Justice Rehnquist of 1975, the Chief Justice Rehnquist of 2005, or both. 
230. Id. at 2836 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 2797 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment)).  Notably, Breyer focused almost entirely on responding to the 
plurality opinion even though Justice Kennedy’s separate opinion states the law (for reasons noted 
infra note 234).  Moreover, Breyer’s references to the Kennedy opinion often come at the end of 
paragraphs.  Accordingly, one might wonder whether the entire Roberts opinion was initially the 
majority opinion and Kennedy decided to write separately later in the opinion-drafting process. 
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in making assignments that he would be prepared to enforce.231  Rather than 
inquiring whether the Constitution speaks to the imposition of such poten-
tially race-based burdens as long daily bus commutes, various forms of 
family hardship, or placement in a school of significantly lower educational 
quality,232 Breyer insisted that the cost associated with using racial criteria in 
order to advance racial integration “does not approach, in degree or in kind, 
the terrible harms of slavery, the resulting caste system, and 80 years of legal 
racial segregation.”233 
That left Justice Kennedy by himself, much as his predecessor, Justice 
Powell, had been by himself in Bakke.  In a separate opinion that is now the 
law of the land,234 Kennedy strongly endorsed racially integrated schools 
while restricting significantly the ability of school boards to classify individ-
ual students on the basis of race.  Kennedy concluded that a “compelling 
interest exists in avoiding racial isolation, an interest that a school district, in 
its discretion and expertise, may choose to pursue.”235  He further concluded 
that “a district may consider it a compelling interest to achieve a diverse stu-
dent population.  Race may be one component of that diversity, but other 
demographic factors, plus special talents and needs, should also be 
considered.”236 
Turning from ends to means, Kennedy approved the candid 
consciousness of race in student assignment: 
 
231. For an articulation of meaningful constitutional limits grounded in the Court’s precedent 
that nonetheless would have advised the Court to uphold the assignment plans of Seattle and 
Jefferson County, see Siegel, supra note 162, at 834–51. 
232. For a discussion of some of the potential burdens associated with race-conscious student 
assignments, see id. at 845–58. 
233. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2836 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
234. Under Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977), the controlling opinion in the 
absence of a majority opinion is the narrowest opinion in support of the judgment.  See, e.g., Panetti 
v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 2842, 2856 (2007) (“When there is no majority opinion, the narrower 
holding controls.” (citing Marks, 430 U.S. at 193)).  While it is not always clear which opinion is 
the narrowest, in Parents Involved it is evident that Justice Kennedy’s opinion is the narrowest in 
support of the judgment of constitutional invalidity because he would allow more instances of race-
conscious government action than would the plurality. 
235. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2797 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
236. Id.  Kennedy made explicit his rejection of the plurality’s approach: 
The plurality opinion is too dismissive of the legitimate interest government has in 
ensuring all people have equal opportunity regardless of their race.  The plurality’s 
postulate that “[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop 
discriminating on the basis of race,” is not sufficient to decide these cases.  Fifty years 
of experience since [Brown] should teach us that the problem before us defies so easy a 
solution.  School districts can seek to reach Brown’s objective of equal educational 
opportunity.  The plurality opinion is at least open to the interpretation that the 
Constitution requires school districts to ignore the problem of de facto resegregation in 
schooling.  I cannot endorse that conclusion.  To the extent the plurality opinion 
suggests the Constitution mandates that state and local school authorities must accept 
the status quo of racial isolation in schools, it is, in my view, profoundly mistaken. 
Id. at 2791 (first emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
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 In the administration of public schools by the state and local 
authorities it is permissible to consider the racial makeup of schools 
and to adopt general policies to encourage a diverse student body, one 
aspect of which is its racial composition.  If school authorities are 
concerned that the student-body compositions of certain schools 
interfere with the objective of offering an equal educational 
opportunity to all of their students, they are free to devise race-
conscious measures to address the problem in a general way and 
without treating each student in different fashion solely on the basis of 
a systematic, individual typing by race.237 
He also offered some examples of methods of racial integration that 
remained available to school districts: 
 School boards may pursue the goal of bringing together students of 
diverse backgrounds and races through other means, including 
strategic site selection of new schools; drawing attendance zones with 
general recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods; allocating 
resources for special programs; recruiting students and faculty in a 
targeted fashion; and tracking enrollments, performance, and other 
statistics by race.238 
Kennedy acknowledged the historical reality that elected officials “for 
generations now have considered these types of policies and procedures,” 
and he insisted that they “should be permitted to employ them with candor 
and with confidence that a constitutional violation does not occur whenever a 
decisionmaker considers the impact a given approach might have on students 
of different races.”239  Indeed, he thought it “unlikely” that any of the race-
conscious methods he had identified “would demand strict scrutiny to be 
found permissible.”240 
 Kennedy, however, also proclaimed that “[a]ssigning to each student a 
personal designation according to a crude system of individual racial classifi-
cations is quite a different matter; and the legal analysis changes 
accordingly.”241  He appeared concerned about the social meaning he attrib-
uted to the government’s use of racial classifications to pursue even 
concededly compelling interests.  According to Kennedy, such use “tells 
 
237. Id. at 2792 (citations omitted). 
238. Id. (citations omitted). 
239. Id. 
240. Id.  For a “domain-centered” interpretation of Kennedy’s opinion in Parents Involved that 
differs from the interpretation offered here and links his embrace of race-conscious student 
assignments to his opinion announcing the judgment of the Court in League of United Latin 
American Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006), see generally Heather K. Gerken, 
Justice Kennedy and the Domains of Equal Protection, 121 HARV. L. REV. 104 (2007). 
241. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
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each student he or she is to be defined by race.”242  That message Kennedy 
found demeaning and divisive: 
When the government classifies an individual by race, it must first 
define what it means to be of a race.  Who exactly is white and who is 
nonwhite?  To be forced to live under a state-mandated racial label is 
inconsistent with the dignity of individuals in our society.  And it is a 
label that an individual is powerless to change.  Governmental 
classifications that command people to march in different directions 
based on racial typologies can cause a new divisiveness.  The practice 
can lead to corrosive discourse, where race serves not as an element of 
our diverse heritage but instead as a bargaining chip in the political 
process.243 
Kennedy suggested that when the government classifies citizens on the basis 
of race, it can demean the citizens so classified and balkanize the 
community.244  By contrast, “race-conscious measures that do not rely on 
differential treatment based on individual classifications present these prob-
lems to a lesser degree.”245 
Yet Kennedy did not prohibit categorically the use of racial 
classifications in student assignment.  He instead concluded that “individual 
racial classifications employed in this manner may be considered legitimate 
only if they are a last resort to achieve a compelling interest.”246  “If 
necessary,” he wrote, school districts may employ a “nuanced, individual 
evaluation of school needs and student characteristics that might include race 
as a component.”247  That approach “would be informed by Grutter, though 
of course the criteria relevant to student placement would differ based on the 
age of the students, the needs of the parents, and the role of the schools.”248 
In important ways, Kennedy’s effort in Parents Involved seems to 
exhibit the practice of judicial statesmanship.  He appeared not merely to 
tolerate but actually to entertain the strongly held moral claims of each party 
to the conflict over exactly whom equal protection protects and in what 
 
242. Id. 
243. Id. at 2796–97. 
244. See id. at 2796 (“Reduction of an individual to an assigned racial identity for differential 
treatment is among the most pernicious actions our government can undertake.  The allocation of 
governmental burdens and benefits, contentious under any circumstances, is even more divisive 
when allocations are made on the basis of individual racial classifications.”); id. at 2797 (“Crude 
measures of this sort threaten to reduce children to racial chits valued and traded according to one 
school’s supply and another’s demand.”). 
245. Id. at 2797. 
246. Id. at 2792. 
247. Id. at 2793. 
248. Id.  It is striking that Kennedy seemed to embrace Grutter, a decision in which he 
dissented.  See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 387 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  His 
opinion in Parents Involved may suggest that he would be loath to revisit Grutter. 
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ways.249  To a significant extent, he considered those competing claims from 
the perspectives of those asserting them.  He neither demeaned their submis-
sions nor fundamentally recast them so as to lend a false sense of 
commensurability to a controversy implicating acute and irreconcilable value 
conflict.250 
There are several examples in the opinion of Kennedy’s genuine 
struggle to consider incompatible commitments and arguments on their own 
terms.  He did not run from the tensions between a color-conscious social 
reality and a color-blind social ideal.251  He held in view both the legitimate 
claims of longstanding government practice and the conflicting demands of 
one part of an evolving culture.252  He was able to register both the nondeci-
sive nature of certain precedent and yet the relevance of that very 
precedent.253  He understood the problem of private discrimination even 
while reinforcing the Court’s prohibition of attempts to remedy so-called so-
cietal discrimination.254  He acknowledged the particular role of the 
distinction between de jure and de facto segregation in post-Brown school 
cases even as he insisted upon the relevance of that distinction to the cases at 
 
249. See generally KRONMAN, supra note 15, at 94 (analyzing the distinction between 
tolerating a point of view and entertaining a point of view). 
250. Cf. id. at 340 (“[T]he claims which compete for judicial endorsement cannot always be 
commensurated without recharacterizing them in a way that alters their essential meaning for the 
parties involved.”). 
251. See, e.g., Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2788 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment) (“That the school districts consider these plans to be necessary should 
remind us our highest aspirations are yet unfulfilled.”); id. at 2791 (“The enduring hope is that race 
should not matter; the reality is that too often it does.”); id. at 2792 (“[A]s an aspiration, Justice 
Harlan’s axiom [that the Constitution is colorblind] must command our assent.  In the real world, it 
is regrettable to say, it cannot be a universal constitutional principle.”); id. at 2797 (“And if this is a 
frustrating duality of the Equal Protection Clause it simply reflects the duality of our history and our 
attempts to promote freedom in a world that sometimes seems set against it.”). 
252. Compare id. at 2792 (“Executive and legislative branches, which for generations now have 
considered these types of policies and procedures, should be permitted to employ them with candor 
and with confidence that a constitutional violation does not occur whenever a decisionmaker 
considers the impact a given approach might have on students of different races.”), with id. 
(“Assigning to each student a personal designation according to a crude system of individual racial 
classifications is quite a different matter; and the legal analysis changes accordingly.”). 
253. See id. at 2793 (“[T]he compelling interests implicated in the cases before us are distinct 
from the interests the Court has recognized in remedying the effects of past intentional 
discrimination and in increasing diversity in higher education. . . .  At the same time, these 
compelling interests, in my view, do help inform the present inquiry.”). 
254. Compare id. at 2795 (“[A]n injury stemming from racial prejudice can hurt as much when 
the demeaning treatment based on race identity stems from bias masked deep within the social order 
as when it is imposed by law.  The distinction between government and private action, furthermore, 
can be amorphous both as a historical matter and as a matter of present-day finding of fact.”), with 
id. (“‘This Court never has held that societal discrimination alone is sufficient to justify a racial 
classification.’” (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986))), and id. (“To 
accept [a] claim that past societal discrimination alone can serve as the basis for rigid racial 
preferences would be to open the door to competing claims for ‘remedial relief’ for every 
disadvantaged group.  The dream of a Nation of equal citizens in a society where race is irrelevant 
to personal opportunity and achievement would be lost . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505–06 (1989))). 
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bar.255  Perhaps most significant of all, he apprehended both the potentially 
balkanizing and stigmatizing consequences of government inaction in the 
face of widespread residential segregation and the potentially balkanizing 
and stigmatizing consequences of race-conscious state action aimed at ame-
liorating the problem.256 
Kennedy, in short, seemed to appreciate what total defeat would mean 
for both sides.257  He understood the meaning for Americans who “conceive 
integration as the enduring moral legacy of Brown” and who “view living 
together across racial and ethnic lines as critical if America is ever going to 
be the kind of nation that it aspires to be.”258  Yet he also apprehended the 
stakes for Americans who “view colorblindness—or, at a minimum, a repu-
diation of racial classifications—as both the true legacy of Brown and the 
embodiment of the sort of community that the nation should aspire to be re-
gardless of who associates with whom.”259 
In accordance with his accurate perception of clashing ideals, Kennedy 
crafted a form of constitutional law that, like Powell’s controlling opinion in 
Bakke, “symbolically and actually recognized the legitimacy of deeply held 
moral claims on both sides.”260  Kennedy perceived a compelling interest in 
advancing racial integration and ameliorating racial isolation, and his analy-
sis of narrow tailoring permitted various forms of race consciousness in 
student assignment.  He appeared genuinely concerned not to render unat-
tainable in fact an interest he had just adjudged compelling in theory.  At the 
same time, he was highly sensitive to the costs that many people believe are 
 
255. Regarding the distinction between de jure and de facto segregation, Kennedy wrote: 
It must be conceded its primary function in school cases was to delimit the powers of 
the Judiciary in the fashioning of remedies.  The distinction ought not to be altogether 
disregarded, however, when we come to that most sensitive of all racial issues, an 
attempt by the government to treat whole classes of persons differently based on the 
government’s systematic classification of each individual by race. 
Id. at 2795–96 (citation omitted). 
256. See id. at 2797 (“Crude measures of this sort threaten to reduce children to racial chits . . . .  
That statement, to be sure, invites this response: A sense of stigma may already become the fate of 
those separated out by circumstances beyond their immediate control. . . .  Even so, measures other 
than differential treatment based on racial typing of individuals first must be exhausted.”). 
257. See generally KRONMAN, supra note 15, at 98 (“Advocates who can see things only from 
a partisan perspective, who are unable to detach themselves in imagination from their own concerns 
or to entertain the concerns of others, will have difficulty understanding the meaning of defeat from 
their adversaries’ point of view.”). 
258. Siegel, supra note 162, at 859; see also Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2788 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“The Nation’s schools strive to teach that our 
strength comes from people of different races, creeds, and cultures uniting in commitment to the 
freedom of all.”); id. at 2797 (“This Nation has a moral and ethical obligation to fulfill its historic 
commitment to creating an integrated society that ensures equal opportunity for all of its children.”). 
259. Siegel, supra note 162, at 859; see also Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2788 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“To make race matter now so that it might not 
matter later may entrench the very prejudices we seek to overcome.”). 
260. Mishkin, supra note 153, at 922; see also Post, supra note 74, at 76 (“[T]he Court . . . 
intervenes into a fierce controversy . . . in a way that recognizes and legitimates concerns on both 
sides of the dispute.”). 
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imposed on communities and individuals when the government classifies its 
citizens on the basis of race.  He was sensitive in that regard in far more than 
words or symbols: he demanded that a community striving to integrate try 
other forms of race consciousness before resorting to racial classifications. 
In those ways, Kennedy’s opinion may fairly be characterized as a 
statesmanlike effort to express social values inclusively and to sustain social 
solidarity in the face of irreconcilable yet reasonable value conflict261—as an 
earnest attempt to articulate “a norm that can elicit the fealty of a divided 
nation,” thereby “forg[ing] community in dissensus.”262  Those 
commentators, including myself,263 who disagree with his analysis and 
resolution of the cases—whether because they would have upheld the plans 
or because they would have gone further in banning any use of race—should 
not be quick to dismiss the ways in which Kennedy handled the controversy 
in a statesmanlike way.264  He gave authoritative voice to the incompatible 
social values that partially construct the identities of different subcommuni-
ties in contemporary American society.  And in acknowledging those 
competing commitments, he may prove effective in shaping social values 
over the long run in the ways that he seeks.  Accordingly, he may succeed in 
fashioning law that sustains its own legitimacy despite longstanding and at 
times bitterly divisive social conflict over race.265 
What is more, Kennedy did not compromise professional norms to the 
same extent that Powell did in Bakke and O’Connor did in Grutter and 
Gratz.266  As noted above, Kennedy actually articulated the antibalkanization 
 
261. Elsewhere I have explored both the compelling interests that support race consciousness in 
student assignment and some of the costs potentially associated with such race consciousness.  See 
generally Siegel, supra note 162.  Of course, commentators who disagree with my judgment that the 
legal and cultural disagreement implicated in Parents Involved falls within the realm of 
reasonableness are also likely to disagree with my assessment that Kennedy executed his 
responsibilities in a statesmanlike way. 
262. Siegel, supra note 63, at 1546. 
263. Before Parents Involved was handed down, I argued that the Court should uphold the two 
plans at issue based on a rationale that would allow modest use of racial classifications in student 
assignment.  See Siegel, supra note 162, at 834–58 (analyzing the two plans before the Court). 
264. Kennedy’s performance in Parents Involved is particularly noteworthy in light of how 
much he implicitly distanced himself from the reasoning and rhetoric in his past pronouncements on 
the subject of race and equal protection.  See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 387–95 
(2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 498–524 (2000) (Kennedy, J., 
delivering the opinion of the Court); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 903–28 (1995) (Kennedy, J., 
delivering the opinion of the Court); Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 631–38 (1990) 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 518–20 (1989) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
265. Concerns about legitimacy have been a persistent undercurrent in the Court’s post-Brown 
equal-protection jurisprudence in the area of race.  See Siegel, supra note 63, at 1475 (“The debates 
over Brown’s implementation show the complex ways in which concerns about legitimacy have 
moved courts to mask and to limit a constitutional regime that would intervene in the affairs of the 
powerful on behalf of the powerless.”). 
266. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); see supra notes 162–64 and accompanying text 
(discussing Powell’s rationale in Bakke and O’Connor’s rationales in Grutter and Gratz). 
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rationale for disfavoring certain forms of race consciousness while allowing 
others.  He thus announced the very rationale that lay submerged in Powell’s 
opinion in Bakke and O’Connor’s opinions in Grutter and Gratz.  Kennedy 
was apparently not as fearful as Powell and O’Connor may have been that 
explicitly stating the grounds of his opinion would undermine the intended 
effect of his judicial speech.267 
Yet it bears mention that throughout his opinion, Kennedy too was not 
completely transparent.  He did not explain why addressing the problem of 
de facto segregation “in a general way”268—“by indirection and general 
policies”269—is less troubling than doing so through “individual typing by 
race.”270  He did not specify why a racial classification that determines some 
student assignments “tells each student he or she is to be defined by race”271 
to a greater extent than, say, a race-conscious attendance zone.  He did not 
identify why it mattered so much that the “racial classifications at issue 
here”272 were “personal ”273 and “explicit”274—why it made a difference that 
the cases involved “official labels proclaiming the race of all persons in a 
broad class of citizens.”275  He did not clarify why “individual 
classifications” present “dangers that are not as pressing when the same ends 
are achieved by more indirect means”276—why “race-conscious measures 
that do not rely on differential treatment based on individual classifications 
present these problems to a lesser degree.”277 
Those are not trivial omissions.  It is not as if race-conscious attendance 
zones avoid classifying groups of citizens in part based on their race.  Nor is 
it the case that race-conscious attendance zones necessarily avoid imposing 
material harms on individuals based on their race: carving a district one way 
as opposed to another determines who goes to which schools.  The primary 
difference between the methods that Kennedy approved and those that he 
disapproved may lie in the likelihood that the individual who is treated by the 
government in part as a member of a racial group will actually register that 
he or she is being so treated.  In other words, the constitutional problem for 
Kennedy (and Powell and O’Connor) may lie not in “be[ing] forced to live 
 
267. See supra note 164 and accompanying text (flagging the issue of the potential impact of 
the Court’s speech on the realization of the Court’s goals). 
268. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2792 (2007) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (emphasis added). 
269. Id. at 2796 (emphasis added). 
270. Id. at 2792 (emphasis added). 
271. Id. (emphasis added). 
272. Id. at 2793. 
273. Id. at 2792 (emphasis added). 
274. Id. at 2793 (emphasis added). 
275. Id. at 2788 (emphasis added). 
276. Id. at 2796 (emphasis added). 
277. Id. at 2797 (emphasis added). 
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under a state-mandated racial label”278 but in the individual’s perception that 
he or she is living in that way.279 
Like the approaches employed by Powell and O’Connor, therefore, 
Kennedy’s rationale may depend for its success on the failure of citizens to 
recognize that certain instances of race-conscious government action are 
more similar in their net operative results than they may at first appear.280  
Powell and O’Connor are gone, but “appearances” apparently still “do 
matter” in constitutional law.281  It is striking that three major efforts at 
 
278. Id. 
279. See Mishkin, supra note 153, at 927–28 (“Even when the net operative results may be the 
same, the use of euphemisms may serve valuable purposes; . . . they may facilitate the acceptance of 
needed measures.”); id. at 928 (“A program formulated along the lines Justice Powell’s opinion 
approves would, by the very lack of ‘sharp edges,’ avoid such visibility in its operations and tend to 
enhance the acceptability of the program.”); Post, supra note 74, at 74 (“The potential for 
balkanization is muted within the Law School program . . . because the value assigned to race is 
camouflaged by an opaque process of implicit comparisons.”); id. at 75 (“Racial inequalities can be 
addressed, but only in ways that efface the social salience of racial differences.”).  Note, however, 
that the schoolchildren in Parents Involved self-identified their race.  See, e.g., Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari at 3, Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (No. 05-908) (“A student is deemed to be of the 
race specified in her registration materials (and if a parent declines to identify a child’s race, the 
District assigns a race to the child based on a visual inspection of the student or parent).”).  It is 
therefore not clear how the children were having an identity imposed on them. 
280. I have previously explored why a given degree of race consciousness might be regarded as 
more suspect when deployed at the micro level of individual racial classifications than at the macro 
level of attendance zones: 
The answer lies in the concern animating Justice Powell’s distinction between using 
racial quotas and using race as a “plus” factor, and the Rehnquist Court’s distinction 
between a publicly declared award of twenty points and a publicly undefined “plus” 
factor.  Judging from the Court’s previous interventions, the felt impact of race-
consciousness on those who are burdened by it is less acute when it is less publicly 
apparent.  In other words, the individualized consideration requirement that I endorse 
would apply the lesson of Bakke, Grutter, and Gratz to a different setting: racial 
criteria are less likely to be balkanizing when government does not needlessly impress 
on people that they (or their children) are being treated in part as members of racial 
groups.  In the assignment context, moreover, the use of race is more general and 
diffuse—that is, less seemingly “personal”—in drawing attendance zones than in 
disposing of individual requests for certain schools. 
Siegel, supra note 162, at 849–50 (footnote omitted). 
281. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993).  The writing may have been on the wall before 
the Court decided Parents Involved: 
In evaluating colorblindness discourse in this setting, it is important to bear in mind 
that a genuine commitment to colorblindness would prohibit any race consciousness 
even in drawing attendance zones, siting schools to increase integration, establishing 
magnet schools to prevent white flight, etc.  Districts could be hard-pressed to achieve 
even modest levels of integration.  The Justices presumably know this and care.  If the 
Court invalidates the Jefferson County and Seattle plans, therefore, it is more likely to 
prohibit explicit racial classifications that impose obvious individual burdens (e.g., a 
race-based denial of an assignment request) than it is to prohibit implicit race 
consciousness that imposes non-obvious individual burdens (e.g., race-conscious 
attendance zones)—even when the former use of race is more limited than the latter.  
Justices Powell and O’Connor are gone, but appearances may matter to several current 
Justices. 
Siegel, supra note 162, at 850 (footnote omitted). 
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judicial statesmanship in the area of race and equal protection put pressure on 
the rule-of-law value of transparency.282  Although the sample size is small, 
the pattern suggests a potential tension between statesmanship and 
transparency.  Indeed, that tension constitutes a specific instantiation of the 
more general potential tension between the practice of statesmanship and 
fidelity to rule-of-law values. 
As with any recent attempt at judicial statesmanship, it is too soon to tell 
whether Kennedy’s controlling opinion in Parents Involved will prove 
statesmanlike in the ways that I have suggested it may.  The ultimate test of 
statesmanship is whether it succeeds over the long run in sustaining the pub-
lic legitimacy of law by accomplishing the preconditions and purposes of the 
legal system that statesmanship is charged with pursuing.  A crucial question 
going forward is the extent to which Kennedy’s approach will allow school 
districts to achieve meaningful levels of racial integration at a politically and 
educationally feasible cost.  At the end of his opinion, Kennedy seemed con-
fident about the answer to that question: 
 The decision today should not prevent school districts from 
continuing the important work of bringing together students of 
different racial, ethnic, and economic backgrounds.  Due to a variety 
of factors—some influenced by government, some not—
neighborhoods in our communities do not reflect the diversity of our 
Nation as a whole.  Those entrusted with directing our public schools 
can bring to bear the creativity of experts, parents, administrators, and 
other concerned citizens to find a way to achieve the compelling 
interests they face without resorting to widespread governmental 
allocation of benefits and burdens on the basis of racial 
classifications.283 
Kennedy offered an empirical assertion about the probable efficacy of 
achieving a concededly compelling end with certain means and not others.  
The problem from the standpoint of statesmanship, however, is that Kennedy 
provided no empirical evidence in support of his causal claim, and he seemed 
unconcerned that he had none.  It is presently uncertain how much racial 
integration (and at what cost) local communities that value integration will be 
able to achieve without resort to even limited use of racial classifications.284  
 
282. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 36, at 2015–16 (discussing rule-of-law values); cf. Gratz v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 298 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“Equal protection cannot become an 
exercise in which the winners are the ones who hide the ball.”); id. at 305 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(“If honesty is the best policy, surely Michigan’s accurately described, fully disclosed College 
affirmative action program is preferable to achieving similar numbers through winks, nods, and 
disguises.”). 
283. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2797 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
284. See, e.g., Goodwin Liu, “History Will Be Heard”: An Appraisal of the Seattle/Louisville 
Decision, 2 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 1, on file with the Texas 
Law Review) (“[T]he efficacy of the race-conscious strategies left open by Justice Kennedy’s 
controlling opinion remains to be seen.”).  Justice Breyer insisted that the various methods approved 
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In that regard, Kennedy’s opinion is potentially different from Powell’s ap-
proach in Bakke and O’Connor’s approach in Grutter and Gratz, both of 
which clearly allowed a continuation of the processes of social adjustment 
that those Justices plainly believed were necessary.  The practice of judicial 
statesmanship might have counseled less confidence and more caution on 
Kennedy’s part before categorically prohibiting a proven method of 
integration “absent a showing of necessity not made here,”285 a requirement 
that Kennedy also described as “some extraordinary showing not present 
here.”286 
Regrettably, Kennedy did not indicate what kind of showing he had in 
mind.  The above concerns become acute to the extent that Kennedy’s uses 
of words like “necessity” and “extraordinary”287 are construed by lower 
courts to render it effectively impossible for school districts to make the re-
quired showing.  It can be very difficult for local communities to achieve 
significant levels of integration in light of limited resources, changing 
demographics, concerns about white flight, competing priorities, threats of 
litigation, and other challenges that school officials routinely confront.  Al-
though I do not believe that Justice Kennedy’s opinion can fairly be read as 
having set up communities around the country for failure, the ultimate extent 
of his success as a judicial statesman in Parents Involved will be determined 
in the crucible of political and legal struggle that is sure to continue in the 
wake of his potentially historic intervention. 
B. Gonzales v. Carhart 
In Stenberg v. Carhart,288 the Rehnquist Court invalidated a Nebraska 
statute prohibiting a method of abortion that opponents of the procedure 
called partial-birth abortion.289  The law prohibited the removal of a living 
 
by Kennedy had been tried and had not worked effectively.  Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2828 
(Breyer, J., dissenting).  It may be noteworthy, however, that use of individual racial classifications 
determined very few student assignments in the Jefferson County plan that was before the Court.  
McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 845, 861–62 (W.D. Ky. 2005), 
aff’d, 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005), rev’d sub nom. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. 2738; see also Liu, 
supra (manuscript at 25–26) (discussing the race-conscious student-assignment plan of Berkeley, 
California, which appears constitutional under Kennedy’s approach); James E. Ryan, The Supreme 
Court and Voluntary Integration, 121 HARV. L. REV. 131, 133 (2007) (“It is not entirely clear 
whether the tools left to them will be sufficient to the task, but Justice Kennedy, whose lone opinion 
is effectively controlling on this issue, does leave the door ajar for districts interested in racial 
integration.”); id. at 148 (“[D]istricts that would like to have racially integrated schools have tools 
available to make that happen.”). 
285. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2797 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
286. Id. at 2796. 
287. From the perspective of the guidance function of the rule of law, that omission is 
unfortunate.  Communities around the country cannot be confident about how they may proceed, 
and they will find out only as a result of much legislative effort and litigation. 
288. 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
289. Id. at 922. 
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fetus or a substantial part of a living fetus with the intent of ending the life of 
the fetus.290  The Court held the statute unconstitutional on two independent 
grounds: (1) it was drafted so broadly that it likely prohibited the most com-
mon method of second-trimester, previability abortion and (2) it lacked an 
exception for the health of the woman.291  Justice Breyer wrote the majority 
opinion, which Justices Stevens, O’Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg joined.292 
Justice O’Connor indicated in a concurring opinion that she would 
allow a ban on “partial-birth” abortion if a legislature cured the vagueness 
problem and included a health exception.293  Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas each wrote dissenting opinions.294  
Kennedy wrote with great passion and bitterness, appearing to suggest that 
the Court had betrayed the balance he had allowed it to establish in Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.295 
In response to Stenberg,296 Congress passed the Partial-Birth Abortion 
Ban Act of 2003.297  The statute provides that “[a]ny physician who, in or 
 
290. The Nebraska statute defined “partial birth abortion” as “‘an abortion procedure in which 
the person performing the abortion partially delivers vaginally a living unborn child before killing 
the unborn child and completing the delivery.’”  Id. (quoting NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-326(9) 
(LexisNexis Supp. 1999)).  It further defined the phrase “partially delivers vaginally a living unborn 
child before killing the unborn child” to mean “‘deliberately and intentionally delivering into the 
vagina a living unborn child, or a substantial portion thereof, for the purpose of performing a 
procedure that the person performing such procedure knows will kill the unborn child and does kill 
the unborn child.’”  Id. (quoting § 28-326(9)). 
291. The Court concluded that the Nebraska law was unconstitutional “for at least two 
independent reasons.  First, the law lacks any exception for the preservation of the . . . health of the 
mother.  Second, it imposes an undue burden on a woman’s ability to choose a D & E abortion, 
thereby unduly burdening the right to choose abortion itself.”  Id. at 930, 929–30 (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted).  “D & E” refers to “dilation and evacuation,” the most common 
method of second-trimester, previability abortion.  Id. at 924. 
292. See id. at 918. 
293. See id. at 951 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[A] ban on partial birth abortion that only 
proscribed the D & X method of abortion and that included an exception to preserve the life and 
health of the mother would be constitutional in my view.”).  “D & X” refers to “dilation and 
extraction,” id. at 927 (majority opinion), the procedure that is called partial-birth abortion by those 
who seek to ban it, id. at 931.  “D & X” is sometimes called “intact D & E.”  Id. at 927. 
294. Id. at 952 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); id. at 953 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 956 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. at 980 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
295. Kennedy wrote that “[w]hen the Court reaffirmed the essential holding of Roe” in Casey, 
“a central premise was that the States retain a critical and legitimate role in legislating on the subject 
of abortion, as limited by the woman’s right the Court restated and again guaranteed.”  Id. at 956–57 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).  Stenberg, he believed, “repudiates this understanding by invalidating a 
statute advancing critical state interests, even though the law denies no woman the right to choose 
an abortion and places no undue burden upon that right.”  Id. at 957; see also id. (“The majority 
views the procedures from the perspective of the abortionist, rather than from the perspective of a 
society shocked when confronted with a new method of ending human life.”); id. at 979 (“The State 
chose to forbid a procedure many decent and civilized people find so abhorrent as to be among the 
most serious of crimes against human life, while the State still protected the woman’s autonomous 
right of choice as reaffirmed in Casey.  The Court closes its eyes to these profound concerns.”). 
296. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1623 (2007) (“The Act responded to Stenberg in 
two ways.”).  As Justice Ginsburg noted: 
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affecting interstate or foreign commerce, knowingly performs a partial-birth 
abortion and thereby kills a human fetus shall be fined under this title or im-
prisoned not more than 2 years, or both.”298  The law defines the term 
“partial-birth abortion” as: 
an abortion in which the person performing the abortion— 
 (A) deliberately and intentionally vaginally delivers a living fetus 
until, in the case of a head-first presentation, the entire fetal head is 
outside the body of the mother, or, in the case of breech presentation, 
any part of the fetal trunk past the navel is outside the body of the 
mother, for the purpose of performing an overt act that the person 
knows will kill the partially delivered living fetus; and 
 (B) performs the overt act, other than completion of delivery, that 
kills the partially delivered living fetus . . . .299 
The statute contains an exception for situations in which performing the 
banned procedure “is necessary to save the life of a mother.”300  The law does 
not contain a health exception, as Congress found as a fact the existence of a 
medical consensus that the prohibited procedure is never medically 
necessary.301 
In Gonzales v. Carhart, the Roberts Court rejected two facial challenges 
to the law, splitting 5–4 along ideological lines.  Justice Kennedy wrote the 
majority opinion on behalf of himself, Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices 
Scalia, Thomas, and Alito.302  Assuming for purposes of his opinion that 
Casey remained the law of the land,303 Kennedy held on behalf of the Court 
 
The Act’s sponsors left no doubt that their intention was to nullify our ruling in 
Stenberg.  See, e.g., 149 CONG. REC. 5731 (2003) (statement of Sen. Santorum) (“Why 
are we here?  We are here because the Supreme Court defended the indefensible . . . .  
We have responded to the Supreme Court.”).  See also 148 CONG. REC. 14273 (2002) 
(statement of Rep. Linder) (rejecting proposition that Congress has “no right to 
legislate a ban on this horrible practice because the Supreme Court says [it] cannot”). 
Id. at 1643 n.4 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (typeface altered) (citation omitted). 
297. 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (Supp. IV 2004). 
298. Id. § 1531(a). 
299. Id. § 1531(b)(1). 
300. Id. § 1531(a). 
301. See § 1531 note (Findings subsec. 1) (“A moral, medical, and ethical consensus exists that 
the practice of performing a partial-birth abortion . . . is a gruesome and inhumane procedure that is 
never medically necessary and should be prohibited.”).  The Court in Gonzales v. Carhart 
determined that no such medical consensus exists.  Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1638. 
302. See id. at 1618.  Justice Thomas wrote a short concurring opinion in which he stated that 
he was joining the opinion of the Court “because it accurately applies current jurisprudence, 
including [Casey].”  Gonzalez v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1639 (Thomas, J., concurring).  He further 
reiterated his “view that the Court’s abortion jurisprudence, including Casey and [Roe], has no basis 
in the Constitution.”  Id.  Justice Scalia joined his opinion, but Chief Justice Roberts and Justice 
Alito did not.  See id. 
303. See id. at 1626 (majority opinion) (“We assume the following principles [articulated in 
Casey] for the purposes of this opinion.”); id. at 1632 (“Under the principles accepted as controlling 
here, the Act, as we have interpreted it, would be unconstitutional ‘if its purpose or effect is to place 
a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability.’” 
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that “a premise central to [the Casey joint opinion’s] conclusion—that the 
government has a legitimate and substantial interest in preserving and pro-
moting fetal life—would be repudiated were the Court now to affirm the 
judgments of the Courts of Appeals” invalidating the statute.304 
Kennedy first concluded for the majority that Congress had cured the 
coverage problem that partially had doomed the Nebraska law in Stenberg.305  
Applying Casey,306 he then held that the purpose of the statute was not to im-
pose a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before 
viability but rather to “express[] respect for the dignity of human life.”307  As 
for the effect of the statute on the health of women, he concluded that the 
Court should reject a facial challenge to the law in the face of “documented 
medical disagreement whether the Act’s prohibition would ever impose sig-
nificant health risks on women,”308 regardless of whether some “abortion 
doctors” might express a “preference” for the “mere convenience” of using 
the banned procedure.309  Finally, Kennedy indicated that an “as-applied” 
challenge was the appropriate way to adjudicate the constitutionality of ap-
plying the ban in a medical emergency.310  He held that the absence of a 
health exception was not fatal in the context of a facial challenge because 
 
(quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992) (plurality opinion))); id. 
at 1635 (“The prohibition in the Act would be unconstitutional, under precedents we here assume to 
be controlling, if it ‘subject[ed] [women] to significant health risks.’” (quoting Ayotte v. Planned 
Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 328 (2006))).  In effect, therefore, Chief Justice Roberts 
and Justice Alito have committed themselves only to the facial constitutionality of the federal law, 
not to Casey.  Technically, Roberts and Alito are committed only to the facial validity of the law 
when evaluated under Casey—that is, they could in theory conclude that the law is unconstitutional 
under a more appropriate test.  But that theoretical possibility strikes me as overwhelmingly 
unlikely in light of their previously expressed views on the legality of abortion, their more-general 
ideological commitments, and their votes in Gonzales v. Carhart. 
304. 127 S. Ct. at 1626. 
305. See id. at 1619 (“Compared to the state statute at issue in Stenberg, the Act is more 
specific concerning the instances to which it applies and in this respect more precise in its 
coverage.”).  The Court thus held that the statute was not void for vagueness and did not impose an 
undue burden as a result of overbreadth.  Id. at 1627–32. 
306. See supra note 303 (quoting the governing law as set forth in Casey). 
307. Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1633; see also id. (“Congress stated as follows: 
‘Implicitly approving such a brutal and inhumane procedure by choosing not to prohibit it will 
further coarsen society to the humanity of not only newborns, but all vulnerable and innocent 
human life, making it increasingly difficult to protect such life.’” (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1531 note 
(Supp. IV 2004) (Findings subsec. 14(N)))). 
308. Id. at 1636; see also id. (“The question becomes whether the Act can stand when this 
medical uncertainty persists.  The Court’s precedents instruct that the Act can survive this facial 
attack.”). 
309. See id. (“The law need not give abortion doctors unfettered choice in the course of their 
medical practice . . . .”); id. at 1620, 1625, 1631, 1632, 1635, 1638 (using the words “abortion 
doctor,” “preference,” or “mere convenience”). 
310. Kennedy thought an “as-applied challenge . . . is the proper manner to protect the health of 
the woman if it can be shown that in discrete and well-defined instances a particular condition has 
or is likely to occur in which the procedure prohibited by the Act must be used.”  Id. at 1638.  He 
reasoned that “[i]n an as-applied challenge the nature of the medical risk can be better quantified 
and balanced than in a facial attack.”  Id. at 1638–39. 
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“respondents have not demonstrated that the Act would be unconstitutional 
in a large fraction of relevant cases.”311 
In support of the Court’s conclusions, Kennedy introduced a novel 
rationale into due-process jurisprudence: 
 Respect for human life finds an ultimate expression in the bond of 
love the mother has for her child.  The Act recognizes this reality as 
well.  Whether to have an abortion requires a difficult and painful 
moral decision.  While we find no reliable data to measure the 
phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude some women 
come to regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created 
and sustained.  Severe depression and loss of esteem can follow.312 
Kennedy appeared to be suggesting that the federal ban was justified in part 
by a particular conception of the appropriate role of women in contemporary 
American society (that is, their role as loving mothers), as well as by a par-
ticular conception of the capacity of women to make autonomous decisions 
(that is, their vulnerability to the experience of regret). 
Kennedy also suggested that the federal law was justified as a way of 
informing the choice of a woman who is considering an abortion: 
 In a decision so fraught with emotional consequence some doctors 
may prefer not to disclose precise details of the means that will be 
used, confining themselves to the required statement of risks the 
procedure entails. . . . 
 It is, however, precisely this lack of information concerning the way 
in which the fetus will be killed that is of legitimate concern to the 
State. . . .  The State has an interest in ensuring so grave a choice is 
well informed.  It is self-evident that a mother who comes to regret her 
choice to abort must struggle with grief more anguished and sorrow 
more profound when she learns, only after the event, what she once 
did not know: that she allowed a doctor to pierce the skull and vacuum 
the fast-developing brain of her unborn child, a child assuming the 
human form.313 
Kennedy apparently believed that the federal ban informed choice, as 
opposed to prohibiting choice, because “[i]t is a reasonable inference that a 
necessary effect of the regulation and the knowledge it conveys will be to 
encourage some women to carry the infant to full term, thus reducing the ab-
solute number of late-term abortions.”314 
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, 
dissented with uncharacteristic and possibly unprecedented anger: 
 
311. Id. at 1639; see also id. (“We note that the statute here applies to all instances in which the 
doctor proposes to use the prohibited procedure, not merely those in which the woman suffers from 
medical complications.”). 
312. Id. at 1634 (citations omitted). 
313. Id. 
314. Id. 
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 Today’s decision is alarming.  It refuses to take Casey and Stenberg 
seriously.  It tolerates, indeed applauds, federal intervention to ban 
nationwide a procedure found necessary and proper in certain cases by 
the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG).  It 
blurs the line, firmly drawn in Casey, between previability and 
postviability abortions.  And, for the first time since Roe, the Court 
blesses a prohibition with no exception safeguarding a woman’s 
health.315 
Ginsburg insisted that the Court’s treatment of the medical evidence was “in 
undisguised conflict with Stenberg”316 and that the statute did not advance 
the government’s interest in protecting fetal life because “[t]he law saves not 
a single fetus from destruction, for it targets only a method of performing 
abortion.”317  She further insisted that it is “‘simply irrational’” to regard the 
banned procedure as warranting state intervention to a greater extent than the 
most common method of second-trimester, previability abortion and that the 
Court “dishonors our precedent” by allowing “moral concerns” to “overrid[e] 
fundamental rights.”318 
Ginsburg seemed most provoked by the Court’s invocation of “an 
antiabortion shibboleth for which it concededly has no reliable evidence: 
Women who have abortions come to regret their choices.”319  She took 
exception to the Court’s fear that doctors might withhold information about 
the nature of the banned procedure “[b]ecause of women’s fragile emotional 
state and because of the ‘bond of love the mother has for her child.’”320  She 
stated sharply that “[t]he solution the Court approves, then, is not to require 
doctors to inform women, accurately and adequately, of the different proce-
dures and their attendant risks”321 but to “depriv[e] women of the right to 
make an autonomous choice, even at the expense of their safety.”322  The 
Court’s “way of thinking,” she charged, “reflects ancient notions about 
women’s place in the family and under the Constitution—ideas that have 
long since been discredited.”323 
Ginsburg would have invalidated the statute on its face because “the 
absence of a health exception burdens all women for whom it is relevant—
women who, in the judgment of their doctors, require [the banned procedure] 
 
315. Id. at 1641 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
316. Id. at 1646. 
317. Id. at 1647. 
318. Id. (quoting Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 947 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring)). 
319. Id. at 1648. 
320. Id. (quoting id. at 1634 (majority opinion)). 
321. Id. at 1648–49. 
322. Id. at 1649. 
323. Id.  Ginsburg compared Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 422–23 (1908) and Bradwell v. 
State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring) with United States v. Virginia, 
518 U.S. 515, 533, 542, n.12 (1996) and Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 207 (1977).  Gonzales 
v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1649 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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because other procedures would place their health at risk.”324  She also as-
serted that the Court “offers no clue” regarding what an appropriate as-
applied challenge “might look like.”325  Concluding with extraordinary 
bluntness, she wrote that “the Court, differently composed than it was when 
we last considered a restrictive abortion regulation, is hardly faithful to our 
earlier invocations of ‘the rule of law’ and the ‘principles of stare 
decisis.’”326  In her view, “the Act, and the Court’s defense of it, cannot be 
understood as anything other than an effort to chip away at a right declared 
again and again by this Court—and with increasing comprehension of its 
centrality to women’s lives.”327 
It is apparent that the Court implicitly overruled precedent in deciding 
Gonzales v. Carhart.  As a matter of professional reason, there seems no way 
that the same Justice reasonably could vote to invalidate facially the 
Nebraska law in Stenberg on the ground that it lacked a health exception 
required under Casey while voting to uphold facially the federal law in 
Gonzales v. Carhart on the ground that it did not require a health exception 
under Casey.328  No Justice reasonably could vote that way because the medi-
cal evidence before the Court had not changed materially in the seven years 
between Stenberg and Gonzales v. Carhart.  The Stenberg Court noted the 
“division of medical opinion”329 on the need for a health exception but none-
theless held that such an exception was required as long as “substantial 
medical authority supports the proposition that banning a particular abortion 
procedure could endanger women’s health.”330  In Gonzales v. Carhart, by 
contrast, the Court held that “the Act can stand when this medical uncertainty 
persists.”331  There also appears to be serious tension between Casey’s facial 
invalidation of a spousal notification provision and the “large fraction” test as 
interpreted and applied by the Court in Gonzales v. Carhart.332  Tellingly, no 
Justice was in the majority in Stenberg and Gonzales v. Carhart, and all six 
 
324. Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1651 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
325. Id. 
326. Id. at 1652. 
327. Id. at 1653. 
328. The vagueness issue is another matter.  For all the reasons offered by Justice Kennedy in 
his majority opinion, the federal law seemed significantly less vague in its coverage than the 
Nebraska law.  See id. at 1626–33 (majority opinion).  Justice Ginsburg did not object to the federal 
law or the majority opinion on grounds of vagueness. 
329. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 937 (2000). 
330. Id. at 938. 
331. Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1636. 
332. Compare Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 894 (1992) (plurality 
opinion) (“The analysis does not end with the one percent of women upon whom the statute 
operates; it begins there. . . .  The proper focus of constitutional inquiry is the group for whom the 
law is a restriction, not the group for whom the law is irrelevant.”), with Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. 
Ct. at 1639 (“[R]espondents have not demonstrated that the Act would be unconstitutional in a large 
fraction of relevant cases.  We note that the statute here applies to all instances in which the doctor 
proposes to use the prohibited procedure, not merely those in which the woman suffers from 
medical complications.” (citation omitted)). 
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lower courts that considered the federal law invalidated it under existing 
Supreme Court precedent.333 
I proffer the foregoing interpretation of the doctrine as a matter of 
analysis, not necessarily as a matter of critique.  If it is plain that the Court 
implicitly overruled precedent in Gonzales v. Carhart, it is also unsurprising 
for several reasons.  “Whatever the Court has said,” Llewellyn instructed 
many years ago, “it has departed from its own precedents whenever it saw fit 
to do so.  It has refined and whittled precedents into unrecognizability, or 
shifted the line of their development from East to West.”334  Llewellyn may 
have indulged in overstatement, but the pressure for doctrinal change can be 
particularly great following a significant change in the composition of the 
Court335 and bipartisan political support for a federal law that is unconstitu-
tional under existing doctrine.336  Such doctrinal change no doubt puts 
pressure on rule-of-law values, and the Court in Gonzales v. Carhart com-
promised rule-of-law values to an unusual extent by only assuming for 
purposes of its decision that controlling law remained controlling.337  But for 
reasons articulated in Part II, doctrinal change is also necessary if constitu-
tional law is to legitimate itself by expressing social values as those values 
evolve in history. 
Indeed, there may be a sense in which the result in Gonzales v. Carhart 
suggests that principled proponents of a living Constitution—of the authority 
of the Constitution as an expression of the American ethos338—must be pre-
pared to take the bitter with the sweet.  If in fact most Americans view 
 
333. See Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp. 2d 805 (D. Neb. 2004), aff’d, 413 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 
2005), rev’d, Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610; Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v. Ashcroft, 330 F. Supp. 
2d 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), aff’d sub nom. Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 278 (2d Cir. 
2006); Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am. v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957 (N.D. Cal. 2004), aff’d, 
435 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2006), rev’d, Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610.  In Gonzales v. 
Carhart, the Supreme Court was reviewing the judgments of the Eighth and Ninth Circuits.  
Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1619–20. 
334. Llewellyn, supra note 104, at 40. 
335. In light of Justice Kennedy’s bitter dissent in Stenberg and the apparent ideological 
reliability of the Chief Justice and Justice Alito, it was not difficult to count to five in Gonzales v. 
Carhart, even if some liberals held out hope that Kennedy would object to the federal law on 
grounds of judicial supremacy or federalism akin to the concerns animating his opinion for the 
Court in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).  In City of Boerne, Kennedy rejected a 
congressional effort effectively to undo a previous Supreme Court interpretation of the Constitution.  
Id. at 511.  For a discussion of that aspect of City of Boerne, see Neil S. Siegel, Dole’s Future: A 
Strategic Analysis, 16 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. (forthcoming Apr. 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=963190. 
336. The final vote on the conference report of the bill in the House of Representatives was 
281–142, with 63 of 200 Democrats voting in favor of the bill.  Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 
2003 – Congresspedia, http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Partial-Birth_Abortion_Ban_ 
Act_of_2003#House_2 (last modified July 5, 2007).  The vote in the Senate was 64–34, with 17 of 
47 Democrats voting in favor.  Id. 
337. See supra note 303 and accompanying text (noting the Court’s assumption that Casey was 
controlling). 
338. See supra subpart II(C) (discussing the ethos conception of constitutional authority). 
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“partial-birth” abortion as morally more troubling than the more typical 
dilation-and-evacuation procedure and if their moral concerns are based on 
accurate information about the actual differences between the two 
procedures,339 then it is not clear that the appropriate judicial response should 
be to dismiss those concerns as irrational and to reify existing doctrine.340  
Particularly in an area of law as emotionally freighted as abortion, deeply 
contested conceptions of rationality may not be the only relevant 
consideration.  As explored in Part III, part of the function of judicial 
statesmanship is to register and express authoritatively prevailing social 
values, fully “rational” or not. 
In Gonzales v. Carhart, however, the Court did not merely stretch 
precedent to the breaking point in order to express certain social values.  
From the vantage point of judicial statesmanship, it is striking that the same 
Justice who wrote the controlling opinion in Parents Involved also wrote the 
majority opinion in Gonzales v. Carhart in the same Term.  Much of the 
rhetoric, the reasoning, and the result of Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion 
seems likely to inflame public sentiment over the issue of abortion—to di-
minish whatever spirit of moderation remains in America regarding that 
question.  The Court validated the concerns of antiabortion groups while de-
meaning and recharacterizing the concerns of advocates of abortion rights to 
the point that they likely no longer recognized those concerns as their own 
when the Court was finished with them.  The Court did so, moreover, not in 
order to avoid compromising the semiautonomous integrity of professional 
legal reason but at the expense of rule-of-law values.341 
The Court failed to entertain genuinely the arguments of advocates of 
abortion rights—to approach the cases even in part from their point of view.  
Revealing in that regard is the Court’s choice of language, which can fairly 
be described as insulting.  Kennedy did not refer to doctors who perform 
 
339. I do not know the extent to which those conditions hold.  There is some indication that 
members of even the concerned public are not fully informed.  See Alan Cooperman, Supreme 
Court Ruling Brings Split in Antiabortion Movement, WASH. POST, June 4, 2007, at A3 (reporting 
that certain antiabortion groups accused Focus on the Family founder James C. Dobson of 
misleading them about what the federal ban would accomplish). 
340. It is in part for this reason that those who fear legal change in a conservative direction 
should concentrate on articulating a constitutional vision with the persuasive power to influence 
elections and judicial appointments, not on stressing the importance of fidelity to precedent: 
I am very seldom a user of charts, but on this one I prepared a chart because it 
speaks—a little too heavy to lift, but it speaks louder than just—thank you, Senator 
Grassley.  Thirty-eight cases where Roe has been taken up, and I don’t want to coin 
any phrases on super precedents.  We will leave that to the Supreme Court.  But would 
you think that Roe might be a super-duper precedent in light— 
[Laughter.] 
Chairman SPECTER.—of 38 occasions to overrule it? 
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of the United 
States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 145 (2005) (statement of Sen. Arlen 
Specter, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary). 
341. See supra note 337 and accompanying text. 
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abortions in the way that the medical community refers to them or in the way 
that they refer to themselves—as obstetrician-gynecologists, surgeons, 
physicians, or simply doctors.  Instead, he repeatedly labeled them abortion 
doctors.342  In his Stenberg dissent, he used the term “abortionist.”343  There 
is no public-spirited justification for such discourse; it is toxic to the cause of 
maintaining community despite robust disagreement over the issue of 
abortion.  In Parents Involved, Kennedy warned about “a new divisiveness,” 
about “corrosive discourse.”344  In Gonzales v. Carhart, he seemed to enact 
both.  He neglected Frankfurter’s counsel “[t]hat the responsibility of those 
who exercise power in a democratic government is not to reflect inflamed 
public feeling but to help form its understanding.”345  That admonition ap-
plies to judges as well. 
Of course, one might suggest that form matters far less than substance, 
so that it may not matter much what kind of language the Court uses when 
the “bottom line” remains the same.  At least two responses seem 
appropriate.  First, it can be less difficult to sustain social solidarity in the 
face of acute value conflict when the losers in a particular fight believe that 
they have been treated with respect and that their concerns have been taken 
seriously.346  The social–psychological literature demonstrates that 
Americans care deeply about procedural justice;347 a process that is perceived 
as fair can help to heal wounds when the process yields disappointing 
outcomes.  The form of words, in other words, reflects the functioning of the 
 
342. See supra note 309 and accompanying text. 
343. See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 957 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“The 
majority views the procedures from the perspective of the abortionist, rather than from the 
perspective of a society shocked when confronted with a new method of ending human life.”). 
344. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2797 (2007) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
345. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 26 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
346. See, e.g., KRONMAN, supra note 15, at 95 (“The inevitable pain of losing will be tempered 
by a sense on the part of those who have lost that their claims have been treated with generosity, and 
by a willingness on the part of those who have won to make real and symbolic concessions to 
preserve this climate of good will, though strictly speaking such concessions are unnecessary.”). 
347. See generally TOM R. TYLER & E. ALLAN LIND, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF 
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988) (finding that people care more about the fairness of procedures than 
about the favorability or fairness of outcomes and that people do not value procedures as a way to 
obtain outcomes but because they communicate status and inclusion in groups); Tom R. Tyler & 
Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the Empowerment of Discretionary Legal Authority: The United 
States Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 43 DUKE L.J. 703 (1994) (finding, among other things, 
that procedural justice in decision making is the critical factor underlying views of authority); Tom 
R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, A Relational Model of Authority in Groups, 25 ADVANCES 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 115 (1992) (finding that people view group authorities as 
representatives of the group and that exercising authority through fair procedures communicates that 
the group respects those who are subject to authority and suggests that they have reason to identify 
with and become involved in the group). 
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process, and that process is itself part of the substance about which people 
may care intensely.348 
Second, form and substance may sometimes be related in more direct 
ways.  Had Kennedy approached Gonzales v. Carhart in the same states-
manlike way that he approached Parents Involved, the substance might have 
turned out somewhat differently.349  A central concern of those challenging 
the federal law was how a national ban on a particular abortion procedure 
would affect the physical health of women.  Many, if not most, Americans 
presumably share that concern.  Yet with the possible exception of allowing 
for the possibility of as-applied challenges to the law (discussed below), 
Kennedy never really seemed to register it, even though doing so may be 
necessary to sustain the social legitimacy of constitutional law on the divisive 
subject of abortion. 
If Kennedy had registered the concern about women’s health, he would 
have been less inclined to simplify the case by recharacterizing the claim to 
constitutional attention as sounding in the “preference” or “mere 
convenience” of the doctor performing the abortion procedure.350  He would 
have been less likely to describe the evidence at issue simply as “documented 
medical disagreement”351 when, as every lower court had found, the weight 
of credible evidence heavily favors the position of the American College of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists that the banned procedure is safest for 
women in certain circumstances.352  His statement that “[a] zero tolerance 
policy would strike down legitimate abortion regulations, like the present 
 
348. Cf. supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text (discussing the normative importance of 
communicative processes in democratic theory).  One might object that public sentiment on any 
aspect of the abortion issue will not be swayed to any extent by the words Kennedy used, whatever 
their tone or logic, because the public does not read judicial opinions.  But it is not necessary to 
assume that the public parses Supreme Court opinions.  It is necessary to assume only that how the 
Court speaks is relevant to the actual effects of its holding and that the meaning of Court opinions is 
conveyed to the public in complex, highly mediated ways. 
349. I do not suggest that the Court would then have affirmed the lower court judgments 
invalidating the law facially.  I do suggest that the Court’s rhetoric and rationales likely would have 
been less inflammatory and seemingly broad.  I also suggest that the Court would have considered 
more seriously the possibility of invalidating the law facially only in medical emergencies, thereby 
following the course unanimously endorsed the previous Term in Justice O’Connor’s final majority 
opinion.  See Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 323 (2006) (“If 
enforcing a statute that regulates access to abortion would be unconstitutional in medical 
emergencies, what is the appropriate judicial response?  We hold that invalidating the statute 
entirely is not always necessary or justified, for lower courts may be able to render narrower 
declaratory and injunctive relief.”). 
350. See supra note 309 and accompanying text. 
351. Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1636 (2007). 
352. See, e.g., Charles Fried, Supreme Confusion, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2007, at A25 (“The 
federal ban cured the vagueness, but sought to overcome the medical testimony by a legislative 
proclamation of a fact that is not a fact: that the procedure was never safer for the mother.”).  This is 
one of several ways in which Congress’s fact-finding was demonstrably false.  See supra note 301 
(noting that problem).  While there are substantial arguments for some deference to congressional 
fact-finding, even in the area of fundamental rights, the force of such arguments is significantly 
diminished when Congress repeatedly finds facts that are not facts. 
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one, if some part of the medical community were disinclined to follow the 
proscription”353 seems like an effort to avoid considering the force of the sub-
mission in question.  There is a difference between “zero tolerance” and 
Stenberg’s requirement of “substantial medical authority.”354  Moreover, if 
Kennedy had registered the concern about women’s health, he might have 
been loath to leave open the possibility of mounting an as-applied challenge 
without explaining how such a challenge could be brought by a woman con-
fronting a medical emergency.355 
It is also appropriate to inquire whether, had Kennedy approached 
Gonzales v. Carhart in the same statesmanlike way he approached Parents 
Involved, he would have elected to bring the politically explosive woman-
protective rationale for limiting access to abortion into the middle of due-
process jurisprudence.  As Kennedy himself conceded, there is no 
“reliable”356 scientific evidence of a “post-abortion syndrome” (PAS).  
Kennedy’s assertion that “it seems unexceptionable to conclude some women 
come to regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created and 
sustained”357 is so watered down in light of empirical uncertainty as to be 
trivially true.  He just as readily could have stated that “it seems unexcep-
tionable to conclude some women do not come to regret their choice to abort 
the infant life they once created and sustained.”  He also could have stated 
with equal likely accuracy that “it seems unexceptionable to conclude some 
women come to regret their choice to carry the fetus to term because they 
lacked the resources to raise the child properly.”  What “some women” 
believe is not a demanding test, nor did he explain why the views of “some 
women” should determine national law on such a divisive issue. 
No doubt there are people who believe in PAS in utter good faith, and 
Justice Kennedy may be such a person.  But there is also substantial evidence 
that PAS has been used manipulatively in politics and law in order to ad-
vance the cause of restricting access to abortion.358  As illustrated by the 
amicus brief359 Kennedy cited as the only evidence of such a syndrome,360 
the idea of PAS has been deployed by ardent opponents of abortion rights in 
 
353. Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1638. 
354. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 938 (2000). 
355. See, e.g., Fried, supra note 352 (“Does the court contemplate a surgeon pausing in the 
midst of an operation in which he determines the banned procedure might be less risky, and seeking 
a court order?”).  A doctor could contest the constitutionality of the law as a defense to a criminal 
prosecution for performing the procedure prohibited by the statute.  The prospect of criminal 
prosecution, however, presumably will dissuade most doctors from performing the procedure, even 
in a medical emergency. 
356. Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1634. 
357. Id. 
358. See generally Reva B. Siegel, The Right’s Reasons: Constitutional Conflict and the Spread 
of Woman-Protective Antiabortion Argument, 57 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming Mar. 2008). 
359. Brief of Sandra Cano et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Gonzales v. Carhart, 
127 S. Ct. 1610 (No. 05-380), 2006 WL 1436684. 
360. Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1634. 
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response to a series of legal and political defeats in which they had stressed 
the rights of the fetus over the concerns of pregnant women.361  After decades 
of national, state, and local laws prohibiting gender discrimination and a con-
stitutional sea change in equal-protection doctrine that began during the 
1970s and is legitimate today beyond reasonable question,362 it seems fair to 
suggest that the Court could have expressed its concerns about abortion in a 
less needlessly divisive way by focusing on its impact on the life within the 
woman, not on the proper role of the woman in American society or her abil-
ity to think for herself.  Yet Kennedy embraced the woman-protective 
rationale in the acknowledged absence of reliable scientific evidence.  Rather 
than respond to a charge of gender paternalism from the only woman on the 
Court,363 he provocatively labeled the Court’s embrace of the woman-
protective rationale “unexceptionable” and “self-evident.”364  And to 
underscore again, he adopted that rationale on behalf of the Court even 
though doing so was unnecessary to support the judgments.365 
It is important to underscore the basis of the foregoing criticism.  The 
central concern is not that Kennedy’s views on the subject of abortion are 
somehow wrong or that the practice of judicial statesmanship necessarily 
requires moderation and compromise regardless of the circumstances.  
Rather, the point is that statesmanship is the judicial virtue that is most re-
quired when trust in law is strained—when the legitimacy of law is 
threatened by intractable disagreement over the identity of the community—
so that judges must discharge their responsibilities in ways that sustain law’s 
legitimacy over the long run and with respect to the nation as a whole.  
Accordingly, the key question of judicial statesmanship in Gonzales v. 
Carhart is this: In light of the forms of abortion regulation that the opinion 
will unleash, the fact that pro-choice Americans are not disappearing, and the 
need to sustain the legitimacy of the legal system as a whole, should 
Kennedy have authoritatively embodied his views on abortion in the ways 
that he did? 
 
361. For a historical account of the development of that more-recent antiabortion theme, see 
Reva B. Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion: An Equality Analysis of Women-Protective Abortion 
Restrictions, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 991.  Siegel’s work is prescient in light of the Court’s 
endorsement of the women-protective rationale in Gonzales v. Carhart, although I suspect even she 
was surprised that the Roberts Court moved so far so fast. 
362. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 539–40 (1996) (holding 7–1 that equal-
protection principles prohibited the Virginia Military Institute from excluding women). 
363. Kennedy has a practice of not responding to dissenting opinions when he authors the 
majority opinion.  Engaging dissents can encourage those in the majority to take dissenting views 
more seriously.  Kennedy’s effort in Parents Involved may have been enhanced by the 
responsibility he felt to distinguish his position from both that of the plurality and that of the dissent. 
364. Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1634. 
365. For a forceful critique of that part of the majority opinion, see Martha C. Nussbaum, The 
Supreme Court, 2006 Term—Foreword: Constitutions and Capabilities: “Perception” Against 
Lofty Formalism, 121 HARV. L. REV. 4, 84–86 (2007). 
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I do not think so because I do not perceive how the modern 
constitutional law of abortion can retain its legitimacy over the long haul 
without a significant measure of moderation regardless of the particular 
views of particular Justices.  Strong opponents of abortion regarded Roe v. 
Wade366 as utterly lawless in much the same way that Justice Ginsburg and 
other strong proponents of abortion rights now regard Gonzales v. Carhart as 
utterly lawless.  Unlike Brown, moreover, experience suggests that views on 
either pole of the controversy are unlikely to change significantly over 
time—perhaps in part because, also unlike Brown, substantial moral concerns 
support arguments on each side.  If that is right (those who reject the premise 
will reject the conclusion367), then for judges to act in a statesmanlike way in 
abortion cases—for judges to attend to the sources of law’s own legitimacy 
in such cases—they must be guided by Judge Hand’s “spirit of 
moderation.”368 
I therefore conclude that Kennedy’s majority opinion in Gonzales v. 
Carhart will likely prove a failure of judicial statesmanship and that our 
country will suffer the consequences.  The Court may have performed the 
judicial equivalent of throwing gasoline on a fire by reducing a profound na-
tional debate over a controversial method of abortion to the “mere 
convenience” of “abortion doctors” who do not understand how 
“unexceptionable” and “self-evident” it is that abortion harms women.  As a 
result, one can expect inflamed rhetoric and greater polarization in the legis-
lative arena, in litigation, in political campaigns, in confirmation hearings, 
and elsewhere.  In an identity-defining conflict of great importance to many 
Americans, the Court registered and expressed the values of only part of the 
national community while dismissing the incommensurable commitments of 
another part of that community.  Indeed, the Court went further and em-
braced the values of arguably the most extreme members of one 
subcommunity.  The Court did not craft a form of constitutional law that 
symbolically and actually recognized the profound concerns of both sides.  It 
spoke for the part, not the whole. 
 
366. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
367. Those who liken abortion to slavery, genocide, or murder will obviously be unmoved by 
my criticism of Gonzales v. Carhart from the standpoint of judicial statesmanship.  From their 
perspective, it may be most important for the Court to express the “correct” social values, even at 
the expense of sacrificing a significant degree of social solidarity.  In short, they may view the 
abortion issue much like liberals have historically tended to view Brown.  A serious problem with 
embodying such a position on abortion in constitutional law, however, is that it has proven 
unconvincing to most Americans, just as it has proven unconvincing to liken abortion to 
contraception.  One premise animating the evaluation I offer in the text is that most Americans do 
not and likely never will adopt a strong antiabortion stance, at least regarding the general subject of 
abortion and considering abortions that occur in particular circumstances (for example, early in 
pregnancy, in cases of pregnant minors, in medical emergencies, or in cases of rape or incest).  If 
my reading of the future proves incorrect, then so will my assessment of the Court’s statesmanship 
in Gonzales v. Carhart. 
368. See supra note 1 (quoting Judge Hand). 
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The Court, it is true, left open the possibility of bringing as-applied 
challenges to the law.  There are times when leaving open final resolution by 
focusing on particular cases may be most statesmanlike.  Among other po-
tential virtues, such a move may leave everyone with the possibility of 
fighting another day.  If Kennedy shows in subsequent cases that as-applied 
challenges remain meaningful options in medical emergencies, then his ma-
jority opinion in Gonzales v. Carhart—despite its balkanizing rhetoric—may 
prove more statesmanlike than I have suggested.  That is one possibility, and 
I do not dismiss it.  The present bases for concern, however, are substantial.  
Kennedy neither suggested what an as-applied challenge in an emergency 
might look like, nor did he explain why the better course was not to follow 
Ayotte,369 nor did his stated reason for preferring as-applied challenges seem 
persuasive.370  In addition, the amount of time and expense associated with 
mounting a series of as-applied challenges may be prohibitive, so that uncon-
stitutional applications of the law may go unaddressed for years.  Kennedy 
did not explain why the as-applied approach was nonetheless warranted.  
Those concerns, when combined with his tone and rhetoric, cause me to 
conclude, at least at present, that his effort in Gonzales v. Carhart is unlikely 
to prove an exemplar of judicial statesmanship. 
The contrast between the Court’s response to the abortion issue in 
Gonzales v. Carhart and its approach in previous abortion decisions is 
striking.  In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the 
plurality respected and incorporated the incommensurable values of those on 
both sides of the abortion divide.371  Indeed, Casey’s undue-burden 
standard,372 which abandoned Roe v. Wade’s “rigid trimester framework”373 
 
369. Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320 (2006).  For a discussion of 
Ayotte, see supra note 349. 
370. As the dissent argued: 
The Court envisions that in an as-applied challenge, “the nature of the medical risk can 
be better quantified and balanced.”  But it should not escape notice that the record 
already includes hundreds and hundreds of pages of testimony identifying “discrete 
and well-defined instances” in which recourse to an intact D & E would better protect 
the health of women with particular conditions.  Record evidence also documents that 
medical exigencies, unpredictable in advance, may indicate to a well-trained doctor 
that intact D & E is the safest procedure. 
Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1652 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
371. Compare, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992) 
(plurality opinion) (declaring that a woman’s “suffering is too intimate and personal for the State to 
insist, without more, upon its own vision of the woman’s role, however dominant that vision has 
been in the course of our history and our culture”), with id. at 872 (insisting simultaneously that “the 
State may enact rules and regulations designed to encourage her to know that there are philosophic 
and social arguments of great weight that can be brought to bear in favor of continuing the 
pregnancy to full term”).  These statements are just two of several ways in which Casey sincerely 
affirmed the moral concerns of each side of the abortion controversy. 
372. See id. at 876 (“In our view, the undue burden standard is the appropriate means of 
reconciling the State’s interest with the woman’s constitutionally protected liberty.”). 
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and Roe’s insistence on strict scrutiny for regulations of abortion,374 reflected 
the plurality’s belief that Roe did not sufficiently validate the concerns of 
opponents of abortion rights.375  In Stenberg, moreover, Justice O’Connor 
went out of her way to suggest that she would uphold a properly drawn law 
banning so-called partial-birth abortion as long as the law included a health 
exception.376  And just last Term in Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of 
Northern New England, in Justice O’Connor’s final majority opinion, the 
Court registered the concerns of each side and insisted that both find expres-
sion in the law.377 
Because the Court failed to express social values on the subject of 
abortion inclusively, Gonzales v. Carhart likely will prove damaging to the 
cause of sustaining social solidarity.  In Stenberg, Kennedy accused “[t]he 
majority [of] view[ing] the procedures from the perspective of the 
abortionist, rather than from the perspective of a society shocked when 
confronted with a new method of ending human life.”378  In Gonzales v. 
Carhart, he appeared intent, at least for now, on reversing the perspective 
from which the Court viewed the abortion debate—intent on giving powerful 
voice to a very strong antiabortion worldview.  I suggest that long-term le-
gitimacy requires the Court to approach abortion cases from multiple 
perspectives and to practice greater moderation than it exhibited in Gonzales 
v. Carhart.379 
Relatedly, it seems unlikely that the majority opinion will succeed over 
the long run in shaping social values.  Justice Kennedy sometimes seems to 
 
373. Id. at 878; see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164–65 (1973) (announcing the trimester 
framework rejected by Casey).  As a result, the Court allowed fetal-protective regulations of 
abortion throughout pregnancy for the first time since Roe. 
374. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 155 (holding that regulations of abortion are subject to strict 
scrutiny). 
375. In retrospect, it appears that the Roe Court was taken by surprise.  The politics of the day 
lined up according to the issues of race and crime, not according to abortion, gender, and family 
values.  Thus, most of the Nixon appointees voted with the majority in Roe.  The Justices seemed to 
have little idea what would happen regarding the politics of abortion and so were blindsided by 
subsequent events.  Post & Siegel, supra note 49, at 411 n.193.  For a challenge to the conventional 
wisdom that Roe itself was responsible for subsequent events—for “Roe rage”—see id. at 410, 410–
18. 
376. See supra note 293 and accompanying text. 
377. Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 323 (2006).  The 
Government in Ayotte argued that it makes scant sense to invalidate an abortion regulation facially 
when the law can be applied constitutionally in almost all circumstances.  Id. at 328.  Advocates of 
abortion rights argued that it makes little sense to allow constitutional challenges to such a law only 
when it is too late—that is, in the middle of a medical emergency.  Id.  The Court’s holding in 
Ayotte reflected its conclusion that each argument had force.  See id. at 331 (weighing both 
arguments in an effort to reach a satisfactory result). 
378. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 957 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
379. It is worth underscoring that my argument cuts both ways.  Statesmanship advises Justices 
who support abortion rights not to dismiss as irrational genuine and distinct concerns about the 
morality of the procedure banned by the federal law.  Statesmanship would also advise such Justices 
to take pause before voting to invalidate a narrowly drawn statute that included an exception to 
protect the physical health of women. 
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hold the false belief that a court in a constitutional democracy can simply 
impose consensus.380  If his long-term ambition is to promote the sort of 
“dialogue”381 that can help Americans “to progress in knowledge and 
understanding and in the attainment of some degree of consensus”382—or, 
more realistically, less robust dissensus—on the subject of abortion, then 
Gonzales v. Carhart is again likely to prove a failure of statesmanship.  
Whatever Kennedy’s short-run goals, the Court’s approach will likely prove 
unpersuasive over the long haul to most people who are not already inclined 
to adopt a strong antiabortion stance.  Defenders of abortion rights are likely 
to feel demeaned and to mobilize in response, and most nonideological 
Americans in 2008 seem unlikely to accept the premises about the roles and 
agency of women that animate the Court’s opinion.383  Genuine dialogue and 
consensus require mutual respect and attempts to experience the world from 
other reasonable points of view.  Regrettably, Gonzales v. Carhart offered 
little of either. 
V. Conclusion 
I have endeavored to conceptualize the phenomenon of judicial 
statesmanship, and I have defended statesmanship as a core component of 
judicial role.  Whether one finds my account persuasive or instead views ju-
dicial statesmanship as a contradiction in terms, it is important to render the 
practice somewhat less mysterious, somewhat more analytically tractable.  
Otherwise, disagreements about the definition of judicial statesmanship are 
 
380. Compare, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Leader: The Arrogance of Justice Anthony 
Kennedy, NEW REPUBLIC, June 18, 2007, at 16, 17 (“By forcing legislators to respect a series of 
moralistic abstractions about liberty, equality, and dignity, judges, [Kennedy] believes, can create a 
national consensus about American values that will usher in what he calls ‘the golden age of 
peace.’”), and id. (reporting that Kennedy described “the most important qualities for achievement 
in his field” as “‘an understanding that you have an opportunity to shape the destiny of the 
country’” (quoting Justice Kennedy)), with Post & Siegel, supra note 49, at 432 (“Carhart[] . . . will 
inspire antiabortion advocates to push for ever more far-reaching restrictions on abortion, and it will 
provoke abortion rights advocates to renewed mobilization . . . .  In a constitutional democracy, 
such disputes cannot be resolved by fiat, judicial or otherwise.”). 
 In some ways, Casey too seemed to reflect a belief in the possibility of imposing consensus by 
judicial fiat: 
Where, in the performance of its judicial duties, the Court decides a case in such a way 
as to resolve the sort of intensely divisive controversy reflected in Roe and those rare, 
comparable cases, its decision has a dimension that the resolution of the normal case 
does not carry.  It is the dimension present whenever the Court’s interpretation of the 
Constitution calls the contending sides of a national controversy to end their national 
division by accepting a common mandate rooted in the Constitution. 
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 866–67 (1992) (plurality opinion). 
381. Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1634 (2007). 
382. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 957 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
383. See, e.g., Post & Siegel, supra note 49, at 432 (predicting that Gonzales v. Carhart will 
provoke political mobilization, “especially now that the debate over women’s agency and women’s 
roles has been expressly joined”). 
2008] The Virtue of Judicial Statesmanship 1031 
 
sure to be conflated with disagreements about its propriety or existence in 
particular cases. 
While there is more to judging than statesmanship, I have argued that 
we should not want judges who have no use for “the posture of 
statesmanship.”384  Judicial statesmanship helps law to legitimate itself over 
the long run by accomplishing fundamental preconditions and purposes of 
the legal system, from expressing social values to maintaining social 
solidarity, all in the face of ceaseless social change, an uncertain future, and 
divisive conflicts over the identity of the community.  While the practice of 
judicial statesmanship may put pressure on rule-of-law values in a given 
case, ultimately the rule of law is not possible without the social support it 
receives from statesmanship. 
It can be no simple or untroubling task for judges to practice 
statesmanship.  The potentially competing demands of statesmanship and 
fidelity to rule-of-law values can be difficult to negotiate, particularly when 
consistency and transparency are at stake.  Further, social values can be con-
flicting at a given time and over time,385 the pace of societal change can be 
difficult to discern, and the problems of the future may be too uncertain to 
imagine concretely.386  Moreover, the manifold social consequences of judi-
cial decisions may be hard to trace out, so that it may be impossible to know 
for sure at the time an opinion is written whether it is (or will become) 
statesmanlike.  In addition, the country may be loath to go where the judges 
wish to take them.  What is more, judges necessarily bring their own com-
mitments and experiences to their tasks, which they must strive to transcend 
by attempting to experience the world from other reasonable points of view. 
But those and other potentially daunting realities do not make the need 
for judicial statesmanship go away.  Judges, like the rest of us, must do the 
best they can, with earnestness and humility in light of the magnitude of the 
challenges they face.  The alternatives to practicing judicial statesmanship, 
 
384. SELZNICK, supra note 2, at 134.  One could agree with the thrust of my argument and still 
maintain that we should want some number of judges on collegial courts who have no use for 
judicial statesmanship.  On the one hand, no interpretive method can succeed over the long run if it 
is unqualified by judicial statesmanship, and statesmanship will remain most secure if all judges on 
a collegial court seek to practice it.  Moreover, statesmanlike opinions will tend to carry more 
authority when they are joined by a greater number of judges.  On the other hand, unstatesmanlike 
judges may discipline their courts not to go too far in compromising the semiautonomous integrity 
of professional legal norms, including fidelity to rule-of-law values.  In addition, some 
statesmanlike judges may become overly confident about their ability to trace out the social 
consequences of judicial decisions, so that it may be beneficial to have other types of jurists on hand 
to push back.  There also may be virtue in having jurisprudential dialogue within courts.  To the 
extent that trade-offs abound (I merely flag this fascinating issue without developing it), a potential 
implication for judicial appointments might be that congressional and public evaluation of a 
nominee should turn in part on the present composition of the court that he or she would be joining 
if confirmed. 
385. See, e.g., Post, supra note 74, at 54 (noting that constitutional culture is neither 
“diachronically singular” nor “synchronically singular”). 
386. See, e.g., supra note 375 (noting the Roe Court’s apparent failure to imagine the future). 
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quite possibly involving a lethal combination of self-delusion, 
irresponsibility, ineffectiveness, and illegitimacy, are hardly less problematic. 
Because of the potential difficulties involved and the elusive nature of 
the phenomenon, it will always be a question of judgment whether the 
Supreme Court of the United States or another court exercised its 
responsibilities in a statesmanlike way in a particular case.  It has always 
been that way, and so it always will be for reasons I have identified.  The 
logical structure of statesmanship is suffused with constitutive tensions, and 
one’s own values and predictions are necessarily implicated in evaluating the 
statesmanship of others.  But because law is an institution that must account 
for the conditions of its own legitimation and because expressing social val-
ues and sustaining social solidarity are basic purposes of law, the practice of 
judicial statesmanship must define a virtue in the role of a judge. 
For judges to take responsibility for law’s legitimacy and diversity of 
purposes is for judges to walk the path of statesmanship.  To underscore 
again, it can no doubt be a perilous path: partially unpaved, insufficiently 
illuminated, and containing opportunities for corruption along the way.  But 
as the contrast between Justice Kennedy’s opinions in Parents Involved and 
Gonzales v. Carhart suggests, it is also a noble and necessary path.  It has 
been traveled at critical times by some of our most important judges, and it 
has been embraced by some of our most thoughtful commentators.  Our 
country cannot afford to do without judicial statesmanship if we are to con-
tinue getting where we want to go, and if we are to remain one traveler when 
we arrive. 
